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Abstract 
Establishing producer organisations to sustain smallholder inclusion in agri-
food value chains: Action research in Myeik and Palaw districts of Myanmar 
by 
Randel W. Esnard 
 
In 2016, Myanmar was recognised as one of Asia’s fastest growing economies. Although agriculture is 
the backbone of Myanmar’s economy, accounting for approximately 30% of GDP and employing 56% 
of the country’s workforce, smallholders find it difficult to capitalise on opportunities to improve their 
incomes and livelihoods. In the remote Tanintharyi region, local produce seldom enters high-value 
markets emerging in regional towns and tourist destinations owing to concerns about poor food safety, 
quality, and consistency of supply.  
In 2017, the New Zealand government approved the Tanintharyi Region Rural Income and Livelihoods 
Development (TRRILD) project to upgrade agri-food value chains in the of Myeik and Palaw districts. 
Value chain researchers identified the paddy and pork chains as suitable candidates for pro-poor 
upgrading, and recommended that producer groups and producer organisations be established to 
manage and sustain the Project’s transactional and capital intensive value-adding interventions. The 
primary purpose of this study was to deliver functional producer groups and producer organisations 
for the TRRILD project. To meet this objective, the study employed a qualitative action research 
strategy informed by economic theory and best practice. This thesis describes the actions undertaken 
to design, initiate, and develop these groups, and reflects on their outputs and outcomes to answer 
questions about the process of establishing creditworthy smallholder organisations.  
Thirty producer groups were established, with a total membership of 1008 smallholders. At the 
research’s conclusion, twenty of these groups were operating at a transactional level, providing 
members with meaningful services such as access to training, bulk ordering of quality inputs, and 
collective marketing of members’ products. Three of these groups were selected to pilot the transition 
to producer organisation status. 
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The findings highlight important roles for external facilitators to guide, train, and mentor newly 
established groups to operate at transactional and value-adding levels. They also highlight the 
importance of a flexible constitution that embeds good governance practices and provides for 
investor-friendly institutional arrangements that producer groups can customise to support their 
business strategies. A key conclusion is that producer groups need to alleviate free-rider problems by 
rewarding members as both patrons and investors, even if their business strategy is simply to procure 
and transact farm inputs. Producer organisations that invest in value-adding assets or that engage in 
supply contracts with premium buyers need to address both free-rider and horizon problems by 
aligning the benefits of investment in tradable shares with the benefits of patronage.  
The study revealed that smallholders have an instinctive appreciation of investor-friendly institutional 
arrangements. Practitioners should actively facilitate these arrangements in the formative stages of 
establishing a producer group. To address concerns about elitism, donor capital should be used to 
award grants that give all members an equal initial shareholding in their producer organisation. 
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Foreword 
This action research was initiated in July 2018. At that time, Myanmar’s ongoing transition to 
democracy, peace-building and economic liberalisation was paving the way for its sustained economic 
growth and reductions in poverty. On the 1st of February, 2021, one month before this research was 
due to conclude, Myanmar’s military leaders staged a coup and seized control of the country’s 
government. Ongoing civil unrest will undoubtedly harm Myanmar’s agribusiness firms, large and 
small, including the producer groups and organisations established by this action research. While this 
unfortunate event emphasises the need for peace and good governance, its outcomes do not negate 
the fundamental findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in this thesis. 
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1.1 Background and research rationale 
Until 2011, Myanmar was one of the most isolated economies in Southeast Asia (ADB, 2018a). 
Emerging from decades of fragmentation and political conflict, Myanmar has been striving towards 
economic growth and poverty reduction (ADB, 2018b; World Bank, 2014). Over the past seven years, 
the country has been actively engaged in political and economic liberalisation that is transforming its 
economy and society. To date, Myanmar has become one of Asia’s fastest growing economies, with 
gross domestic product (GDP) growing in excess of 6% in 2017 (ADB, 2017, p. 242). Despite recent 
economic and political progress, Myanmar remains one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia 
(World Bank, 2014): it ranks a lowly 145 out of 188 countries on the 2016 Human Development Index 
(Jāhāna, 2016). In 2015, 32.1% of the nation’s 51.4 million people lived below the national poverty 
line of USD1.90 per day (ADB, 2018b).  
It is estimated that more than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas (Duflos, Luchtenburg, & 
Ren, 2013) where agriculture, forestry and fishery are the main sources of livelihood and employment, 
accounting for approximately 56% of the workforce (Myanmar Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and 
Irrigation - MMOALI, 2018). According to the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) (2018), 
agricultural profits and wages for persons employed in this sector are the lowest in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless, the agricultural sector remains the backbone of the 
country’s economy (Raitzer, Wong, & Samson, 2015). In 2016/17, agriculture, livestock, and fisheries 
accounted for approximately 30% of the country’s GDP and 25% of the nation’s export earnings 
(MMOALI, 2018). Raitzer et al. (2015) contend that agricultural potential remains largely untapped, 
with 12.8 million hectares of cultivated land. There is also the possibility of cultivating a further six 
million hectares of fallow lands. While the rural farming population makes a significant contribution 
to GDP and employment, the benefits of farming to the economy, and the socio-economic status of 
farmers remain low (MMOALI, 2016). 
Empirical studies conducted in other developing countries show that agriculture, through its direct 
and indirect impact on rural livelihoods, can generate significant economic growth and reduce poverty 
rates (Irz, Lin, Thirtle, & Wiggins, 2001; Mellor & Malik, 2017; Valdés & Foster, 2010). However, 
Myanmar’s agricultural sector faces numerous challenges (Tun, Kennedy, & Nischan, 2015; World 
Bank, 2016). The MMOALI has flagged increasing agricultural productivity, the promotion of 
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smallholder agriculture and agribusiness, and value chain development as high priorities in its 
Agriculture Development Strategy 2018-2023 (MMOALI, 2018, pp. 12-13). International donors and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are lending support to these efforts through development 
projects. In 2017, New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) launched the 
Tanintharyi Region Rural Income and Livelihoods Development (TRRILD) project. The TRRILD project 
is a five-year project aimed at improving rural livelihoods through upgrading important agri-food value 
chains in Myanmar’s remote Tanintharyi region. The Project was implemented through a collaborative 
partnership involving World Vision Myanmar (WVM), Vision Fund Myanmar (VFM), Lincoln University, 
and the International Livestock and Research Institute (ILRI). The TRRILD project was designed to be 
both research-informed and research-led. The action research reported in this thesis guided the 
delivery of one of the Project’s three outputs: the establishment of producer groups (PGs) and 
producer organisations (POs) that are equipped to capture value-added by upgraded agri-food chains 
in the Tanintharyi region.  
1.2 The target areas 
The Tanintharyi region is located in southern Myanmar, bordered by Mon State to the north, Thailand 
to the east and south, and the Andaman Sea to the west (Figure 1.1). It covers 43,000km2 and has a 
population of 1.4 million people, 76% of whom reside in rural areas. The region is divided into ten 
townships or districts. Dawei, the region's capital, and Myeik, represent substantial economic, 
political, and social hubs. Despite the country’s long history of armed conflict, the region has witnessed 
social and political stability following the signing of bilateral and nationwide ceasefire agreements (in 
2012 and 2015), between armed government forces and non-state actors representing minority ethnic 
groups (MIMU, 2016). This relative stability has been a contributing factor to the region’s recent 
economic growth and attractiveness as a tourist destination. The TRRILD project focused on the rural 
parts of two neighbouring districts, Myeik and Palaw (Figure 1.2). Table 1.1 presents population and 
household data for these districts, including their urban areas.  
Primary data obtained from the Project’s baseline survey conducted in the rural parts of Myeik and 
Palaw show that 55% of rural households are farming households (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). While non-
farm rural households do not have their own crop or livestock enterprises, many of them derive 
income from agriculture. More than 20% of these households earn wages for farm labour and 15% 
operate small businesses that process products grown by local farmers. Although farms are small (with 
a mean area of 2.43 hectares), farm households earn higher incomes and have greater food security 
than non-farm rural households. On average, sample households earned less than 1 USD per person 





Figure 1.1 Map of Myanmar 






Figure 1.2 TRRILD project’s target areas in Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region 
 




Table 1.1 Population and household demographics for Myeik and Palaw districts 
Demographic Myeik Palaw 
Area (km2) 1417.9 1652.3 
Population  284,489  93,438  
% of urban population 40.5 20.3 
% employed in agriculture 36.2 63.9 
% Female-headed households 20.1 24.2 
Mean household size 5.0 5.0 
Literacy rate % 96.4 94.9 
Source: The 2014 Myanmar population and housing census - Tanintharyi region (Myanmar Ministry of 
Immigration and Population, 2015).  
 
Agriculture is labour intensive work and farmers in Myanmar use few productivity-enhancing inputs. 
The vast majority of sample farmers in the Project’s baseline survey (69%) had no access to agricultural 
advice. Furthermore, only 11% had attended an agricultural training course. Less than half of these 
smallholders purchased fertiliser. Only 25% hired machinery services, and fewer than 11% owned 
tractors or farm equipment (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). In large part, these problems reflect liquidity 
problems aggravated by the virtual absence of formal credit (Htun & Tin, 2017; Livelihoods and Food 
Security Fund, 2012, p. 33; Lyne & Snoxell, 2018; Okamoto, 2011).  
1.3  Research problem 
Snoxell and Lyne’s (2019) research shows that PGs are rare in Myeik and Palaw. Less than 5% of 
smallholders surveyed in the target areas belong to any form of PG, let alone POs that engage their 
members in value-adding activities. Farmers lack the equipment, machinery, and storage facilities 
needed to produce and market safe food products of a quality acceptable to premium buyers. In 
addition, the TRRILD’s baseline survey shows that smallholders are faced with severe restrictions to 
accessing affordable credit from formal lenders (Lyne & Snoxell, 2018). Despite a proliferation of small 
supermarkets in regional towns, virtually all of the food produced by smallholders is sold in local village 
markets. The TRRILD project’s baseline survey data show that very few smallholders benefit from 
preferred market opportunities in their region, with even fewer capitalising on high-value markets 
outside their region. For example, grain processed by local rice millers cannot compete with imported 
rice due to its poor quality. As a result, smallholders sell minimally processed products in local village 
markets, often at very low prices. Although opportunities to exploit higher value markets exist, 
smallholders are constrained by poor access to affordable credit, inadequate information and training, 
the small-scale of their farming operations, and poor market linkages. These constraints, and the 
absence of collective action in the target areas prevent smallholders from investing in productive 
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assets and making fixed improvements to increase their on-farm productivity. These constraints mean 
it is nearly impossible to meet the food safety, quality, and quantity requirements of premium buyers. 
Numerous studies have shown that collective action (through agricultural marketing cooperatives), 
can link smallholders to markets (Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009; Moustier, Tam, 
Anh, Binh, & Loc, 2010; Narrod et al., 2009; Rosairo, Lyne, Martin, & Moore, 2012). Conversely, there 
are several empirical studies that highlight the high rates of cooperative failure (Mugambwa, 2005; 
Ortmann & King, 2007; Senanayake, 2004). More recently, applications of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) theory to cooperative models emphasise the importance of constituting PGs with 
institutional arrangements that incentivise investment and compliance with supply contracts 
(Beverland, 2007; Chibanda, Ortmann, & Lyne, 2009; Esnard, Lyne, & Old, 2017; Rosairo et al., 2012; 
Salazar & Gorriz, 2011).  
Myanmar’s Cooperative Society Rules appear to support the type of institutional arrangements that 
characterise well-designed cooperatives; however, there is little information about agricultural 
marketing cooperatives in Myanmar, and the extent to which these rules are enforced to 
accommodate value-adding cooperative models. Ferguson (2013, p. 8) reports that state capture has 
tarnished the cooperative brand. She claims that farmers have little sense of ownership, autonomy, 
or control, and view cooperatives as state-run organisations. As a result, farmer-driven initiatives 
supported by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) tend to establish PGs that 
embed (some) cooperative principles without being formally registered as cooperatives (Ferguson, 
2013, p. 23). The most critical implication is that PGs and POs - like most small businesses in Myanmar 
- will not qualify for term loans from commercial banks to finance investments in productive assets. 
While they may qualify for loans from microfinance institutions (MFIs), current MFI legislation does 
not allow them to offer loans with repayment periods longer than two years, or to secure their loans 
with non-conventional forms of collateral (Kloeppinger-Todd & Sandar, 2013). This poses a major 
challenge for smallholders and fledgling POs that intend to pursue a value-adding business strategy. 
More importantly, it emphasises the need for institutional arrangements that accommodate and 
encourage investment from members, formal lenders, strategic agribusiness partners, and donors. 
This research’s overarching aim is to design and nurture functional PGS that are capable of performing 
at the transactional level (organising bulk purchase of inputs and collective marketing output), and 
POs that are capable of undertaking value-adding interventions in partnership with private investors 
and donors. Section 2.8 outlines the research’s specific objectives and guiding questions. 
To help alleviate liquidity constraints and access to affordable capital needed to upgrade the selected 
agri-food chains, the TRRILD project established two VFM microfinance branches in Myeik and Palaw, 
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the target towns. The selection of value chains and identification of value chain interventions with 
meaningful and widespread pro-poor impacts to rural households in the target areas was the subject 
of another PhD thesis led by ILRI: A pro-poor approach to upgrade agri-food value chains in the 
Tanintharyi region of Myanmar. 
1.4  Structure of the thesis 
In keeping with the research’s action orientation, the thesis’ chapters are presented in a multi-stage 
progression (Figure 1.3) that resemble a completed action research cycle to emphasise how the study 
associated research with practice. The iterative element of action research allows theory to inform 
































Figure 1.3 Layout of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a review of relevant literature dealing with smallholder collective action and 
inclusion in agri-food chains to contextualise the research problem. It then draws on NIE theory to 
identify key theoretical propositions relating to well-defined institutional and governance 
arrangements of producer-owned organisations that are needed to achieve a hierarchy of outcomes. 
The chapter concludes by outlining the key knowledge gaps identified in the literature and listing the 
study’s research objectives and the research questions. Chapter 3 outlines the study’s scope and 
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boundaries. It also discusses the action research approach designed to achieve the Project’s output 
and address the research objectives. Chapter 4 describes the action research components of the thesis 
which follows the research approach described in Chapter 3. The chapter outlines the activities that 
preceded and triggered the action research process. It then describes the associated activities, 
process, and outputs of each action cycle over the entire research period. Chapter 4 concludes with a 
synopsis of the action research process and its outcomes. Chapter 5 reflects on the outcomes of the 
action research in the context of the research questions posed in Chapter 2. The thesis concludes in 
Chapter 6 with some key conclusions and lessons learned through the process of establishing 
functional PGs and POs. It explains the research’s contribution to the literature, the research’s 






This chapter examines literature on smallholder collective action and inclusion in agri-food chains. 
First, it draws on the NIE literature addressing the institutional problems of agricultural marketing 
cooperatives. Second, it draws upon a scant, but growing body of literature, which deals with inclusive 
business models and blended finance. The chapter concludes with the overarching theoretical 
propositions, the key knowledge gaps, the research objectives and the research questions. 
2.1  Coordination in agri-food chains 
In developing countries, smallholders continue to play a key role in agriculture, rural development, 
and economic growth. In most agrarian economies, agricultural growth is acknowledged as a primary 
source of poverty reduction (Irz et al., 2001; Valdés & Foster, 2010). Mellor and Malik (2017) suggest 
that in both low and middle-income countries, the primary means of rural poverty reduction are rapid 
growth in agricultural production and increased income for small commercial farmers. The authors 
attribute this effect to small commercial farmers’ increased expenditure on locally produced non-farm 
goods and services. Empirical evidence from other developing areas shows that these local economy 
consumption multipliers are strong, ranging from 1.28 in South Africa to 2.61 in Niger (Hendriks & 
Lyne, 2003). However, in developing countries, smallholders face numerous productivity and 
transactional challenges in their efforts to access high-value agri-food markets (London, Anupindi, & 
Sheth, 2010). These include low levels of productivity, high transaction costs, poor market institutions, 
poor governance, inaccessible rural finance, and a lack of scale (Salami, Kamara, & Brixiova, 2010; 
Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012, pp. 17-20; Wiggins, Kirsten, & Llambí, 2010). In the past decade, this has been 
aggravated by volatile food and energy prices (Salami et al., 2010), and structural changes taking place 
globally in agri-food markets (Boehlje, 2000; Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009; Zakić, 
Vukotić, & Cvijanović, 2014).  
Boehlje (2000) attributes structural changes in agriculture to changes in fundamental business 
propositions and ways of doing business. He argues that the transformation of production away from 
commodity products to differentiated products has been driven by growth in consumer demand for 
differentiated products and food safety concerns, advances in technology, and the need for private 
firms to minimise production, processing, and distribution costs. At the food retail level, there is an 
increased focus on quality and product differentiation (Reardon, Timmer, & Berdegué, 2005). Today, 
products are increasingly valued for specific traits: they are differentiated based on inherent quality 
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attributes (Hobbs & Young, 2000) that can provide firms with a competitive advantage (Reardon et 
al., 2009). Agri-food chains are becoming more tightly aligned across production and distribution, with 
input supply and product-processing sectors becoming more integrated (Poulton & Lyne, 2009). These 
changes have increased the need for new and varied forms of coordination along the agri-food chain 
(Bijman, Muradian, & Cechin, 2011). 
Poulton et al. (2004), as cited by Poulton and Lyne (2009, p. 145), define coordination as efforts or 
measures within a marketing system intended to encourage market players to act in a complementary 
way towards a common goal. These measures are designed to incentivise players towards achieving a 
specific goal and to prevent them from pursuing contrary paths or goals. From a value chain 
standpoint, coordination means managing the mutual dependencies between activities and actors in 
the chain (Bijman et al., 2011). In this context, it is fitting to distinguish between horizontal, vertical, 
and complementary coordination.  
Horizontal coordination refers to coordination among actors at a given stage of the marketing chain. 
At the producer level, horizontal coordination can range from informal agreements among farmers to 
coordinate purchases and sales of inputs and outputs to more formal groups that are established to 
facilitate collective action, such as farmers’ associations, PGs, and investor-owned firms (IOFs) (Lyne 
& Martin, 2008). An extreme form of horizontal coordination, horizontal integration arises where 
members of PGs surrender their decision-making power to managers in exchange for benefits and 
voting property rights (Gadzikwa, Lyne, & Hendriks, 2007). Due to high transaction costs in dealing 
with a multitude of smallholders, and the idiosyncratic constraints that confront smallholders when 
undertaking production and marketing activities, this form of coordination is often essential to link 
smallholders vertically with other actors in the agri-food chain (Gadzikwa et al., 2007; Lyne & Martin, 
2008; Poulton & Lyne, 2009). 
Vertical coordination occurs when actors at different stages of the marketing chain coordinate their 
efforts. This form of coordination encompasses a wide range of possibilities: from spot market 
transactions, to vertical integration using mechanisms such as joint ventures (Hobbs & Young, 2001; 
Wysocki, Peterson, & Harsh, 2006). In order to market products profitably, Carbone (2017) suggests 
that agri-food firms need to be involved in a network of relationships that go beyond spot markets. 
These relationships allow for shared risk and reward, and for complex information exchange relating 
to retail customers and final consumers’ production and quality requirements. 
Complementary coordination occurs when players along the marketing chain combine efforts to 
provide complementary services to other actors at a given stage in the chain (Poulton & Lyne, 2009). 
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Complementarity exists when the combination of individual activities produce an output greater than 
the sum of outputs generated by individual activities (Wysocki et al., 2006). Poulton and Lyne (2009) 
assert that the need for complementary coordination diminishes once there are several service 
providers of each type operating in a given market; this allows new entrants to enter the market 
competitively (without a strategic partner), and/or to overcome missing markets for services. 
However, in areas where complementary services (for example, seasonal finance, crop insurance, and 
technical advice) are missing or limited, investment in agri-food chains is discounted for ‘coordination 
risk’ (Poulton, Kydd, & Dorward, 2006). Markelova et al. (2009) show that horizontal coordination, in 
the form of PGs, can reduce coordination risk, allowing smallholders to access markets for value-added 
products. 
2.2 Rationale for collective action and producer groups 
Many authors (Bijman et al., 2011; Markelova et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2005) 
have summarised the literature that attributes the exclusion of smallholders from premium markets 
to high unit transaction and compliance costs associated with low levels of output and increasing 
demand for safe, high quality food, produced using practices that are ethical and environmentally 
friendly. The literature identifies four ways in which collective marketing via a PGs can improve 
smallholder access to markets (Maijers, Nalla, & Commandeur, 2019; Mukindia, 2014; Mwambi, 
Bijman, & Mshenga, 2020; Penrose-Buckley, 2007). First, collective marketing allows smallholders to 
take advantage of discounted prices by ordering inputs in bulk. They can also share the costs of 
acquiring information about production techniques and market requirements. Second, smallholders 
can reduce unit compliance, processing, marketing, and transaction costs by pooling their output. 
Third, the PGs can coordinate members’ production and harvesting decisions to meet the terms of 
marketing contracts with buyers and sellers. This coordination not only reduces the level of risk that 
smallholders confront when they enter contracts as individuals, but also lends visibility and credibility 
to the group as a reliable supplier (Narrod et al., 2009), ultimately improves its bargaining power 
(Markelova et al., 2009) and reduces the threat of hold-up (Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008). Lastly, 
smallholders can pool their capital to finance lumpy investments in value-adding activities (Lyne & 
Collins, 2008).  
For these reasons, much of the literature recommends organising farmers into PGs to enable inclusive 
smallholder development (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Bitzer, Van Wijk, Helmsing, & Van der Linden, 
2010; Markelova et al., 2009; Minah & Malvido Pérez Carletti, 2019; Mwambi et al., 2020). These 
authors argue that bargaining PGs (groups that provide transactional services) are typically more 
inclusive of poor farmers than POs who engage in value-adding because of their low capital and 
12 
 
investment requirements. They contend that organisations that pursue value-adding and competitive 
strategies tend to require greater member investment and capital contributions which may lead to 
the exclusion of poor farmers. In a Zambian case study, Minah and Malvido Pérez Carletti (2019) 
present contradicting evidence that shows that the cost of membership fees and share capital 
contributions are inversely associated with poorer farmers. They argue that capital intensive groups 
can accrue external funds and partnerships (Bitzer et al., 2010) to offset poor and vulnerable farmers’ 
contributions. 
For smallholders in developing countries to benefit from opportunities in emerging domestic and 
international markets, Trienekens and Zuurbier (2008) assert that they must achieve better control 
over inputs, the production, processing, marketing, and distribution of their products to meet 
premium buyers’ quality, quantity, and consistency requirements in a cost-effective way. Collective 
action can help in this regard. This topic has received substantial attention in the literature (Libecap, 
1994; Markelova et al., 2009; Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio, & McCarthy, 2004; Narrod et al., 2009; Olson, 
1971; Poulton & Lyne, 2009; Rosairo et al., 2012; Stigler, 1974; Stringfellow, Coulter, Hussain, Lucey, 
& McKone, 1997).  
Several studies provide compelling evidence that producer-owned marketing cooperatives and 
companies can support the collective action needed to improve smallholder access to high value 
markets (Markelova et al., 2009; Moustier et al., 2010; Narrod et al., 2009; Rosairo et al., 2012). 
However, the literature is also peppered with examples of cooperative failure (Mugambwa, 2005; 
Ortmann & King, 2007; Senanayake, 2004). Contemporary applications of the NIE theory to 
cooperative models have emphasised the importance of constituting PGs with institutional 
arrangements that incentivise investment and compliance with supply contracts (Beverland, 2007; 
Chibanda et al., 2009; Esnard et al., 2017; Rosairo et al., 2012; Salazar & Gorriz, 2011).  
2.3 Producer groups and producer organisations 
In the literature, the terms PG and PO are often used interchangeably because they are both based 
on the premise that working collectively provides producers with greater benefits than working as 
individuals (McKague & Siddiquee, 2014). In addition, they are both viewed as possible institutional 
solutions to overcome high transaction costs and market failures in developing countries (Groot 
Kormelinck, Bijman, & Trienekens, 2019; Markelova et al., 2009; Mukindia, 2014). Penrose-Buckley 
(2007, p. 2) defines a PO broadly as, “a rural business that is owned and controlled by producers, and 
engaged in collective marketing activities”. Bijman (2016) and Nilsson and Ohlsson (2007), narrow the 
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definition down to a ‘formal’ farmer-owned organisation that adopts value-adding strategies with 
suitable institutional and governance arrangements.  
This revised definition differentiates POs from PGs which tend to be less formalised. The latter’s 
primary purposes are to facilitate the bulk purchase of inputs, coordinate the sale of members’ 
produce, and provide training. Bijman (2016) claims that such groups are usually focused on providing 
services to members within their community. They tend to be more inclusive of poor and vulnerable 
farmers because of their low investment requirements (Mwambi et al., 2020). Their functionality relies 
on their inclusiveness, their ability to provide ongoing services to their members and the community 
(Groot Kormelinck et al., 2019), social cohesion, and their basic capabilities and procedures for internal 
democratic management (Catholic Relief Services, 2007). These capabilities include, knowledge of 
how to develop a shared vision, objectives, rules, dynamic leadership, and group cohesion (Catholic 
Relief Services, 2007; McKague & Siddiquee, 2014; Tallam, 2018; Thompson et al., 2009). In this 



















Figure 2.1 Key dimensions of functional PGs  
Source: Adapted from Thompson, Teshome, Hughes, Chirwa, & Omiti (2009). 
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For a PG to be deemed functional, there must be evidence of its activities and achievements in each 
of the five dimensions: 
• Well defined objectives that generate ongoing member services. The PG’s objectives should 
be based on its members’ collective needs (Chambers, 1995). Rondot and Collion (2001, p. 2) 
argue that these objectives generally include the efficient management of natural resources, 
the expansion of access to natural resources, improved access to services, and advocacy in 
decision-making processes and policy. These objectives must be well-defined so that 
individuals can internalise the benefits of group membership. 
•  Group cohesion. Tallam (2018) contends that strong group cohesion has a positive influence 
on PG performance. The author defines group cohesion as the extent to which members are 
connected and participate in the group’s activities, and how motivated they are to remain in 
the group. This can also be demonstrated by group members’ willingness to work together to 
achieve collective activities.  
• Dynamic leadership. This refers to the leaders’ capacity and skills to manage, plan, and initiate 
activities to achieve the group’s stated objectives. Dynamic leaders are typically proactive in 
terms of motivating members and working towards providing them with services (Thompson 
et al., 2009).   
• Constitutional arrangements that encourage growth and good governance. These 
arrangements include investor-friendly institutional and governance arrangements that can 
accommodate a shift from transactional activities to value-adding activities. Good governance 
practices can be demonstrated by the process of arriving at group decisions, keeping meeting 
records, transactions, decisions made, and annual general meetings (AGMS). These practices 
are linked to transparency which is a key element of good governance.   
• Performance towards objectives. This refers to observable evidence of services provided by 
the PG to its members or the benefits they receive as a result of their membership. 
Performance can also be gauged by the PG’s engagement with key actors in the value chain 
(private and public) in an effort to provide services to its members. This may include a record 
of transactions, collaborations, and evidence of well-considered business plans or proposals 
developed by the PG to attract strategic partners.  
POs are dynamic groups that develop over time. In the process, they may change their structure to 
match their intended strategy. They are typically built on a foundation of functional PGs. In contrast, 
POs have an outward focus and seek to mediate relationships between their members and economic, 
institutional, and political actors outside of their community (Bijman, 2016). They are typically 
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integrated to provide economic services to their members. In particular, they integrate downstream 
to provide value-adding services like processing and branding products for high-value markets, or 
upstream to capture value in production services or manufacture and retailing of inputs like animal 
feed and fertiliser. The PO’s shift towards marketing and value-adding strategies has implications for 
the resources and capabilities needed to perform effectively: for example, POs require capital 
investments and dynamic leaders skilled in marketing, negotiating, and management. In this research, 
the increased need for capital and expertise points to a fundamental difference between PGs and POs. 
PO’s capital-intensive business strategies require them to adopt institutional arrangements that 
encourage patron investment and compliance with contracts. In contrast, PGs have less complex 
institutional arrangements to support less ambitious transactional business strategies.  
For the purpose of this research, PGs are viewed as an entity that could in the future become POs by 
extending their transactional business to include value-adding operations. This will only be possible if 
they are willing and able to upgrade their institutional arrangements to incentivise patron investment 
and contract compliance. This argument is consistent with Penrose-Buckley’s (2007) claim that 
effective and sustainable POs are often built on a solid foundation of functional PGs. Bijman (2016) 
also supports this view, stating that POs that are strongly committed to community benefit, from 
increasing local social capital to reducing transactions costs related to information gathering and 
contract enforcement. 
Bijman (2016) posits that formalisation is a basic requirement for POs to establish sustainable trading 
relationships with downstream actors in the chain. However, in developing countries like Myanmar 
where the laws governing the legal status of POs are poorly defined or bureaucratic, such 
organisations may choose to operate informally as collective action groups with no legal status 
(Ferguson, 2013, p. 23). Their informal status will most likely inhibit their ability to raise sufficient 
equity or debt capital to finance value-adding activities. Penrose-Buckley (2007, p. 39) posits that such 
groups may only register as a legal entity once the benefits of registration are greater than the 
additional costs and effort associated with formal registration. They argue that if the market within 
which the organisation is competing is informal, the costs associated with registration may be 
disadvantageous to the PO, relative to its informal competitors, thus, leading to its demise. In most 
countries, POs tend to formalise their legal structure through laws that govern associations, 
cooperatives, or private firms (Mutinda, Baltenweck, & Omondi, 2015; Penrose-Buckley, 2007). For 
this research, it is important to understand the main functional and organisational characteristics of 
PGs and POs and the difference between the two because their strategy and structure needs to be 
aligned for the organisation to be effective. Acknowledging Chandler’s (1962) proposition that 
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structure follows strategy, the next section draws on relevant literature to identify institutional, 
governance, and partnership arrangements that POs are required to initiate to sustain value-adding 
activities.  
2.4  Producer organisation models  
POs are similar to other business forms in terms of their structure, functions, and business practices. 
Shareholders elect a board of directors that develops policy and strategies to achieve shareholder 
objectives. This board may opt to appoints managers to oversee the implementation of these 
strategies (Adrian & Green, 2001). Business strategy refers to the choices an organisation’s top-level 
management makes in support of their collective understanding of how to achieve a particular 
outcome within a competitive environment (Boland, Hogeland, & McKee, 2011). In any PO, the 
alignment of patron interests and business strategy is critical for success. Boland et al. (2011) suggest 
that prior to developing such strategy, members must come to an understanding on a central business 
proposition. They argue that a shared vision cements member solidarity in the early development 
stage of the organisation. It also reduces the (transaction) cost of reaching agreement on objectives 
and constitutional arrangements (Nilsson, 2001).  
Kavale (2012) posits that an organisation must align themselves to their operating environment and 
develop a structure which matches their business strategy. Changes in the operational environment 
and the ongoing structural changes in agriculture have forced POs to adopt market-related and growth 
strategies to safeguard their competitiveness, profitability, and capacity to maintain member services 
(Alho, 2019; Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014; Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007). As a response, many organisations 
have pursued various generic competitive strategies to gain a competitive edge over their rivals 
(Porter, 1985). In the past, organisations that have focused on simply achieving economies of scale 
and providing their members with preferential access have typically pursued ‘cost leadership 
strategies’. Others have chosen to embark on ‘differentiation strategies’ and placed greater emphasis 
on what the market demanded rather than what their members produced. Their renewed focus was 
on directing members’ production in terms of quality and volumes. Others have pursued ‘focus 
strategies’ for niche markets with the aim of differentiating their members’ products through activities 
such as value-added processing and branding (Nilsson, 1999). A major consequence of the latter 
strategies is the need for capital (Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014).  
Nilsson and Ohlsson (2007) found that traditional marketing POs that embarked on these strategies 
were exposed to both governance and capital problems. As a result, many had to modify their 
organisational form, moving away from traditional cooperative models (collectively financed and 
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governed by patron members), towards more hybrid structures that include certain IOF features, such 
as external equity capital, tradable equity shares, and investment-proportional voting rights (Chaddad 
& Cook, 2004; Nilsson & Barnheim, 2000; Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007). These shifts are predominant in 
organisations that require significant amounts of capital to finance value-adding investments or 
implement growth-related strategies. For example, an organisation established primarily to negotiate 
favourable terms for its members may achieve this objective structured as a traditional cooperative. 
However, if that same organisation alters its purpose to include value-adding activities that require a 
predictable supply of quality products, its directors may consider changing its institutional 
arrangements to realign the organisation’s structure with its new strategy (Esnard et al., 2017). 
Nilsson and Ohlsson (2007) found that low-cost leadership strategies (where there are no premiums 
to be earned from value-adding) benefit from PO models that link investment to patronage. Those 
that pursue product focused strategies for niche markets benefit from organisational models with 
closed membership, and mechanisms that allow them to raise internal capital and predict supply. 
Finally, hybrid organisational models that allow the organisation to bring in external capital best 
support those that embark on capital intensive product differentiation strategies for large volume 
markets.  
Chaddad and Cook (2004) assert that the fundamental alterations in these organisational models 
relate to ownership and residual control rights. They argue that attenuating restrictions of the 
traditional cooperative model to accommodate hybrid structures may warrant trade-offs relating to 
ownership and residual control rights to incentivise investments and accommodate new 
organisational costs that will arise. They classify these organisational models on a spectrum, ranging 
from traditional cooperatives to IOFs. Table 2.1 summarises these hybrid models and their main 
institutional characteristics.  
Theoretically, the capital problem diminishes as the organisation shifts from a PIC to a NGC and 
ultimately an ISC. However, the MIC, ISC, and Subsidiaries do not benefit from well aligned incentives 
in their transactions with patrons because patron benefits are not proportional to investment and not 
all investors are patrons (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Thus, while patrons want higher prices for their 
produce, investors desire higher returns on their investment. The nature and extent of hybridisation 
is influenced by the organisation’s intended strategy, as well as its access to alternative sources of 
capital (for example, government and donor grants), the extent to which compliance with supply 




 Table 2.1 Summary of hybrid cooperatives and their institutional characteristics 
Source: Adapted from Chaddad and Cook (2004, pp. 352-358), Nilsson, (1999). 
2.4.1  Constitutional arrangements 
Although horizontal coordination and integration can reduce smallholders’ unit transaction costs and 
link them to more reliable and high value markets, the institutional arrangements that govern such 
coordination can introduce new costs and problems that discourage smallholder participation and 
investment in these organisations (Bijman et al., 2011; Gadzikwa et al., 2007; Lyne & Martin, 2008). 
NIE theory suggests that producer-owned marketing organisations that adhere strictly to the 
cooperative principles of democratic control, member economic participation, and open membership 
find it difficult to raise sufficient equity capital to finance productive assets (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; 
Royer, 1999). This claim is supported by empirical studies conducted in both developed and 
developing countries (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Esnard et al., 2017; Lyne & 
Collins, 2008; Rosairo et al., 2012; van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006; Wouterse & Francesconi, 2017).  
Countries that favour a traditional cooperative model tend to embed these principles in conservative 
legislation that gives every member of the organisation one vote regardless of the amount of capital 
they invest in the organisation. These principles restrict membership to patrons of the organisation. 
These organisations distribute profits to their members according to their patronage rather than their 
investment, and prevent new members from paying more for voting and benefit rights than members 
who joined earlier. To fulfil these last two requirements, cooperatives usually set a limit on any 
dividends earned via equity shares. Members’ shares are redeemable, non-appreciable, and therefore 
non-tradable. These institutional arrangements characterise the traditional cooperative model that is 
endemic to many developing countries, including Myanmar, which has been found wanting of a 
Cooperative model Institutional characteristics 
 Restricted to member patrons  
Proportional Investment 
Cooperatives (PIC)  
Redeemable equity shares; benefits accrue to patrons; investment 
proportional to patronage; controlled by patron majority  
Member-investor 
Cooperatives (MIC)  
Redeemable, tradable equity shares; benefits accrue to investors; 
benefits proportional to shareholding, controlled by patron majority   
New Generation  
Cooperatives (NGC)  
Non-redeemable, tradable delivery rights; benefits proportional to 
patronage and investment; controlled by patron majority  
 Not restricted to member-patrons  
Subsidiary Companies (Irish 
Model)   
Cooperative owns non-redeemable, tradable equity shares in a 
subsidiary company that owns value-adding assets  
Investor-share  
Cooperatives (ISC)  
Non-redeemable, tradable equity shares; benefits proportional to 
investment; controlled by majority investors  
19 
 
structure capable of supporting value-adding business strategies that benefit smallholders. Much of 
the NIE literature relating to cooperative performance has focused on traditional cooperatives’ 
inability to attract the equity capital needed to finance productive assets. Very little has focused on 
the need to encourage member compliance with supply contracts. 
With regard to low levels of equity capital, NIE theory links the institutional arrangements that 
characterise a traditional cooperative to five problems that discourage patrons from investing in their 
marketing cooperative. These institutional problems have been labelled as the free-rider, horizon, 
portfolio, control, and influence problems (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Sykuta & Cook, 2001). In 
particular, empirical evidence points to the free-rider, horizon, and influence problems (Beverland, 
2007; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Rosairo et al., 2012; Salazar & Gorriz, 2011). The free-rider problem 
arises because traditional cooperatives reward members for their patronage and not for their 
investment. As the benefits accrue mainly to large patrons who do not contribute capital in proportion 
to their patronage, members have little incentive to finance assets (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). The free-
rider problem can be alleviated by obliging members to invest in proportion to their patronage – 
typical institutional arrangements of a PIC or NGC (Chaddad & Cook, 2004).  
Productive assets are usually long-term investments. NIE theory suggest that members of traditional 
cooperatives are reluctant to finance long-term assets as the benefits of these assets accumulate 
beyond their membership period. This horizon problem arises because members of a traditional 
cooperative cannot trade equity shares at their market price (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). If members decide 
to exit the organisation, their shares are redeemed at par value, meaning that the exiting member 
cannot realise capital gains. This problem is particularly damaging as it not only discourages 
investment but also shifts preferences away from retained earnings (that could be used to finance 
long-term assets) towards more current patronage benefits such as favourable prices for products and 
inputs (Nilsson, 2001). The horizon problem can be alleviated by issuing non-redeemable shares that 
members can trade amongst themselves. This includes tradable delivery rights (TDRs) sold (or granted) 
to NGC patrons. 
TDRs are a key feature of NGCs that emerged in the United States during the 1900’s. These rights 
developed out of cooperative members’ growing concerns about the liquidity of their cooperative 
stock (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000). TDRs create member property rights based on a contractual right to 
deliver commodities to the organisation and permit members a limited right to trade and transfer this 
asset to other members of the organisation (Moore & Noel, 1995). The property rights conferred by 
this instrument create a secondary market for members’ residual claims and patronage and are 
separate and distinct from cooperative stock ownership. This secondary market allows members to 
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manage the risk preferences associated with their investment to capture desired or quasi rents (Cook 
& Iliopoulos, 2000). Moore and Noel (1995) postulate that the following conditions are necessary to 
form and sustain a secondary market for TDRs: 
1. The delivery rights are perceived to have value by the potential buyers; 
2. There are willing sellers; 
3. Transaction costs are low, relative to the perceived value of the delivery rights; 
4. The cooperative has a closed membership and a marketing pool for the commodity; 
5. The cooperative’s constitution and by-laws allow for the transfer of delivery rights. 
While necessary to avoid prohibitive transaction costs in decision-making, Royer (1999) notes that the 
separation of ownership and control in business organisations, could lead to outcomes where 
managers pursue their own objectives at the expense of the owners’; this practice gives rise to the 
principal-agent problem or the control problem. The control problem is more serious when owners 
cannot trade their shares, as is the case in traditional cooperatives, and therefore have no share market 
to signal changes in an organisation’s value (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). The absence of a liquid market for 
the organisation’s equity shares also prevents owners from sanctioning poor management by 
disinvesting, and from aligning the manager’s interests with those of the owners by remunerating 
them with shares. These problems can be alleviated by issuing tradable equity shares, a key feature of 
NGCs and ISCs (Chaddad & Cook, 2004).  
The redeemable, non-appreciable, and therefore non-tradable nature of equity shares in a traditional 
cooperative also gives rise to the portfolio problem. If members are unable to trade their shares freely 
in order to match their own investment portfolios with their personal risk preferences, they are 
discouraged from investing (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Investors may also be discouraged by the influence 
problem. Some authors attribute the influence problem to democratic voting rights, arguing that both 
lenders and entrepreneurial shareholders will refrain from injecting capital if investment decisions 
made by the organisation’s directors are influenced by the majority voters rather than the majority 
investors (Royer, 1999). However, empirical evidence suggests that the influence problem is more 
likely to materialise when members’ interests are heterogeneous and cooperative ownership is not 
clearly separated from control (Rosairo et al., 2012).  
The institutional problems that constrain an organisation’s ability to raise equity capital also limit its 
ability to borrow, as lenders prefer term loans to be collateralised by equity. Clearly, it is important to 
alleviate these institutional problems in POs that require significant equity and debt capital to pursue 
value-adding business strategies. However, it may be equally important to incentivise patron 
compliance with supply contracts, especially when members can side-sell to rival buyers. Relationships 
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between a PO’s institutional arrangements and its supply contracts have not received much attention: 
much of what has been explored in the NIE literature relates to transaction costs incurred in 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing supply contracts. 
It is often argued that marketing POs confront lower transaction costs than IOFs because their patrons 
are the shareholders: this eliminates conflict between investors seeking capital returns and patrons 
seeking patronage returns (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). In short, marketing POs are assumed to be more 
cost-effective in their supply contracts because members’ (as patrons and shareholders) interests are 
perfectly aligned. This reduces the problem of asymmetric information which often increases 
transaction costs in supply contracts negotiated by IOFs with suppliers who are not shareholders. This 
argument is flawed because the alignment of shareholder and patron interests only occurs when 
investment is proportional to patronage, as in a PIC or NGC. Traditional cooperatives and ISCs do not 
embed this proportionality. Converting a PIC or NGC into an ISC in order to raise equity capital from 
non-patrons thus involves a trade-off as supply contracts become less cost-efficient (van Bekkum & 
Bijman, 2006). 
Transaction costs aside, a marketing organisation’s institutional arrangements influence supply 
contracts in ways that bear directly on the success of its business strategy. Beverland (2007) found 
that while both PICs and NGCs could initiate value-adding strategies, only NGCs were able to sustain 
a product focus strategy. He attributes this to the fact that NGCs issue patrons with non-redeemable 
TDRs, whereas a PIC’s supply shares are redeemable and non-tradable. First, this makes it easier for 
NGCs to raise the equity capital needed to finance long-term assets: this is because patrons can realise 
capital gains on their investment in delivery rights. Second, Beverland (2007) establishes an important 
link between institutional arrangements and contract performance by explaining why patrons who 
hold TDRs have a stronger incentive to comply with their supply contracts. Compliance means that 
NGCs can offer premium buyers in niche markets a predictable supply of quality products. This practice 
fosters long-term and robust trading relationships. Unlike patrons who supply PICs, ISCs or IOFs, those 
who supply an NGC benefit or suffer from capital gains or losses if they meet or do not meet their 
delivery obligations. These gains or losses are directly proportional to their personal investment in 
TDRs. 
In practice, a PO’s business strategy may not fit neatly into a particular category. Furthermore, the 
structure that would best support it may require a mix of institutional arrangements drawn from 
different cooperative models. Regardless, this ‘best fit’ structure must comply with prevailing 
legislation. In Myanmar, the constitution and by-laws of producer-owned entities are typically guided 
by the Cooperative Society Rules and in particular, Rule No. 52/2013. However, the rigid procedures 
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and costs associated with registering nascent POs may oblige producers to operate their business 
informally at the onset. Inevitably, the choice of constitutional arrangements will entail a trade-off 
between what is desirable and what is feasible, and between institutional arrangements that improve 
access to capital and those that encourage compliance with cost-efficient supply contracts. 
Consideration must also be given to governance, group, and management factors that may reinforce 
or undermine the intended outcomes of institutional arrangements. These factors are discussed in 
sub-sections 2.4.2-2.4.5. 
2.4.2 Governance arrangements 
Definitions of governance vary widely. Graham, Plumptre, and Amos (2003) broadly define 
governance as a process whereby organisations make important decisions, determine whom they 
involve in the process, and how they render accountability. Viewed from the agency theory 
perspective, Fukuyama (2013) posits that governance is about the agent’s performance or how well 
they follow the principal’s wishes. He argues that good governance is more about execution than goals 
set by the principal. In the context of value chains, Bolwig, Ponte, Du Toit, Riisgaard, and Halberg 
(2010) extend this definition to include external actors and institutions that create the enabling 
environment and business services. Chibanda et al. (2009) contextualise governance as the processes 
that organisations follow in exercising authority, and in making and implementing decisions. They 
contend that good governance is characterised by discipline, transparency, accountability, fairness 
and social responsibility.  
Good corporate governance minimises risk and encourages shareholders to finance assets that create 
value (Amba, 2014). Cooperative legislation typically holds management accountable to the Board of 
Directors (BoD) and directors accountable to the shareholders. The governance arrangements of a 
cooperative influences who gets to direct and manage the organisation, to whom the directors and 
managers are accountable, and the extent to which directors and managers can be held accountable 
for decisions that impact on the organisation’s performance (Rosairo et al., 2012). Processes adopted 
to elect directors, and to hire and fire managers are key components of good governance 
arrangements as they have an impact on accountability. 
Voting by a show of hands to elect directors can aggravate the influence problem (Chibanda et al., 
2009; Cook, 1995; Rosairo et al., 2012). Rosairo et al. (2012) recommend that all directors should be 
nominated by shareholders and that voting should be conducted by secret ballot. However, their 
empirical findings attach more importance to the separation of ownership and control, with strategic 
and operational decisions delegated to accountable directors and managers. They recommend that 
23 
 
the right to hire and fire executive managers should remain with the BoD and not be appropriated by 
government agencies or external agencies. Their findings also reveal bi-directional links between good 
managers and good governance arrangements: good governance promotes better management, and 
good managers implement better governance arrangements.  
2.4.3 Group dynamics 
A group’s size and composition is an important determinant of competing interests within that group 
(Cyert, 1992) and group outcomes (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996). In a cooperative 
setting where voting rights are democratic, heterogeneity that results in the formation of subgroups 
can influence the appointment of directors and hence the outcome of significant decisions (Gruenfeld 
et al., 1996; Höhler & Kühl, 2017). This influence problem can encourage large patrons and investors 
to exit the organisation in pursuit of more attractive alternatives. 
Although Rosairo et al. (2012) recommend that decision-making should be centralised in the hands of 
accountable directors and managers to mitigate the adverse effects of member heterogeneity, they 
recognise the need for directors and managers to inform and consult shareholders before they make 
key decisions on business strategy, investment, and the distribution of profits. In a cooperative 
organisation, member participation is deemed critical for success (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). Well-
governed cooperatives generally require shareholder participation when decisions are made on 
proposals or to change the organisation’s constitution and by-laws (that is, its institutional and 
governance arrangements). 
Several authors emphasise the role of social capital in collective action and POs (Bijman et al., 2011; 
Nilsson, 2001; Ostrom, 1994; Trienekens, 2011; Wiesinger, 2007; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Social 
capital refers to relationships and networks that facilitate cooperation between individuals and groups 
to achieve mutually beneficial goals that are difficult to achieve individually (Kilpatrick, Field, & Falk, 
2003). Social norms such as trust, reciprocity, and commitment facilitate information exchange and, 
thereby reduce transaction and agency costs which are critical in the establishment of PGs (Herbel, 
Rocchigiani, & Ferrier, 2015; Mwambi et al., 2020). In groups where membership is heterogeneous 
and large, the free-rider problems is often aggravated because there is a greater sense of anonymity 
within the membership, signalling poor social capital (Feng, Friis, & Nilsson, 2016). Smaller and more 
homogenous groups often have higher levels of trust and commitment among the members, both of 
which ultimately lead to higher member participation (Höhler & Kühl, 2017; Nilsson, 2001). Herbel et 
al. (2015) found that the presence of strong and close social relationships among farmers and leaders 
within their local PG mitigated free-rider problems. 
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2.4.4  Management factors 
Hobbs and Young (2001) note that the scope of an organisation’s activities is influenced by managerial 
competencies. It is important that PO managers understand their responsibilities and have a sound 
knowledge of finance, business relationships, and business decision-making (Adrian & Green, 2001). 
Although directors are responsible for high-level decisions about business strategy, hired managers 
often assume greater responsibility for strategic decisions in organisations where the directors are 
farmers who may be unfamiliar with off-farm business operations (Cook, 1994). Thus, the 
organisation’s success is contingent on the BoD’s ability to hire, retain, and motivate high quality 
managers who have the required skills to execute the organisation’s business strategy. Often, these 
hired managers are non-patrons. Newly established PGs and POs can seldom afford to outsource 
expert managers (Adrian & Green, 2001). This calls into question attempts to establish value-adding 
POs that restrict entry to patrons only as this prevents strategic partners from becoming co-owners of 
a jointly financed value-adding organisation. If smallholders do not have the capital and expertise 
needed to add value beyond the farm gate, they will not share in the value added by downstream 
processors, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers (Feng & Hendrikse, 2008). In the context of this 
action research, this finding signifies the importance of building the capacity of PG directors in 
governance, leadership, and management.  
2.4.5 Contractual arrangements 
There has been much debate in the literature about smallholders’ participation in agri-food chains via 
supply contracts. Bhattarai, Lyne, and Martin (2013) argue that their participation typically relies on 
farmer-buyer dyads that generate acceptable levels of risk and reward for the sellers and the buyers. 
At the micro level, supply contracts are anticipated to reduce transaction costs between buyers and 
sellers, and decrease buyer and sellers’ supply and marketing risks. It also provides an avenue through 
which downstream buyers and producers can respond to consumers’ changing preferences and the 
increase in demand for quality and safe foods (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002).  
From a transaction cost perspective, some authors argue that downstream buyers are more likely to 
form contracts with larger farmers than smaller farmers because of the high ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs involved in signing contracts with a vast number of smallholders (Kirsten & Sartorius, 
2002; Prowse, 2012). Supply contracts have also been criticised as a means by which buyers can exploit 
farmers due to asymmetries in power and information (Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009). However, studies 
that examine contract design and the role of PGs in advocating for well-designed contracts (Abebe, 
Bijman, Kemp, Omta, & Tsegaye, 2013; Poulton & Lyne, 2009; Prowse, 2012; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007) 
tend to subdue these arguments on the basis that well-functioning PGs with suitable institutional 
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arrangements can mitigate these problems and represent smallholders’ interests in the complex task 
of designing contracts with desirable attributes.  
Bhattarai et al. (2013) argue that as the frequency and complexity of transactions increase, supply 
contracts between farmers and buyers tend to shift from conventional contracting to relational 
contracting. Abebe et al. (2013) found that farmers’ willingness to participate in contracts increases if 
the contract includes the following attributes: a written form, access to inputs and technical 
assistance, and variable pricing options. They also found that introducing institutional interventions 
that alleviate side-selling in the contract design can induce agribusiness firms to offer attractive 
contracts to smallholders. Studies have found that institutional arrangements, like TDRs, encourage 
member compliance with contracts and alleviate side-selling in marketing cooperatives (Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 2000; Woodford, 2008). From a coordination perspective, Sartorius and Kirsten (2007) 
contend that the contract should facilitate the creation of trust by incorporating smallholders in the 
design and negotiation process.  
2.5 Producer organisations within inclusive business models 
Most of the current literature dealing with inclusive business models (IBMs) has been produced by 
NGOs and international donor agencies. As yet, there is no universal definition of IBMs. Wach (2012) 
reports that while key organisations advocating inclusive business models publicise different 
definitions, all agree that IBMs create positive development impacts and are financially viable. 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), defines IBMs as businesses that promote 
the integration of smallholders into markets, with the fundamental principle of mutual benefits for 
poor farmers and the business community (Kelly, Vergara, & Bammann, 2015). UNDP (2008, p. 2) 
defines IBMs as businesses that include the poor on the demand side as clients and customers, and 
on the supply side as employees, producers, and business owners at various points in the supply chain. 
IBMs build bridges between businesses and the poor for mutual benefit. These mutual benefits not 
only include immediate profits and higher incomes, but also innovations and long-term supply chain 
partnerships. The poor also stand to benefit from increased productivity, sustainable earnings, and 
greater empowerment (UNDP, 2008). Likoko and Kini (2017) contextualise these definitions as the 
‘practitioners view’ of inclusive business. They argue that the operationalisation of these definitions 
can contribute to global poverty alleviation by including the poor as employees, business owners, 
business partners, and consumers. Their argument is consistent with London et al.’s (2010) conclusion 
that alleviating market constraints at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) creates value for partner firms 
but also for the poor. 
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Tewes-Gradl, Peters, Vohla, and Lutjens-Schilling (2013, pp. 16-17) expand the definition to include 
businesses that contribute to environmental and socially sustainable development goals (SDGs). This 
likens IBMs to social enterprises and social businesses, a view which the G20 Inclusive Business 
Framework firmly rejects. They argue that IBMs differ from social enterprises in terms of their 
business-driven partnerships with the poor, expected financial returns, and their primary sources of 
funding (G20 Development Working Group, 2015). 
2.5.1 Critical success factors for inclusive business models 
The FAO is perhaps the leading development practitioner advocating smallholder inclusion in agri-
food chains. Its guide for IBM development proposes four key principles that make a business model 
inclusive (Kelly et al., 2015, pp. 14-15). These principles are best reviewed alongside the critical success 
factors for smallholder inclusion in high-value supply chains identified by Sjauw-Koen-Fa, Blok and 
Omta (2016), and Lundy et al.’s (2014, pp. 84-96) new business model principles. 
In the first instance, the IBM must consider and include existing value chain actors, business 
relationships between actors, and existing value chain knowledge. Omitting or intentionally excluding 
existing actors can adversely influence the overall objective and competitiveness of the inclusive 
business. This principle calls for interventions that build on the value chain actors’ existing knowledge 
and competencies, and mechanisms that allow actors to jointly address challenges and explore 
opportunities.  
Critics of IBMs argue that this principle can deliberately exclude some smallholders based on socio-
economic criteria. This has sparked debate as to which smallholder segments should be targeted for 
inclusion in high value supply chains (Sjauw-Koen-Fa et al., 2016). Criteria highlighted in the literature 
include, the size of the farm holding, the market, and institutional orientation (Torero, 2011), the 
degree of commercialisation, and household income (Christen & Anderson, 2013). Sjauw-Koen-Fa et 
al. (2016) conclude that the best business case for smallholder inclusion should be primarily focused 
on commercial smallholders in value chains that produce high value commodities or staple crops. 
Second, the IBM must integrate more poor but committed and capable smallholders and 
entrepreneurs) into the value chain. As the IBM develops, and best practices and lessons are learnt, 
opportunities to include actors and minority groups with fewer assets will emerge. Sjauw-Koen-Fa et 
al. (2016) view this principle as a component of chain upgrading. In this context, they define upgrading 
as a shift towards increased value-adding activity on and beyond the farm to improve smallholder 
knowledge, skills, productivity, and benefits from participating in the chain.  
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Third, the IBM must build long-lasting and sustainable relationships between chain actors. Kelly et al. 
(2015) posit that this principle forms the core of the IBM and relates to the governance of (vertical) 
relationships between actors. Lastly, an IBM must create the right mix of partners. Collaboration 
between local partners is favoured (Gradl, Krämer, & Amadigi, 2006) as this improves the IBM’s 
outreach and its prospects for sustainability and growth once donor support for its establishment is 
withdrawn. Gradl et al. (2006) recommend that when selecting partners, organisations should 
consider which linkages are critical for, or facilitate the successful implementation of the IBM. 
Although the partner organisation’s resources are important, third party linkages can be used to 
leverage additional resources that can influence the overall outcome.    
While these reasons for developing agribusiness IBMs around POs are widely recognised and quoted 
(Bitzer et al., 2010; Bolwig et al., 2010; Sjauw-Koen-Fa et al., 2016), many authors underline the 
importance of appropriate institutional arrangements within the PO. Developments in NIE literature 
suggest that the PO’s institutional arrangements are equally important. These arrangements influence 
producer incentives to comply with supply contracts and incentives them to participate in equity 
sharing arrangements. Smallholders involved in IBMs will struggle to capture value added beyond the 
farm gate unless they have some ownership and control of the value-adding enterprise. Another key 
reality is that a PO owned and controlled solely by smallholders will rarely have sufficient capital or 
expertise to finance and manage a value-adding enterprise.  
One way of addressing these realities within an IBM is to establish a joint venture firm, co-owned by 
a PO and a strategic partner. However, international experience with this partnership arrangement, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Irish model’ (Chaddad & Cook, 2004), shows that capital constraints 
within the PO quickly lead to a situation where the strategic partner becomes the majority investor 
(van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006). As majority investor, the strategic partner reaps most of the benefits 
of value-adding and acquires control of the joint venture. This results in a greater share of profits being 
distributed as dividends and a smaller share as price rebates to producers (Nilsson, 1999). 
For this reason, POs established to participate in IBMs should be constituted with investor-friendly 
institutional and governance arrangements that allow and encourage strategic partners to become 
co-owners of the PO itself without relieving smallholders of their majority control -  what is known as 
the ‘Finnish model’ (van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006). Such equity-sharing partnerships bring capital, 
expertise, and intangible assets (like reputation and distribution networks) into the PO where 
smallholders have more control and where their learning can be reinvested in a sustainable PO 
(Mwayawa, Lyne, Lees, & Trafford, 2018). They also create scope for donor and government agencies 
to incentivise IBMs through grants that boost the share of equity capital owned by smallholders in 
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their organisation, making equity sharing and access to debt capital less risky and a more attractive 
option for strategic partners and financiers. 
During the late 1990s, the South African government awarded grants to farm workers to give them a 
meaningful stake in a farming business co-owned with a large-scale commercial farmer. These grants 
were complemented with loan products funded primarily by donors. Lyne, Zille, and Graham (2000) 
describe the rapid uptake of these financial products to finance ‘farm worker equity-share schemes’. 
Today, these initiatives would be labelled IBMs, and the financial products that incentivised them 
would be classified as ‘blended finance’. 
2.5.2 Blended finance in pro-poor inclusive business models 
In the Project’s targeted villages, smallholders have limited access to affordable credit. The seasonal 
loan products available are inadequate to finance inputs to increase yield and income or to diversify 
into other lucrative value chains. Small seasonal loans offered by the Myanmar Agriculture 
Development Bank (MADB), primarily for paddy production, are unattractive as they have short 
repayment schedules that oblige farmers to sell their crop immediately after harvesting when prices 
are very low. Commercial banks have virtually no outreach in rural areas in Myanmar, and micro-
finance institutions have not yet established a presence in the Project’s targeted areas (Duflos et al., 
2013).1 As a result, smallholders turn to informal lenders who charge high interest rates to cover 
lending risks as they lack competition from more cost-efficient lenders. Therefore, it is virtually 
impossible for smallholders to secure term loans from formal lenders to finance durable assets and 
fixed improvements needed to improve on-farm productivity and to add value to their products post-
harvest. This can be explained by the fact that formal lenders lack information about smallholders’ 
creditworthiness and therefore require collateral to cope with the high risk of default inherent in 
conventional term loans, particularly in the early part of the repayment schedule (Finnemore, Darroch, 
& Lyne, 2004).  
Term loans are relatively large, and lenders prefer a constant stream of repayments to improve their 
own cash flow. The borrower is committed to fixed repayment schedules at a particular nominal 
interest rate, while income from their operations vary widely. In the event that a borrower’s ability to 
repay is imperilled by low yields, below expected prices and/or unexpected business expenses, they 
have little choice but to default on debt repayments (Finnemore et al., 2004). In addition, these meso-
level loans seldom generate significant cash returns in the first few months or years of their life. This 
creates a temporary cash flow problem for the borrower. As a result, the risk of default is perceived 
 
1 In 2019, the TRRILD project established two VFM branches, one in Myeik and one in Palaw. 
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to be high, and formal lenders who seldom have reliable information about a smallholder’s 
creditworthiness, require collateral to cope with this risk (Carter, 1988). In Myanmar, banks are legally 
obliged to accept only traditional forms of collateral, something which smallholders can seldom 
provide. In addition, formal micro-financiers cannot accept collateral, nor can they offer loans with 
repayment periods longer than two years. 
These liquidity constraints must be alleviated to upgrade smallholder farming systems in order to 
deliver products that meet the IBM’s partners’ quantity and quality requirements (London et al., 
2010), and to help finance the assets needed to add-value beyond the farm gate. Blended finance can 
help alleviate these constraints. The purpose of blended finance is to invest cheap capital provided by 
donors and government agencies in development initiatives in a way that (a) leverages a much larger 
quantity of private debt and equity capital, and (b) meets both the private lenders and investors’ profit 
motives, and the donors and government’s development objectives. From a private sector 
perspective, internalising returns on agricultural investment in developing and emerging markets can 
be either too risky or long term (OECD, 2017). Many studies and reports have shown that to incentivise 
the private sector towards such investments, complementary services are required to mitigate market 
related risks (Kelly, 2012; Mitchell & Coles, 2011, pp. 218-222; Narrod et al., 2009; OECD, 2017; 
Poulton et al., 2006; Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012, pp. 32-34; Tewes-Gradl et al., 2013, pp. 20-21).  
Blended finance has emerged as an innovative value chain financing mechanism to decrease the risk 
and unlock private sector investments for sustainable development (OECD, 2017). Blended finance 
refers to the strategic use of donor and public funds to leverage capital from private investors by 
improving the risk-return profile of investments that have development objectives (World Economic 
Forum, 2015, p. 8). This form of finance has received increased attention from the international 
community as a way for traditional aid providers to mobilise private sector investment in emerging 
markets. Blended finance makes use of development finance sources such as donor funds, grants from 
private foundations, friendly governments and, social impact investors. These funds can be used as 
concessional finance in a first loss position to provide a risk cushion for private investors to meet the 
demands of smallholders and value chain finance (OECD, 2017).  
While this mechanism has recorded success in Myanmar through Yoma Bank’s Agribusiness Finance 
Programme (Yoma Bank, 2017, p. 2), loan guarantee schemes have been criticised on the grounds that 
they do not address the temporary liquidity problems that arise when productive assets are financed 
with term loans (Finnemore et al., 2004). In reality, they encourage reckless lending by transferring 
the risk from the lender to the donor. As a result, loan guarantees are seldom sustainable tools to 
finance term loans to invest in productive assets. Instead, Finnemore et al. (2004) recommend loans 
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with graduated or deferred repayment schedules to encourage commercial bank lending to finance 
productive assets. These loan products alleviate cash flow problems often experienced within the first 
few years of financing plant and equipment using a conventional term loan. Compared to conventional 
term loans, graduated payment loans and deferred payment loans have lower levels of repayment in 
the early years, and higher levels of payment in the later years. Loan repayments therefore align better 
with the borrower’s cash flow, making the loan financially feasible. Although these loan products are 
profitable and alleviate the borrower’s cash flow problem, they transfer this problem to the lender. 
To address this dilemma, development funds can be used to provide wholesale loans with graduated 
or deferred repayment schedules to commercial banks that, in turn, provide smallholders’ with retail 
loans on the same or similar terms (Lyne et al., 2000)  
Through blended finance, development funds can be used to establish the IBMs needed to upgrade 
agri-food value chains and provide significant benefits to resource poor smallholders and 
entrepreneurs. For the TRRILD project, a significant sum of the grant was dedicated to establishing 
branches of a successful microfinance company (VFM) in Myeik and Palaw. These funds were intended 
to address the liquidity problems that constrain on-farm productivity. Development funds can also be 
used to boost smallholder equity in co-owned POs. Apart from increasing smallholders’ share of added 
value, this additional equity sweetens the deal for strategic partners by reducing their share of the risk 
associated with a new value-added investment. This leverages private sector equity capital, expertise, 
and intangible assets, vastly improving the PO’s creditworthiness and hence its access to term loans 
that banks may previously have considered too risky. Development practitioners refer to these 
development funds as impact investing funds (Beckwith, 2018, p. 48). These investments are made 
with the primary intention of generating sustainable social and environmental impacts with a zero to 
nominal return on capital (UNDP, 2014, p. 140). The underlining importance of these funds is their 
ability to draw private sector capital towards businesses that would otherwise not attract, or have 
access to, private sector financing (Sunderland, 2016). This study proposes that smallholders can 
capture greater benefits in the value chain if their PO model allows them to attract strategic partners 
and retain control of the assets in an inclusive business. 
2.6 Establishing functional producer groups and producer organisations 
For value chain facilitation agents, donors, and rural development practitioners, working at improving 
value captured by smallholders through the agricultural value chain almost always require focusing on 
the producers (McKague & Siddiquee, 2014, p. 63). As a result, instigating horizontal coordination and 
integration at the producer level is one of the most common activities in value chain development. 
The mixed results and sustainability of such initiatives signal that PG membership is not sufficient to 
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enhance productivity and improve smallholders’ livelihoods (Tallam, 2018). Stockbridge, Dorward, and 
Kydd (2003) argue that without a common sense of purpose, solidarity, socio-economic homogeneity, 
and appropriate institutional arrangements, the establishment of PGs can incur transaction costs that 
can erode the benefits of collective action. In addition, Pingali, Khwaja, and Meijer (2005) report that 
when forming new collective action groups, particularly in rural areas, development practitioners are 
faced with the dilemma that the poor often lack the essential resources for successful cooperation 
and operation of a business enterprise. These include basic education, management and 
entrepreneurial skills, and financial capacity.  
The process of establishing PGs capable of operating on their own is complex and can take an 
enormous amount of time and resources (Hellin, Lundy, & Meijer, 2009; Penrose-Buckley, 2007). For 
these reasons, PGs rarely self-organise without external support. Mishra and Swanson (2009) show 
that with external support, the process of establishing informal PGs among small vegetable producers 
in India took a minimum of two years before the groups were capable of operating independently at 
the transactional level. Where the PG forming process is spearheaded by external actors, Penrose-
Buckley (2007, p. 79) cautions that from inception, producers should take ownership of the initiative 
and work together to avoid over-dependency on external support. 
Tuckman and Jensen (1977) postulate that small groups go through a five-stage development phase 
of forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning. From a PG development perspective, the 
process starts from when the producers first meet. The process ends when they have developed a 
group that is capable of performing independently towards the achievement of their collective 
objectives. Some groups may never experience the adjourning stage. While some may carry on as 
transactional collective action groups, others may become POs. Some may dissolve after support 
(whether internal or external) to the group ceases. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the recommended 
process for establishing PGs with external support. 
In the early stages, many authors point to the need for interventions that build group solidarity 
towards a common purpose, social capital, and autonomy (McKague & Siddiquee, 2014; Mishra & 
Swanson, 2009; Mwambi et al., 2020; Penrose-Buckley, 2007; Tallam, 2018). Abaru, Nyakuni, and 
Shone (2006) suggest that from the onset, farmers should identify their collective needs. As the group 
develops, they should focus on building sufficient capacity within the group to meet these needs. 
During the early stages, the groups tend to be large, have a multi-product focus, low formalisation 
status, and require little or no member investment. Their functions are limited to simple marketing 
transactions such as the bulk purchase of inputs and collective selling of outputs, and training (Groot 
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Kormelinck et al., 2019). Their primary objective is to provide members with services that encourage 
them to participate in collective action (Mukindia, 2014).  
 Table 2.2 Recommended process for establishing PGs with external support 
Stages Role of external actor 
Start-up 
(Forming) 
- Engage the community to raise awareness among producers to work 
collectively  
- Conduct village meetings to explain how PGs work 
- Identify interested producers and group leaders 
Firming-up 
(Storming)  
- Organise group meetings 
- Define the purpose and objectives based on commonality of group interests 
- Identify challenges and opportunities 
- Resolve conflict 
Setting-up 
(Norming) 
- Develop rules for the group 
- Encourage activities that promote group cohesion 
- Capacity building and leadership training 
- Brainstorm collective plans  
Acting upon 
(Performing) 
- Facilitate development and implementation of collective marketing plans 
- Encourage leaders to pursue short-term attainable goals 
- Provide demonstration support such as pilot activities 
Scaling-up (PG 
to PO) 
- Provide training to build group leaders’ managerial capacity (business 
administration, enterprise planning, budgeting, and record keeping) 
- Facilitate the development of enterprise plans 
- Help POs to select and formalise appropriate legal status  
Source: Developed by Author and adapted from McKague and Siddiquee (2014), Mishra and 
Swanson (2009), and Penrose-Buckley (2007)   
Penrose-Buckley (2007) postulates that producer-owned organisations undergo a progressive 
development path from informal ‘early stage’ groups to formal ‘advanced’ organisations. Groups that 
do not make it past the informal phase are unlikely to develop into organisations that engage in value-
adding activities. As the PG develops and the capacity of its leadership increase, they transition to an 
intermediate phase where they begin to pursue transactions with trading partners. Groups that are 
more progressive may also begin to diversify their service offerings and alter their business strategies 
to focus on fewer high-value products and develop good market relationships with value chain actors. 
During this phase, the organisation’s need for capital is still low. However, members’ needs for on-
farm investments to penetrate high-value markets intensifies. Therefore, the organisation pursues 
marketing mechanisms with buyers, such as supply contracts, to reduce transaction costs and other 
market uncertainties for its members. 
Finally, at the advanced stage, the organisation’s focus shifts to collective marketing and value-adding. 
As a result, these POs tend to be small, have a single product focus, require member investment, and 
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a high formalisation status (Groot Kormelinck et al., 2019). Due to the high frequency of transactions 
and need for capital, some may choose to vertically integrate with strategic partners or purse mutually 
beneficial supply contracts with buyers in the value chain. Consequently, they may be obliged to 
activate institutional arrangements to raise equity capital and to comply with supply contracts. 
Penrose-Buckley (2007) contends that given the scale and magnitude of challenges facing small-scale 
producers, it may take several years before newly established PGs reach this advanced stage. 
However, the author recommends activities that ensure that the PGs develop sufficient capacity to 
find the right fit between their strategy, structure, and market environment. This research argues that 
from the outset the PG must develop rules and institutional arrangements that reinforce their 
members’ expectations, and accommodate a shift from transactional activities to value-adding. 
2.7 Overarching theoretical proposition for establishing functional producer 
groups and producer organisations 
The central proposition guiding this research is that PGs established with appropriate institutional and 
governance arrangements can develop into organisations that offer viable transactional and value-
adding services to producers previously excluded from high value agri-food value chains. Several 
authors (Beverland, 2007; Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014; Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; 
Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007) have applied elements of the NIE literature to explain critical relationships 
between a PG’s business strategy and the institutional arrangements that it adopts to support its 
business strategy.  
Typically, newly established PGs adopt institutional arrangements similar to those found in a 
traditional cooperative. While these arrangements are generally sufficient to support initial 
transactions with preferred upstream suppliers and downstream buyers, they may not be sufficient 
to sustain supply contracts with downstream buyers, as there is little incentive for patrons not to 
bypass the PG and side-sell to a buyer that offers them an even slightly better deal. At this advanced 
transactional level, institutional changes that address internal free-rider and horizon problems 
become important as they incentivise contract compliance. Marketing cooperatives often issue TDRs 
to patrons to achieve greater predictability in the quantity and quality of products delivered by 
members (Woodford, 2008). In so doing, the organisation has adopted some of the institutional 
characteristics of an NGC. 
Addressing the institutional problems discussed in Section 2.4.1 becomes much more critical when 
the PG needs to raise significant amounts of equity capital to help finance investments required to 
support a value-adding business strategy. This is especially true when patrons cannot provide all the 
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equity capital themselves, and when there are other benefits in taking on a reputable strategic 
business partner as an equity investor. The institutional changes required to convert a transactional 
PG into a value-adding. 
2.8 Research objectives and research questions 
Concerning the central proposition presented in Section 2.7, the literature review identified two 
significant research gaps. First, little is known about the institutional and governance arrangements 
that newly established PGs should adopt to function at a transactional level and to support future 
value-adding enterprises involving strategic partners. Second, there are very few guidelines to help 
practitioners with the daunting task of creating appropriately constituted PGs and IBMs. 
This research’s primary objective is to establish functional PGs and POs that sustain smallholder 
inclusion in higher value markets. More specifically it aims to:  
1. Guide the establishment, training, and mentoring of PGs and value-adding POs; 
2.  Design institutional and governance arrangements to support the business strategies of PGs 
and POs required to upgrade targeted value chains, and; 
3. Monitor PGs and POs, refine and adapt their structures to support their strategies, and report 
lessons for best practice.   
Consequently, this thesis poses three key research questions: 
1. What processes should be followed to establish functional PGs for smallholders? 
2. What institutional arrangements are required in PGs to facilitate and sustain collective 
marketing and value-adding by smallholders in partnership with agribusiness firms and 
financiers? 
3. What lessons can be shared with facilitators seeking ways of creating mutually beneficial 
partnerships between smallholder PGs, agribusiness firms, and financiers? 
These research questions will not answered by testing theoretical propositions attributing the 
performance of a patron-controlled firm to its institutional arrangements because there are no 
relevant cases to study in the target areas. Instead, this research addresses these questions by using 
the propositions listed in Section 2.7 to guide the establishment and upgrading of PGs and monitoring 
their performance as transactional PGs and value-adding POs. This research will contribute to the 
(scarce) literature dealing with pro-poor IBMs. The outcomes of this research will provide rural 
development planners, practitioners, investors, and donors with pragmatic and evidence-based 
recommendations to consider in the design and implementation of pro-poor IBMs. 
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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
This chapter begins by outlining the study’s scope and its boundaries. It then proceeds to describe a 
generic research approach and strategy to achieve the Project’s output and address the research 
objectives discussed in Section 2.8. The use of a generic approach and strategy to guide the research 
process acknowledges that in naturalistic inquiries, methodologies continuously evolve throughout 
the research process (Herr & Anderson, 2015). The actual account of the processes, actions, and 
methods used, represent a significant part of the study’s contributions which are described in Chapter 
4. The final section of this Chapter 3 describes the research’s ethical considerations.  
3.1 Research scope 
The choice of any research methodology is influenced by the research’s purpose and scope. The 
research’s purpose was derived from the TRRILD project’s intended output and outcomes. Its scope 
was defined by the Project’s boundaries and results management framework (Appendix A). These 
boundaries included: 
• Research location and target: Thirty-two peri-urban and rural villages in Myeik and Palaw within 
the Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar; 
• Agri-food value chains: The paddy and pig value chains; 
• Value chain interventions with meaningful pro-poor impacts on smallholders: These 
interventions were identified in a separate study led by Lincoln University and the ILRI; 
• Project timeframe (2017-2022) and budget provisions. 
The research built on 32 farmer groups initiated by WVM in the Project’s first year of operation (2018) 
using its standard methodology for establishing community groups (see Section 4.2). These groups 
were loose associations intended primarily to facilitate farmer training. The Project intended to 
strengthen these groups to support transactional activities (such as the collective purchase of inputs 
and the collective marketing of members’ products), and to upgrade some of them into POs (capable 
of financing and sustaining value-adding activities in partnership with donors and private investors). 
In this context, a conventional and purely investigative research approach would not be sufficient 
because ongoing actions are required throughout the research process to instigate incremental 
change towards achieving these outcomes. Instead, an action-oriented research approach was 
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deemed most appropriate. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) identify action research as one of the key 
methods for studying collective action. 
3.2 Research approach 
Figure 3.1 presents a schematic overview of this study’s research approach. This design was informed 
firstly, by the literature reviewed in Section 2.6, and secondly, by the TRRILD project’s aims and scope. 
The schematic provides a structure to ensure that the research process was logical. Nowell, Norris, 
White, and Moules (2017) assert that such a structure helps to ensure dependability, which they argue 
is crucial for establishing trustworthiness in qualitative research. The first phase of the research 
approach was exploratory where the researcher actively engaged with members of each farmer group 
to gain a better understanding of their objectives and the purpose of their individual groups. The 
second phase covered the establishment stage, where the groups adopted constitutions that 
introduced good governance practices and investor-friendly institutional arrangements. The latter 
were broadly specified, allowing groups to customise and align members’ benefit rights with their 
evolving business strategies. The final phase of the research focused on PG upgrading where 
prioritised groups moved beyond transactional business into value-adding enterprises that require 
significant capital investment and mechanisms to incentivise contract compliance.  
The research component of this approach was informed largely by NIE theory relating to agricultural 
marketing cooperatives and by empirical studies that examine relationships between the performance 
of PGs and their institutional and governance arrangements. In action research, theory is used not 
only to inform, but also to complement practice, in an attempt to create positive social change 
(Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire, 2003). 
The action components of this approach stemmed from the need to help smallholders negotiate 
barriers to collective action that could improve their incomes and livelihoods. Clearly, the research 
intended to take an explicitly interventionist approach. The advantage of this approach is that research 
outputs and outcomes generated over time have the potential to help the Researcher and participants 
perform more effectively to achieve desired change as the research progresses. The goal is thus not 
simply to broaden general knowledge about a situation (Burns, 2005). The action components 
involved training and supervising WVM’s in-field facilitators, constituting PGs, training PG members 
and directors, mentoring, and monitoring the development of functional PGs. Chapter 4 describes the 




• Upgrade different types of PGs 
to PO status 
• Develop value-adding enterprise 
plans with PGs  
• Mentor PGs to implement 
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support their particular business 
strategy 
Phase 3: Upgrade PGs to POs 
Phase 1: Examine existing situation 
Actions 
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target areas 
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group’s purpose  
Phase 2: Establish functional PGs 
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• Introduce investor-friendly 
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transactional activities to value-
adding 
• Constitute the PGs  
  
Figure 3.1 Research approach used to establish functional PGs and POs 
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3.3 Action research strategy 
This research adopted a qualitative research strategy situated within the parameters of the action 
research paradigm. This paradigm recognises the researcher as actively engaged in the critical 
exploration of dynamic relationships between people and their physical and socio-cultural 
environment (Zuber‐Skerritt & Perry, 2002). The researcher’s role is not simply to investigate and 
report, but simultaneously to develop participants’ capacity through exploratory joint inquiry of 
phenomena. Such a strategy generates new knowledge by challenging the researcher to use theory to 
implement change at individual, group, and system levels (Watkins, Nicolaides, & Marsick, 2016). 
Considering the purpose of the research, the strategy needed to be flexible enough to accommodate 
change over time, beginning with an exploratory component. Exploratory research is recommended 
when relatively little is known about a topic or phenomena (Singleton, 2010, p. 107; Stebbins, 2001, 
pp. 2-4). Stebbins (2001, p. 6) suggests that as a researcher gains more understanding of the topic, 
they can spend less time exploring the phenomenon and more time confirming and building theory. 
In this regard, he qualifies the logic of exploratory research as inductive, and confirmation as 
deductive. This thesis adopts a similar logic. 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) endorse action research as one of the key methods for studying collective 
action in rural development settings. As action research is widely used across many sectors and 
contexts, it has been defined in a variety of ways. In simple terms, it is a research methodology that 
pursues the dual outcome of both action and research (Piggott-Irvine, 2009, p. 12). Reason and 
Bradbury (2001) contend that action research brings together action and reflection, and theory and 
practice in a participatory way to identify and apply practical solutions to people’s concerns. To qualify 
as action research, the research strategy must satisfy the generic principles of action research. It must: 
i) be collaborative, ii) focused on practical problems, iii) practice transformation and practical 
knowledge, and iv) follow a systematic sequence of events to solve problems (Oja & Smulyan, 1989, 
p. 13). 
This study’s research strategy satisfies these principles. First, the desire to create change through 
improved practices signalled a clear need for a collaborative strategy that is flexible and adaptable to 
address smallholders’ existing situation in the Project’s target areas. This collaborative element 
recognises that action research is not simply researching about the participants, but rather a process 
of co-creation (Chambers, 1995). It acknowledges that the researcher and all participants are initiators 
of change throughout the entire research process (D'Cruz & Jones, 2004, pp. 87-89). In this regard, 
Jacobson (2007, p. 58) advises that the intrinsic role of the researcher should be treated with caution 
to ensure that his/her input, values, power, and ideas do not negatively affect participation, how 
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group processes are undertaken, or the process of creating change. The Researcher thus endeavoured 
to promote mutual understanding, consensus, and participatory decision making among key 
stakeholders in defining the research problem, prioritising actions, and implementing research 
outputs. These key stakeholders included smallholders, value-chain actors, the TRRILD’s project field 
staff, village and government officials, and the TRRILD’s Project Advisory Committee (PAC) – senior 
personnel from World Vision New Zealand, WVM, VFM, Lincoln University and the ILRI. 
Second, action research is problem-focused. Its actions are specifically intended to address practical 
problems within a particular community (Price, 1980, p. 6). The research strategy thus focused on the 
need to design and embed good institutional and governance arrangements in the process of 
establishing functional PGs in the target communities to achieve a hierarchy of PG outcomes following 
the research approach presented in Figure 3.1. Oja and Smulyan (1989, p. 14) advise that where such 
frameworks are used, caution should be taken to ensure that the research does not become too 
prescriptive. It must be flexible enough to accommodate serendipitous findings that are not predicted 
by theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Similarly, Bray and Mirfin-Veitch (2003, cited by D'Cruz & Jones, 2004, 
p. 89) state that action researchers need to be wary of being captured by their methodology. They 
argue that while action research provides a framework for conducting research, participants are 
heavily biased towards action. Thus, it may not always be possible to strictly conform to a research 
approach. The researcher must be willing to delay or readjust plans to accommodate new actions and 
to accommodate the pace at which participants implement actions.  
The third element of action research seeks to encourage transformation and produce practical 
knowledge that enhances the effectiveness of actions, while concurrently broadening the scientific 
body of knowledge about the phenomenon under investigation (Herr & Anderson, 2015, p. 121; 
Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p. 84). The generated outputs, outcomes and knowledge are grounded in 
realities that are valuable to the local participants. Bruce and Freudenberger (1992, cited by Lyne, 
2009) recommend an ‘adaptive strategy,’ involving incremental but predictable change to embed a 
mix of arrangements that produce the desired outcome. They also recognise the importance of power 
structures and the need to include powerful actors to bring about desired change (Bruce & 
Freudenberger 1992, cited by Thomson, 1996, pp. 49-50). This element not only triggers meaningful 
change, but generates practical knowledge (McNiff & Whitehead, 2001, pp. 3-4) that contributes to 
the literature. In this research, changes were informed by both theory and feedback from key 
participants during the research process. This element required the Researcher to observe and 
monitor participants, maintain a research journal to record critical actions taken during the research 
process, and to reflect on the results to ultimately enhance transformation. These practices are 
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consistent with Braun and Clarke’s (2006) rigorous thematic analysis technique designed to produce 
credible and insightful findings that make a significant contribution to the existing literature.  
Lastly, well-designed action research follows a sequence of events and a systematic approach to 
problem-solving (Oja & Smulyan, 1989; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). This entails a series of interlocked 
cycles of research and action that engage the researcher and the target participants in a dynamic 
sequence of problem definition, critical analysis, and first-hand responses to deliver incremental 
change. Piggott-Irvine (2009, p. 13) describes this sequence as an iterative, non-linear process 
involving planning, executing, observing, and reflecting until the issue that prompted the research is 
resolved. Through this process, the research problem is defined and adapted to correspond to the 
literature and what has been learned through reconnaissance (Watkins et al., 2016). This process is 
repeated with the outputs and reflections of the previous cycle becoming inputs for the following 
cycle. These processes should not be bound by time but by solutions to the issues that warrant each 
research cycle (Piggott-Irvine, 2009, p. 80).  
3.3.1 Action research framework 
This research adapted Piggott-Irvine’s (2009, p. 14) problem resolving action research model to 
operationalise the action research approach within the Project’s boundaries and the thesis’ time 
constraints. Three major action cycles (ACs), with interconnecting spin-offs were planned between 
August 2018 and March 2021 (Figure 3.2): i) examine existing situation, ii) establish functional PGs, 
and iii) upgrade PGs to POs. The major ACs correspond to the three distinct phases of fieldwork 
presented in Figure 3.1. Zuber‐Skerritt and Perry (2002) argue that action research projects need to 
progress through at least two or three major cycles to make a distinctive contribution to knowledge. 
The spin-offs or ‘mini-cycles’ (MCs) were designed to trigger action based on theory and observation, 
and help address unexpected issues that arose during the major ACs. They also exemplify the role of 
the Researcher and research-led interventions in the action research process.  
The actions, data collection techniques, and sources of data in each AC were influenced by interactions 
with the PG members. Throughout the action research process, the Researcher interacted directly 
with participants during field visits and indirectly via email, audio, and video calls with the in-field 
team. These participants included WVM’s in-field staff, TRRILD’s PAC, the PG leaders and members, 
and prospective agribusiness partners. Field notes and transcripts of meetings, and dialogue with 
participants, formed a critical part of the data collected in this thesis. Chapter 4 provides a detailed 
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Figure 3.2 Action research framework used to establish functional PGs and POs 




Lastly, leading PGs were used as test cases to refine the research actions and outputs and to train 
WVM’s in-field team before they were applied to other PGS. This approach was taken to improve the 
credibility and transferability of the research actions and outputs and provide theoretical replication 
(Yin, 1994, pp. 48-49). This was important as the research sought to achieve outcomes that extend 
beyond knowledge generation. Since lessons learned in the pilot PGs were to be applied in other PGs 
with similar contexts, settings, and conditions, there was a strong focus on transferability and the 
credibility gained by using multiple test cases to verify propositions that underpinned the actions. 
Guba and Lincoln (1989, cited by Nowell et al., 2017) assert that confirmability is established when 
credibility, transferability, and dependability are all achieved. In this case, confirmability relates to the 
fact that the Researcher’s interpretations and conclusions were derived from data that was verified 
by key research participants. 
3.3.2 The action research team 
Researcher positionality is a critical factor in action research (Herr & Anderson, 2015, p. 37). By design, 
the Researcher is an outsider in relation to the research setting and study participants. This is very 
common in international development projects that seek to initiate transformation (Herr & Anderson, 
2015, pp. 40-41). The research strategy pre-empted this positionality issue by locating the Researcher 
within the TRRILD project action research team (ART) to bridge gaps between the Researcher, 
participants, and the research setting. The purpose of the ART was to gather and analyse research 
data, implement research actions and outputs, help PGs initiate and manage value chain 
interventions, monitor their business performance and compliance with governance arrangements, 
and document and report this information. The team was comprised of the Researcher and WVM’s 
in-field project team – a Project Manager, a Market Facilitator, a Livestock Specialist, an Agricultural 
Specialist and five Community Development Facilitators (CDFs). The in-field team members were 
Myanmar nationals with a reasonable knowledge of English and previous work experience in the 
target villages. Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the ART’s roles and responsibilities. Chapter 4 
describes their involvement in the action research process.  
3.3.3 Data collection 
In action research, primary data comes from engagement with participants in the action research 
cycles (Coghlan & Brannick, 2014, p. 89). This research used a wide range of qualitative research 
techniques for data collection. Primary data were collected primarily through face-to-face key 
informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussion (FGDs) and participant observations during the 
Researcher’s field visits. Key informants included WVM’s in-field team, PG directors and members, 
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input suppliers and buyers in Yangon, Myeik and Palaw, village authorities, government officials, and 
commercial banks. Respondents were identified by WVM and selected based on their involvement in 
the Project, their willingness, their ability to provide relevant information, and their potential to 
provide relevant services to the PGs. The research tools, participants, and sources of data varied within 
each AC depending on the actions that had to be undertaken. 
Table 3.1 The TRRILD project’s ART roles and responsibilities 
Position in the 
TRRILD project 
Role Key responsibilities 
PhD Researcher ART leader - Facilitate and document the action research process 
- Provide training to the in-field team 
- Prepare the interview and focus group discussion 
guides 
- Provide technical support to the in-field team to 
implement actions and outputs 
- Lead ART’s reflection exercises on-site, and off-site 
through monthly virtual meetings 
- Document analysis 
WVM’s in-field team 
Project Manager In-field team 
leader 
- Lead the implementation of action plans 
- Organise logistics for field visits and monthly 
meetings 
- Maintain connections with local government officials 
- Report field activities to project partners 
Market Facilitator Lead facilitator - Lead focus group sessions and interviews 
- Translate information for the Researcher and 
participants 
- Facilitate the action research process 
- Mentor PGs to implement constitution and VC 
interventions 
- Develop market linkages between PGs and VC actors 
- Communicate research outputs and lead reflection 
exercises with PG directors  
Livestock Specialist Technical 
advisor 
- Provide technical guidance and training to PGs to 
implement pork value chain interventions  





- Provide technical guidance and training to implement 
paddy value chain interventions 




PG liaison - Village engagement 
- Organise logistics for all interactions with the PGs 
- Note-taking during focus group sessions and 
interviews 
- Record participant observations 
- Mentoring and monitoring PGs to implement their 
constitution 
- Provide support to Market Facilitator 
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KIIs and FGDs formed a major part of the primary data collection. Semi-structured interviews were 
used where the main objective was to gain deeper insights from participants and to identify the initial 
actions required. Throughout the research, participant questioning and FGDs was standardised based 
on a list of topics (Appendix D) relating to the theoretical propositions described in Section 2.7. Such 
guides are extremely important in action research to facilitate communication between the 
researcher and research participants, and to ensure that critical topics are addressed systematically 
(Greenbaum, 2000, pp. 85-100). The ART used probing questions during the interviews and FGDs to 
encourage deep reflection on issues related to the PGs governance, institutional arrangements, 
business opportunities, and strategies. Gillham (2000, pp. 45-50) asserts that probing questions are 
particularly useful for eliciting clarification, justification, and perspective. 
FGDs were the primary method used for engaging with the leaders. The composition and size of the 
groups varied depending on the issues of interest. Following Chadwick, Gill, Stewart, and Treasure’s 
(2008) advice, group size was managed to ensure that FGDs were not too small (they had a minimum 
of seven members) or too large (they had a maximum of 15 members). The chosen venues for the 
FGDs were convenient to the participants. The ART conducted FGDs and KIIs in Burmese. An in-field 
team member or a translator mediated all of the Researcher’s interactions with the participants. The 
Researcher manually recorded translations and field notes in English while a member of the in-field 
team recorded the discourses in Burmese. Interviewee’s consent (both written and verbal) was sought 
to participate, take photographs, and audio recordings of the discussions. The ART held reflection 
sessions to verify the field notes and data at the end of each day of interviews and FGDs. To improve 
accuracy, the ART cross-checked all field notes against audio recordings. Where necessary, and to 
reduce ambiguity and biases, the Researcher outsourced translation of the documents from English 
to Burmese to Burmese students at Lincoln University who were familiar with his field of study. 
Field visits gave the Researcher first-hand exposure to the smallholders’ day-to-day situations and 
allowed him to observe the in-field team as they implemented actions with the smallholders. 
According to Kawulich (2005), data gathered through participant observation offers perspectives that 
complement other data collection techniques and helps to provide a holistic understanding of the 
phenomena under study. To alleviate potential researcher bias associated with this technique, 
observational data was validated by incorporating it into the interviews and FGDs as probing 
questions. Secondary data were collected from PG documents (membership and share registers and 
meeting minutes), TRRILD project reports, and monthly meeting minutes with the in-field team. These 
were particularly useful for triangulating primary data and monitoring outcomes and lessons learned. 
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3.3.4 Data analysis and reporting 
In applied qualitative research, data collection, analysis, and reporting are not always idiosyncratic 
steps - they are often interrelated and occur simultaneously (Guest, 2012, pp. 22-27; Nowell et al., 
2017). This is particularly apparent in action research where participants’ responses and reflections 
influence the actions and outputs intended to create transformation as the research progresses. In 
















This approach to data analysis in action research echoes Herr and Anderson’s (2015, p. 128) 
recommendation that as data is collected, there should be a constant process of feeding observations 
back to participants. Through this process, relevant themes emerge that produce outputs and trigger 
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Figure 3.3 How data were analysed and used to inform actions, outputs, and reporting 
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(2016) contend that an important first step in data analysis is to eliminate data that does not fit the 
research purpose. Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) recommended thematic analysis technique, 
the ART reflected on the data in each cycle and filtered it to identify relevant data and themes. 
Data were considered relevant if it pointed to specific actions and outputs that would help achieve 
the Project’s aims or if it helped to address the research questions posed in Section 2.8. Relevant 
information was recorded in the Researcher’s journal. This information, together with theoretical 
considerations, informed the design of outputs and actions taken in each AC. The ART, together with 
the relevant participants reviewed, negotiated and refined all research outputs and actions before 
reaching agreement on their adoption. The ART observed and reported the outcomes of this process 
to the PAC bi-monthly for discussion. This high-level reflection triggered project work plans and 
budgets to support the planning, execution, observation, and reflection required for the action cycle.  
Chapter 4 details the actions and outputs of the research process to establish the functional PGs and 
POs. Since each AC is distinct, the Chapter also provides a synopsis of the methods and resources used 
within each AC to execute the research approach and generate the cycle’s actions and outputs. 
3.3.5  Human ethics 
The data collected in this thesis and the engagement of research participants occurred strictly within 
their professional capacity. Therefore, this research did not require approval from Lincoln University’s 
Human Ethics Committee. This exemption is offered in article 6.2.3; sub-article two of the University’s 
policy on human ethics. In the interest of best practice, the research adhered to the basic ethical 
principles of research throughout the action research process. These include voluntary participation, 
maintaining respondents’ anonymity and confidentiality, and avoiding personal or sensitive questions.  
Before participating in data collection activities, the ART obtained written and verbal consent from 
respondents to record all proceedings and take photographs for further analysis using the participant 
consent form provided in Appendix B. At the beginning of each interview and focus group session, all 
participants were informed of the research’s background, objectives, the voluntary nature of their 
participation, and research’s expectations using a research information sheet (Appendix C) written in 
both English and Burmese. As per official foreigner visits within Myanmar, the Researcher was 
accompanied by a government representative from the Department of Social Welfare in Myeik during 
interactions with participants in the target villages. 
The implementing partner, WVM facilitated and sponsored the research and obtained all necessary 
permissions and approvals from within Myanmar for the research to occur. Their international non-
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governmental organisation operating licence in Myanmar and National and Regional Government 





Chapter 4  
The action research process  
4.1 Chapter overview 
Having outlined the thesis’ research approach and action research framework in the previous chapter, 
this chapter details the action research components. The current chapter describes how the Project’s 
activities align with the action research to help achieve both the Project’s intended output and 
research aims stated in Section 2.8. The actions and outputs reported in this chapter are the result of 
participatory interaction, exploration, and reflection on the local realities of smallholders seeking to 
capitalise on opportunities to engage in high-value markets with external support. The ongoing nature 
of action research studies typically provide an account of the research up to a particular point (Herr & 
Anderson, 2015, p. 106). Bound by the thesis’ time constraints, this chapter provides an account of 
the action research process from August 2018 until March 2021. External support to the PGs was 
expected to continue until the end of the TRILD project in 2021, with an impact evaluation scheduled 
for early 2022.  
The chapter begins by reporting Project activities that preceded and initiated the action research 
process. It then describes each of three ACs and interconnecting spin-offs separately as they occurred, 
with reference to the methods used, key actions taken, and outputs generated. The ACs were 
influenced by interactions with key informants, the TRRILD project’s resources, and the research 
objectives. While this chapter is mainly descriptive, it provides material and evidence relevant to the 
interpretation, discussion of outcomes, and conclusions drawn in later chapters. Anecdotes, 
photographs, and quotes from key informants are included to provide a deeper understanding of the 
issues under investigation and the transformations initiated by the action research.2 The chapter 
concludes with a synopsis of the action research process, outputs, and key outcomes involved in 
establishing functional PGs and POs. The outcomes and lessons learnt from the action research 
process are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
4.2 Activities that preceded the action research 
The paddy and pig value chains were prioritised by the Project’s value chain researchers based on a 
combination of economic (profitability, on and off-farm employment potential), environmental 
 
2 The respondents’ quotes provided in this thesis were translated from Burmese to English by a translator or a 
member of the in-field team. The Researcher only made minor grammatical alterations. 
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(climate resilience and environmental impact), equity (inclusiveness of gender and minority groups), 
health, and pro-poor outreach criteria (Rich, 2018). The proposed value chains were accepted by the 
Project partners in October 2018 and approved by the donor in November 2018. This approval 
immediately triggered WVM’s PG forming process which involved creating farmer groups for paddy 
and pig farmers in the target villages. These groups were developed using WVM’s village-level 
engagement methodology. This methodology involved a five-stage process of community 
engagement activities between WVM’s in-field team and households in the target villages.  
The first stage involved introducing the project. Here, WVM’s in-field team conducted village-level 
community meetings with the farmers and village authorities in their respective villages. These 
meetings lasted approximately three hours. The purpose of this introductory meeting was two-fold: 
first, to establish WVM’s presence in the village; and second, to present and explain the Project 
concept to households to determine smallholder interest and willingness to participate. Once the 
Project concept was accepted, the team proceeded to the second stage: ‘group forming’. In this stage, 
the team explained the benefits of PGs and the process of forming groups to the participants. This 
stage was emphasised and took approximately six hours per group, as there was no history of 
smallholders working collectively in the target areas (Snoxell & Lyne, 2019). Stage two concluded with 
participants selecting – by show of hands – five individuals who would act as group leaders. Each 
leadership team was comprised of a manager, secretary, treasurer and auditor. The selected leaders 
were then encouraged to choose a market facilitator from their own ranks or from the participants to 
build relationships with market actors, primarily buyers and sellers.  
The third stage, ‘capacity building,’ took the form of a two-day training session with the group leaders 
selected in stage two. These sessions were hosted at WVM’s field office in Myeik and Palaw township 
and facilitated by WVM’s subject matter specialists. The purpose of the training was to equip group 
leaders with basic knowledge about leadership and management. Group leaders were also educated 
about the importance of social mobilisation and trust building. The team spent a lot of time on stage 
three as smallholders had little prior experience in leading or managing a group. Stage four, ‘goal 
setting and action planning’, entailed three days of participatory discussions and planning with group 
leaders and interested members to set their group’s goals and strategies. Participants were split into 
paddy and pig clusters and asked to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
(SWOT) of each product. Responses were summarised in SWOT matrices to help participants establish 
goals and strategies for their groups. During this stage, the team also provided the participants with 
basic business and financial training. In the fifth and final stage of the process, group leaders were 
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asked to provide a broad business plan to the members for agreement and adoption during a group 
meeting in their village.  
According to the in-field team, stages four and five met with little success as the groups encouraged 
all members to participate in decision-making, meaning it was difficult to reach a consensus on an 
acceptable plan. This immediately signalled the need for a more rigorous definition of the rights and 
roles of members and leaders – a deficiency that could have gone undetected had the in-field team 
recommended goals in support of specific interventions identified by the Project’s value chain 
researchers. Notwithstanding this deficiency, it took approximately seven days to create each PG. By 
April 2019, WVM had facilitated the creation of 32 PGs in the target villages (17 in Myeik and 15 in 
Palaw). 
As an outsider, the Researcher had to acquaint himself with the Project’s activities and context in 
order to successfully launch the action research process. This necessitated desktop research on the 
Project’s design and reports, its target villages, smallholder collective action, and the institutional 
arrangements of PGs, as part of the ‘planning’ phase of AC1. The Researcher developed standardised 
interview guides as described in Section 3.3.3 to gather information from key respondents to gain 
deeper insight into the existing situation of smallholders and their PGs (Appendix E). Herr and 
Anderson (2015, p. 86) refer to these preceding activities as a crucial early cycle in the action research 
process. 
4.3 Action cycle 1: Examine the existing situation 
AC1 took the form of an exploratory rapid appraisal. The purpose of the appraisal was to: 
• Visit all of the PGs formed by WVM in the target villages, and assess their intended and actual 
business strategies, their institutional and governance practices, the capacity and quality of 
their leaders, and to elicit information about their perceived constraints;  
• Gather baseline data from the PGs regarding their membership, production capacity, input 
usage and market linkages;  
• Engage with strategic partners (input suppliers and buyers) to explore opportunities for 
future business relationships with the PGs. The Researcher used this information to 
contextualise the research problem, and to identify changes required to better allign the PG’s 
observed institutional and governance arrangements, with a strategy at least capable of 
supporting the bulk purchase of safe inputs and the coordinated sale of members’ products 
to preferred buyers. 
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4.3.1 Methods and resources used in action cycle 1 
The exploratory rapid appraisal was conducted from January 14 to April 30 2019, during the 
Researcher’s first field visit. An important first step was to create the ART (Image 4.1), introduce and 
explain the action research approach, and discuss each team member’s roles and responsibilities. The 
ART was authorised by the PAC.  
During the rapid appraisal, primary data was gathered by the ART in semi-structured interviews with 
input suppliers and product buyers based in Yangon, Myeik and Palaw, WVM and VFM staff assigned 
to the TRRILD project, village authorities, and through FGDs with PG leaders and members. 
Occasionally, a village authority or an official from the Department of Social Welfare based in Myeik 
attended the FGDs. The presence of these local government authorities did not appear to constrain 
or suppress the voices of other participants.  
Prior to conducting the interviews and FGDs, the Researcher conducted a training session with the in-
field team prior to familiarise them with the interview guides, the consent forms, and techniques 
which would be used to record the data. The Researcher conducted mock focus group sessions with 
Image 4.1 Members of the TRRILD project ART 
From left to right: CDF, Market Facilitator, Livestock Specialist, CDF, CDF, Researcher, CDF, 
CDF, Project Manager and WVM’s TRRILD project Program Manager (absent: 
Agricultural Specialist).  
Source: Researcher (April, 2019). 
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team members to acquaint them with the interview guides and how to use them. This involved 
crosschecking between the Burmese and English versions of the guides, revising the guides to reflect 
local knowledge, and some roleplaying to improve the team’s facilitation skills. The latter proved 
difficult as some of the terms and concepts were new to team members. To deepen their 
understanding, the Researcher facilitated the first 16 FGDs with the help of a translator. The remaining 
16 sessions were ably facilitated by the in-field team as they had developed a thorough understanding 
of the process and concepts underpinning the questions.  
At the beginning of each FGD, the Market Facilitator introduced the ART, explained the objective of 
the session, and obtained written consent from the PG leaders to proceed with, and record, the 
discussions. The facilitator explained that the team was not there to tell the PG what to do, but rather, 
to gather information about the group’s aspirations, its governance arrangements, and the sum of pig 
and paddy resources controlled by its members. This information would later help in the search for 
preferred suppliers and buyers to conduct transactions with the PGs. All the FDG with the PGs were 
conducted in their respective villages. These sessions were typically held in a community centre, at 
one of the PG directors’ place of residence, or in the village teashop (Image 4.2). The FGDs lasted 
between 1.5-2.0 hours, with 9-15 smallholders attending each session. More than 70% of the PG 
participants were women, many representing households in which the male head was busy with farm 











Image 4.2 FGD with leaders and members of a PG in Myeik township 
Source: Researcher (January 2019). 
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Direct observations made during field visits to the PGs and individual farms in target villages were 
captured in the form of photographs and field notes. These notes also included participant 
observations outside the immediate context of the FGDs and interviews. Immediately after each focus 
group session, the ART met to share notes and observations, and to reflect on the interview process. 
These reflection sessions were particularly important in improving the data’s credibility, synthesising 
it to identify relevant themes, and providing feedback to the in-field team to improve their facilitation 
skills. 
The Researcher conducted a total of 21 face-to-face interviews with input suppliers and product 
buyers in Yangon, Myeik and Palaw, both before and after the FGDs with the PGs. The purpose of 
these meetings with prospective business partners was to gauge their appetite for bulk transactions 
with PGs, to share information about the potential size of these transactions, and to explore options 
for future business relationships. The follow-up meetings held with these firms represent part of the 
participant reflections that took place in AC1. A summary of the methods employed in AC1 is 
presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Summary of methods and resources used in AC1 to execute the research approach 
Purpose Understand the research problem from the participants’ perspective and 
identify actions required to achieve desired change  
Fieldwork 
approach 
Field trip 1: Eight weeks on-site and monthly off-site meetings with the in-
field team 




PG leaders and members (350), input suppliers and buyers in Yangon, 
Myeik and Palaw (21), officials from the Cooperative Department in 
Myeik and Palaw (2), and local government officials (2) 





In person and via the in-field team. The Researcher kept field notes and 
action research journal, and audio files  
 
4.3.2 Key findings from the rapid appraisal of producer groups 
The 32 PGs facilitated by WVM were assigned to one of three administrative clusters demarcated in 
each of the Myeik and Palaw townships (Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively). The purpose of this 
clustering was to improve cost-efficiency in the provision of training and support services to the 














Figure 4.1 Clustering of PGs in Myeik township 

















Figure 4.2 Clustering of PGs in Palaw township 
Source: WVM (2019). 
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All of the PGs were formed around the paddy and pig value chains. In most cases, the groups were 
comprised of both paddy and pig farmers. Although these enterprises were not necessarily the largest 
contributors to farm income in the target villages, the incidence and scale of one or both enterprises 
was high in most of these villages compared to other villages in the target area. In four of the PGs (two 
in Myeik and two in Palaw) neither paddy nor pigs were significant livelihood supporting activities. 
These groups had less than 10 farmers who showed an interest in forming a PG. As one of the PG 
leaders from Myeik township explained: 
We [referring to farmers in the village] do not raise pigs in this village 
because most of our villagers are Muslims … Our group size is small 
because most of the villagers are rubber farmers and only grow paddy for 
home consumption … 
Two other PGs made similar comments, stating that they had formed PGs because WVM had advised 
them to do so in order to benefit from the Project. Together, the 32 PGs consisted of 753 smallholders 
with a primary interest in pigs, and 510 with a primary interest in paddy. Table 4.2 provides a summary 
of the baseline data relating to PG membership and their share of village paddy and pig production. 
 Table 4.2 Initial PG membership and product shares (n=32 PGs) 
Households PG members Hectares of paddy Number of pigs 
Village PGs Paddy Pig Village PGs Village PGs 
7456 1100 510 753 4621 946 4664 1439 
 
Pigs are broadly categorised as ‘local’ or ‘hybrid’. Respondents indicated that the indigenous local 
breed is considered less susceptible to disease and produces pork with a higher fat content. Hybrid 
pigs are a cross between commercial breeds such as Landrace, Duroc and Yorkshire. These pigs have 
a higher feed conversion ratio, and produce leaner pork that is preferred by consumers (WVM’s 
Livestock Specialist, personal communication, 2019). More than 75% of the PG members were 
women, many of whom had previously raised pigs. Most households reared one or two indigenous 
pigs as a form of savings. PG leaders indicated that households would sell their pigs to brokers when 
they needed cash to purchase fertiliser for the paddy season, or to repay loans from moneylenders.  
Most farmers had previously kept indigenous sows and raised piglets to sell to other villagers. Piglets 
not sold were typically fattened by allowing them to roam in the village to scavenge for food, or were 
fed with swill and small portions of broken rice and rice bran purchased from local rice millers. Some 
farmers in PGs, closer to Myeik town (primarily in Clusters 2 and 3) reared hybrid pigs. These farmers 
supplemented local feed (broken rice and rice bran) with commercial feed purchased in Myeik. 
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Farmers in more remote rural villages were less inclined to raise hybrid pigs owing to the high risk of 
disease, prohibitive feed costs, a shortage of animal health workers and vaccination services. 
There were no official records of pig numbers at the township level. However, most of the respondents 
stated that the demand for pork was increasing at pace with population growth in towns and the 
rapidly growing number of tourists. Local slaughterhouse owners confirmed this trend and during the 
interviews, stated that most of the demand was met by importing live pigs from Thailand and other 
townships in Myanmar, particularly Mawlamyine, located approximately 570km north of Myeik.  
Discussions with butchers and retailers revealed that the chain was highly fragmented, with very little 
coordination between farmers and buyers. Local pig farmers usually conducted their transactions with 
brokers who scouted the villages. There were no consistent quality standards for live pigs. Brokers 
visually inspected the pigs and offered farmers a price based on rates previously negotiated with a 
slaughterhouse. Faced with high unit transportation costs, small pig farmers had little bargaining 
power, especially when dealing with brokers. In the absence of recognised basic quality standards, 
there was also little incentive for them to improve the quality of their pigs. The interviews also 
revealed the presence of high information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. 
Most of the paddy growers in the PGs were men. Paddy farmers in Myeik and Palaw townships usually 
cultivate one paddy crop per year during the wet season. Interviewed farmers attributed low yields to 
inadequate training, high production costs, poor quality seed, poor soil management, and frequent 
excess flooding of the paddy fields. The latter problem often resulted in the loss of the entire crop. In 
the target villages, the average yield per hectare was approximately 2243.7-2522.9kgs (99-111 
baskets) of paddy grain. 3 This is 55-60% less than average yields in Myanmar’s main paddy producing 
areas. Myanmar Awba’s Chief Agronomist stated that yields in the Project’s target area could double 
if farmers used better quality inputs (seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides) and better production 
techniques.  
In the traditional system, farmers typically sell their paddy crop at low prices immediately after 
harvest, as they have to redeem seasonal production loans. Again, the Researcher found little 
evidence of coordination in the supply chain. While some paddy grain is sold to brokers who supply 
large rice millers in Myeik, most of the grain is of poor quality and is sold to local millers who operate 
obsolete milling equipment (Image 4.3).  
 
3 A basket is the standard measurement of harvested paddy grain used by farmers, brokers, and millers. 














A local miller indicated that milling losses could be as high as 45% depending on the quality of the 
paddy grain. Grain processed by local millers fetches low prices in village markets, as it cannot 
compete with better quality grain available in regional towns. Broken rice is sold as animal feed at 
very low prices. Millers require term loans to finance new milling equipment, but term loans are only 
available from commercial banks that require formal collateral that few rural households can provide. 
4.3.3 Producer group institutional and governance arrangements 
Interviews with WVM staff responsible for establishing the PGs suggest that little consideration was 
given to the PGs’ institutional and governance arrangements. Typically, groups created using WVM’s 
village engagement methodology are instituted with ten basic rules which the staff refer to as the 
basic constitution and by-laws of PGs (Box 4.1). Their five-stage process of PG forming does not include 
any discussions or negotiations about the groups’ institutional or governance arrangements. The 
interview data indicated that the in-field team had little knowledge about establishing PGs with 
appropriate institutional and governance arrangements. 
 
Image 4.3 Typical rice milling equipment observed in the PGs 
Source: Researcher (January 2019). 
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Box 4.1 WVM’s basic rules used to establish PGs 
PG constitution and by-laws4 
 
1. The PG members must attend basic agriculture or livestock training 
2. Members must help each other 
3. The group members must attend training and meetings provided by World Vision for 
Agriculture or Livestock 
4. PGs members must apply the business which they received from training 
5. The PG members must be willing and able to share information and technology with other 
local value chain development (LVCD) 
6. Members must sell their produce in accordance with the group’s agreements 
7. Before collective selling, the leaders must hold a meeting to obtain agreement from the 
group’s members 
8. The Local Market Facilitator must share market information two to three days in advance 
of any group meeting designed to gain members’ agreement for collective selling 
9. PG members must attend monthly group meetings 
10. If there is a monthly meeting or urgent meeting, members must invite each other 
 
The audit of PGs confirmed that they had very loose institutional and governance arrangements and 
that membership was not well defined. When questioned about their institutional arrangements and 
membership requirements, a PG leader from Shin Myat Taung PG responded: 
Anyone from the village can join our group if they are interested in the 
project. When they come to the meetings we [referring to leaders] record 
their names and contact numbers. If they stop coming to the meetings, they 
are no longer members … 
These views were echoed across all of the PGs. This loose approach to membership was also evident 
in most of the PGs’ membership lists which varied every time WVM hosted a meeting or training 
session with each group. Group leaders had been selected by villagers that showed interest in the 
project rather than by registered PG members. None of the PGs were engaged in, or had any prior 
experience with, collective marketing. They had no stated objectives or functions, and neither the 
leaders nor the members knew what the intended purpose of their PG was. When asked about their 
plans, more than half of the PG leaders responded: 
We [referring to the PG] do not have any plans yet; we are waiting for 
WVM and the Project [referring to the Researcher] to tell us what to do and 
how they can help us… 
After the first four FGDs, the ART’s reflections on the collected data demonstrated that the PGs 
facilitated by WVM were dysfunctional and that the action research should focus on helping the PGs 
 
4 Translated from Burmese to English 
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set clear objectives and institute well-defined rights and responsibilities for group leaders and 
members. The virtual absence of institutional and governance arrangements made many of the 
questions in the original interview guideline redundant and shifted the objective of the FGD from 
investigation to actions that would provide the groups with a purpose and ensure they were 
functional. This represented the first instance where the participants’ responses promptly influenced 
the course of action in the research process. In subsequent FGDs, the participants were asked to 
identify major challenges they faced as farmers. This exercise was designed to highlight their 
commonalities. Table 4.3 summarises the responses obtained from the FGDs.  
 Table 4.3 Summary of participants’ responses to challenges faced (n=30 PG FGDs with 9-15 
participants per PG) 
Challenges faced Some statements from participants 
• Quality inputs, seeds and 
breeds 
We use our own seeds and no fertiliser 
because it is too expensive to leave the 
village to purchase it … 
We do not know how to grow paddy or 
raise hybrid pigs systematically. Our pigs 
die because we have no medication … 
We borrow money from our family or 
friends to grow rice or to buy a pig. We do 
not have access to affordable loans to 
expand our business … 
We sell our paddy locally or to brokers that 
come to the village … 
Most times we sell our pigs when a broker 
come to the village and we need cash … 
• Labour shortages 
• Land preparation 
• Access to good 
agricultural practices 
(GAP) training 
• Access to extension and 
veterinary services  
• Access to affordable 
seasonal and term loans 
• Coordination with buyers 
and input suppliers 
At the same time the ART engaged the farmers in discussions (Image 4.4) to identify solutions to 
common challenges. Initially, participants voiced solutions relevant to their own circumstances. 
However, as the discussions progressed, participants began to appreciate what might be achieved 
through collective action. By the end of the sessions, the participants realised and accepted that the 
purpose of their PG was to find solutions to common challenges confronting paddy and pig farmers.  
Another PG group leader stated in a closing speech: 
We need to work together because we cannot solve our problems alone … 
Our village is far away from Myeik [town] and instead of each person going 
there to buy animal feed, we can put our money together and purchase 













These participatory and active discussions were the first step in helping the PGs develop a shared 
vision that would contribute to mutual trust building and group solidarity. Although the responses 
varied, the ART’s reflection on FGDs with the PGs revealed that the agreed individual challenges and 
solutions resonated with the five main themes presented in Figure 4.3. Participants validated these 
themes in a follow-up visit with the field team. This information was used as inputs to develop well-




Image 4.4 A PG leader summarising the group’s discussion on the PG’s purpose 





4.3.4 Findings from meetings with strategic agri-businesses 
Table 4.4 lists the agribusiness firms interviewed during AC1 and summarises their potential roles as 
strategic partners. Only two of the six firms interviewed in Yangon had business operations in the 
target area. Most of these firms channelled farm inputs through dealers situated in Myeik and Palaw. 
Some indicated a willingness to offer bulk discounts and complementary technical advice to PGs that 
placed large orders with their local dealer. 
A meat wholesaling company in Yangon indicated that it would pay premium prices for fresh pork if 
the PGs could meet its quality requirements for raising and slaughtering pigs. The ART’s Livestock 
Specialist used quality requirements from the meat wholesaling company to design food safety 
protocols and training packages for PG members. Similarly, the Agricultural Specialist benefited from 
training in soil testing methods provided by Myanmar Awba. The knowledge gained from this training 
was later used in AC2 to provide advice for PGs that contracted their members to produce high quality 
paddy seed. Interviews with high-end restaurant and hotel managers in Myeik revealed a significant 
and growing demand for high quality fresh pork cuts, particularly during the high tourist season and, 

























* Affordable seasonal & term loans





Figure 4.3 Summary of challenges faced by PG members (n=30PGs) 
Source: Developed by the ART.  
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Wholesale Myanmar and the Myeik Township Development Committee - TDC) also expressed interest 
in providing equity capital and expertise to upgrade local abattoirs and the cold chain. 
Table 4.4 Agribusiness firms interviewed during AC1 
Prospective business 
partners 
Core business Location Potential benefit for PGs 
Myanmar C.P. Livestock 
Company Limited 
Producer and supplier of 
animal feed 
Yangon 
Technical advice and bulk discounts 
for animal feed and hybrid pigs  
De Heus Myanmar 
Limited 
Producer and supplier of 
animal feed  
Yangon 
Technical advice and bulk discounts 
for animal feed  
Myanma Awba  Agricultural input supplier Yangon 
Training, technical advice, and bulk 
discounts for fertiliser and pesticide  
Myanmar Livestock 
Federation 
Protect livestock farmers’ 
interests  
Yangon 




Producer and supplier of 
animal feed 
Yangon 
Technical advice and bulk discounts 
for animal  
Dr Feed Producer of animal feed Yangon Technical advice 
Metro Wholesale 
Myanmar 
Buyer of premium meat 
products 
Yangon 
Premium prices for pork cuts, 
quality control, equity finance, and 
expertise to upgrade abattoirs and 
the cold chain 
Yadanar  Fertiliser and input retailer  Palaw Local supply of inputs 
Shwe Phi Min  Fertiliser and input retailer  Myeik  Local supply of inputs 
OK Millers Company 
Limited 
Rice miller Myeik 
Improved seed, buyer of paddy 
grain and de-hulled rice, supplier of 
broken rice and bran for animal feed 
Tanintharyi Light Rice miller Myeik 
Improved paddy seed, contract 
buyer of paddy rice 
Good Brothers 
Company Limited 
Farm machinery retailer Myeik Technical advice 
Htoo Htoo Fish Mill 
Company Limited 
Producer and supplier of 
fish meal 
Myeik 
Bulk supply of fish meal for animal 
feed 
Mergui De Kitchen Restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Myeik TDC Local government  Myeik 
Slaughter licenses, equity finance to 
upgrade abattoirs and the cold chain  
Lashio  Restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
My Mergui  Bar and restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Mr. Bamboo  Restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Grand Jade Hotel Hotel and restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Green Eyes Hotel Hotel and restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Lotus  Restaurant Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Pearl Laguna Resort  Hotel Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
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In Myeik and Palaw, pig slaughtering is regulated by the TDC. The TDCs auction annual quotas 
(licenses) that limit the maximum number of pigs the holder is permitted to slaughter that year. In 
Myeik, the TDC auctioned two principal licences, one of which was divided into two sub-licenses, and 
the other into ten sub-licenses. In Palaw, the TDC auctioned one primary license that was divided into 
four sub-licences. Although these short-term quotas create uncertainty that discourages holders from 
making long-term investments in their businesses, the interviewed license holders were reasonably 
confident that they would continue to secure quotas. Some had held their licenses for more than five 
years. Nevertheless, most license holders did not invest in abattoirs of their own: instead, they 
slaughtered pigs in a derelict and unhygienic municipal abattoir administered by the TDC (Image 4.5).  
  
None of the local (public or private) abattoirs met the food safety standards required by premium pork 
buyers (one of the private abattoirs visited could have achieved these standards without too much 
additional investment). Slaughterers had little incentive to upgrade these shared facilities owing to 
problems with free-riders. Nor did they have a strong incentive to upgrade their own slaughterhouses 
due to the uncertainty created by short-term quotas. Key informants from the TDC in Myeik stated 
that the license system was being reviewed, along with plans to upgrade the public slaughterhouse so 
that it would meet acceptable food safety standards. 
 
Image 4.5 Shared municipal slaughterhouse in Myeik  
Source: Researcher (January 2019). 
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4.4 Mini-cycle 1: Prepare constitution and by-laws for producer groups 
The Researcher’s audit of the PGs found that their members had not negotiated any institutional or 
governance arrangements. The groups had no clearly stated objectives or strategies. These began to 
emerge when the focus of the group discussions shifted in favour of identifying and solving agricultural 
problems common to all PG members. This triggered MC1 – the first spin-off cycle in the action 
research process – as it was clear that PGs had an important role to play in addressing these shared 
problems, but would remain dysfunctional unless members agreed on their goals, rights, and 
responsibilities. This section describes the template that was developed by the ART between March 
and May 2019 to streamline the task of constituting PGs with well-defined, investor-friendly 
institutional and governance arrangements.  
To address the general lack of experience with collective action in the PGs and the in-field team, the 
template offered a set of broad institutional and governance arrangements that could be easily 
explained and understood, and which provided a foundation for members’ business aspirations 
expressed in AC1. To this end, the Researcher prepared a master constitution containing institutional 
and governance arrangements that allowed PGs to issue different types of shares to patron and non-
patron investors to incentivise investment and to encourage member compliance with supply 
contracts if and when needed to support a group’s evolving business strategy. The constitution took 
into consideration the data gathered from the PGs in AC1, best practice, lessons learnt from other 
developing countries, and cooperative legislation in Myanmar. The latter was particularly important 
to ensure that the by-laws specified in the master constitution would not be compromised if a group 
decided to register as a cooperative, taking into consideration that successful PGs may choose to 
formalise their legal status at some future stage of their business development. 
Regular interaction with the in-field team via Skype and email was crucial during this mini cycle to 
clarify and contextualise the law and relevant information gleaned from the interviews and FGDs in 
AC1. The master constitution and by-laws went through numerous iterations and reflections by the 
Researcher and his supervisory team before it was presented to the PGs for explanation and 
negotiation. 
4.4.1 Producer group master constitution and by-laws 
The master constitution equips informal PGs with pragmatic institutional and governance 
arrangements. Typically, evidence of a well-considered constitution, negotiated with, and accepted 
by members at a general meeting, is also a prerequisite for formal registration of a PG as a company, 
(unitised) trust or cooperative. The master constitution in Appendix F has 19 clauses, including a 
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member registration form that are consistent with the requirements outlined in Myanmar’s existing 
Cooperative Rules No. 52/2013. The vision, objectives, membership requirements, duties, and rights 
of the members outlined in Sections 4-8 were influenced by key themes generated from farmer 
responses to questions raised during the FGDs in AC1. As a result of their reflection and thematic 
analysis of the data gathered in AC1, the ART drafted the general vision and objectives for the PGs: 
‘To promote the economic and social welfare of our members through collective agricultural 
marketing activities.’ 
This vision signifies the common bond that unites PG members. As stated in Clause 5, the 
corresponding objectives of the constitution are as follows: 
• Encourage coordination among farmers, buyers and other key value chain actors to improve 
market linkages, access to market information, training, and other services. 
• Arrange for the collective purchase of inputs, storage, grading, transportation and sale of 
agricultural products through the PG. 
• Encourage and disseminate among members, knowledge on the use of modern farming 
techniques to promote profitable and sustainable methods of farming. 
• Where necessary, enter into contractual [contracts] arrangements with members to grow and 
supply agricultural products that meet market safety and quality standards. 
• Facilitate members’ access to individual and group loans to improve and grow their farming 
business. 
These objectives are a direct response to the key themes outlined in Figure 4.3. They represent 
fundamental strategies that the PGs intend to pursue in order to address the common challenges 
confronting their members. The master constitution distinguishes between full and associate 
members (as shown in Sections 6 and 8 of the constitution) and includes pro-forma membership 
application forms for both natural and juristic persons – the latter catering for corporate members like 
strategic business partners. The final section of the master constitution confirms its acceptance by 
members. Myanmar’s Cooperative Society Law requires a minimum of five persons to witness a 
group’s decision to form a primary cooperative.  
Training manuals and support tools were developed to assist the in-field team to constitute the PGs. 
These tools included a Burmese version of the master constitution, templates for recording 
transactions with members, and minutes from board and general meetings, Excel© databases for 
registered members, and brochures summarising key features of the master constitution (see 
Appendix G). Adhering to the collaborative principle of action research, a second action cycle was 
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initiated to train the in-field team and present the constitutions and by-laws to the leaders and 
members of the PGs for explanation, adaptation and acceptance, and to guide them through the 
implementation process.  
4.5 Action cycle 2: Establish functional producer groups 
This cycle relied less on exploration and more on application because the focus was implementing 
actions to make the PGs functional. These actions were guided by the key dimensions of functional 
PGs depicted in Figure 2.1 and the recommended process for establishing PGs outlined in Table 2.2. 
The actions undertaken in this cycle were also informed by the outputs and research from the 
preceding cycles, preliminary recommendations from the value chain research team, and by ongoing 
interaction with the participants.  
AC2 was initiated by the ART during the Researcher’s second field visit in May 2019. The purpose of 
that visit was to provide on-site training and technical support to the in-field team who were 
presenting the constitution and by-laws to the PGs for further reflection, adaptation, and adoption. 
This cycle also comprised actions and outputs aimed at strengthening the PGs’ ability and capacity to 
operate at a transactional level. The following sections describe the methods employed, the actions 
taken, and outputs generated in AC2 to help achieve functional PGs in the Project’s target areas.  
4.5.1 Methods and resources used 
Four of the 32 groups created in the TRILLD Project’s target villages were identified by the in-field 
team as test cases to embed the process of constituting the PGs. Three of the four PGs (Pyin Gyi, Kywe 
Ku, and Shin Myat Taung) were located in Myeik township, and one (Min Htein) in Palaw township. 
These groups were purposefully selected based on data gathered during AC1 relating to their 
production capacity (paddy and pigs) and members’ willingness to participate in the Project’s 
activities. The remaining 26 PGs were constituted by the in-field team over the period of the 19th of 
June to the 30th of August 2019.5 After they had accepted their constitution, the PGs were supported 
to operate at the transactional level while the value chain upgrading interventions were being 
modelled by the TRILLD Project’s value chain research team. Throughout this period, the Researcher 
provided off-site support, advice, and monitoring via monthly Skype meetings and email 
correspondence. Table 4.5 provides a summary of the methods employed in AC2.  
 
5 Two of the groups formed by WVM were not constituted because of low participation rates and a lack of 
interest in the Project’s activities. 
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 Table 4.5 Summary of methods and resources used in AC2 to execute the research approach 
Purpose Constitute PGs and strengthen their ability and capacity to operate at the 
transactional level 
Fieldwork approach Field trip 2: Six weeks on-site, and monthly off-site meetings with the in-field 
team 
Method(s) Training workshop, face-to-face interviews with key informants, FGDs with PG 
directors and members, participant observations  
Participants (no. of 
participants) 
PG directors and members (1028), input suppliers and buyers in Myeik and 
Palaw (10), commercial bank managers from Yoma bank and CB bank in Myeik 
(2), Cooperative Department in Myeik (1), in-field team and VFM’s field staff 
Reflection ART and participant reflection sessions  
How action was 
achieved and records 
kept 
In person and via the in-field team. Off-site support to the in-field team 
primarily via email, Skype and Zoom. Monthly meeting notes and action 
research journal, WVM’s Project database 
 
In May 2019, the Researcher hosted a two-day training workshop with the in-field team and staff from 
VFM’s newly established branches in Myeik and Palaw. The purpose of the workshop was to:  
1. Review and coordinate the Project and action research activities aimed at establishing 
functional PGs in the target areas; 
2.  Explain the master constitution and its by-laws to the in-field team and VFM staff, and; 
3. Develop joint processes to train, constitute, and provide information and technical support to 
the PGs.  
The training workshop commenced with an overview of the Project’s activities and a recap of the 
action research activities completed in AC1 and MC1. The remainder of the workshop was used to 
explain the master constitution and to develop a plan to constitute the PGs. As part of the ART’s 
reflection exercise, the Burmese version of the master constitution was crosschecked to ensure that 
it was consistent with the original English version. Ambiguities and contradictions were clarified and 
changes were made where necessary. Facilitation sessions were rehearsed with the in-field team 
before meeting with the PG leaders to ensure that they could clearly explain the terms and 
requirements of the master constitution. 
During this cycle, the ART conducted interviews with key informants from the Cooperative 
Department in Myeik and Palaw, and with the Branch Manager of Myanmar’s CB Bank in Myeik. The 
purpose was to gather more information about current legislation governing cooperative societies, 
the process and requirements for registration, and the type of support, if any, that the Department 
offered to groups that registered as cooperatives. The interview with CB Bank’s Branch Manager 
focused on services that the bank could offer to PGs, and to ascertain whether or not unregistered 
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PGs could open bank accounts in their own name. Information gathered from these interviews was 
presented to the PGs for consideration during the PG constituting process and subsequent meetings. 
4.5.2  Train in-field team to mentor producer groups 
The ART’s frequent interaction with the smallholders (by way of training, mentoring, and technical 
support), was critical in promoting a common understanding of the constitution and by-laws that their 
PG had adopted, its purpose, and the necessary short-term actions to implement these arrangements. 
This, in turn, required the Researcher to provide ongoing training, technical support, and guidance 
(both on and off-site) to the in-field team during the implementation of these actions.  
The training workshop was particularly useful for VFM’s field staff who were not familiar with the PGs 
or their responsibilities as the Project’s micro-finance partner. As one of VFM’s Branch Managers 
admitted: 
We [referring to branch staff] do not know where the PGs are located. Our 
credit officers do not know the PG leaders and they do not know who is a 
PG member and who is not… 
Similarly, the in-field team knew little about VFM’s loan products and services, or how VFM’s products 
and services could be used by the newly established PGs and their members. 
The Researcher provided both parties with extra information about these issues and engaged them in 
discussions to synchronise their respective extension and finance contributions to the PG members. 
Following these discussions, the ART changed the application form prepared for PG membership to 
capture information that would assist VFM in determining the creditworthiness of prospective PG 
clients. The form was also modified to capture each applicant’s National Registration Card (NRC) 
number. This meant that VFM could identify and report on loans taken out by clients who were also 
members of PGs. Lastly, the VFM’s field team and the ART developed a joint work plan to support the 
PGs and to educate their members on VFM’s products and service offerings. These activities were 
endorsed by the PAC which mobilised resources and necessary approvals to initiate the PG 
constituting process. 
4.5.3 Constitute the producer groups 
The process of constituting the PGs took two days per PG. On the first day, the in-field team facilitated 
FGDs with group leaders in their village, initially with oversight and support provided by the 
Researcher using a translator who was part of the in-field team. These sessions lasted approximately 
five hours per PG. The primary purpose of the first day was to present, explain, and negotiate changes 
to the master constitution and its by-laws with the leaders of each group. Where changes were 
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negotiated, the ART amended the master constitution and customised it to each PG. The most debated 
issue was the purposeful exclusion of geographic boundaries that might constrain the PG’s future 
access to capital, products, and expertise. Significantly, none of the negotiated changes affected the 
fundamental institutional and governance arrangements embedded in the master constitution. 
PG directors were given practical training in submitting and assessing written applications for 
membership, maintaining the membership register, and recording meeting minutes. These 
documents and good governance practices are essential should a PG decide to formally register as a 
cooperative in the future. At the end of the first session, participants were evaluated using a simple 
questionnaire to gauge their understanding of the constitution and by-laws (see Section 4.5.4). 
 On the second day, FGDs were conducted with the leaders and members of each PG in their respective 
villages. The main aims of the FGDs were to explain the customised constitutions and by-laws with the 
members of each group, to check that the constitutions and by-laws had broad-based support, and to 
start the process of formally registering members in the PG. These sessions were facilitated by the 
ART and lasted approximately six hours per PG. Acceptance of the constitution was confirmed by a 
majority vote of those present at the meeting. Some (or all) of the group leaders (from AC1) were then 
confirmed as directors and, in this capacity, signed their group’s customised constitution to 










Image 4.6 Group leaders from accepting their positions as directors (Palaw township) 




The brochure developed in MC1 summarising the master constitution’s key features and the potential 
benefits of PG membership was customised to each of the 30 PGs and distributed to their members 
and prospective members (Appendix F 1). The directors of each PG appointed a chairperson, vice-
chairperson, and secretary from within their own ranks. The group’s secretary documented these 
proceedings in notebooks provided by the Project. After signing the constitution, individual farmers 
completed member application forms with the help of the ART. These applications were reviewed by 
the directors and approved applicants were recorded in the PG’s membership register as shown in 
Image 4.8.  
All registered members were issued with a copy of their PG’s constitution and by-laws. Information 
taken from the application forms of the constituted PGs was captured by the in-field team and 
included in a database managed by WVM for monitoring purposes. These details were shared with 
the Project’s partners to facilitate the development of the Project’s value chain and lending 
interventions. The ART held reflection sessions at the end of each FGD to analyse the data and address 
problems encountered with the delivery or interpretation of the constitution and the process of 
constituting the PGs. The in-field team documented the lessons learned and then applied these to the 
other PGs. Once constituted, the PGs were encouraged to pursue activities that promoted group 
cohesion. The ART mentored more progressive groups as they pursued transactions with their 
Image 4.7 A PG’s chairperson signing the constitution and by-laws in the presence of PG 
members (Palaw township) 
Source: Researcher (June 2019). 
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members and trading partners. At the same time, WVM delivered a range of capacity-building courses 











4.5.4 Key findings from the process of constituting producer groups 
Using a subset of PGs as test cases to train the in-field team was vital in improving their facilitation 
skills and familiarisation with the constitution and by-laws. This hands-on approach was particularly 
important since they had little prior experience with the process. During an ART reflection session, the 
Market Facilitator revealed that the entire field team had learnt a lot by participating in this process: 
This learning by doing was very useful for us [WVM field staff]. Since it was 
the first time establishing PGs like that, it was very helpful that you 
[Researcher] were there to guide us through the process … the first two PGs 
we constituted were a little difficult, however, after the third PG, we were 
more comfortable with explaining the constitution and the process of 
constituting the PGs… 
Evaluation of the PG directors’ understanding of the constitution and by-laws indicated that the vast 
majority (80%) understood the importance of the constitution and its contents. Box 4.2 presents some 
direct responses obtained from the post training evaluation.  
 
Image 4.8 PG directors reviewing member application forms and completing the 
membership register (Myeik township) 
Source: Researcher (June 2019). 
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Box 4.2 Participant responses obtained from the PG directors’ post training evaluation 
Kwye Kue PG director: 
I understand everything in the constitution; it was explained very well ... 
It is important to have these rules in place because farmers would come 
to meetings and assume that because they attended the meetings, they 
are automatically members of the PG. With this process we will be able 
to differentiate between members and non-members… 
Pyin Gyi PG director: 
Yes, I understand the constitution and by-laws. I like that it has clear 
rules for directors and for members. I remember him [Researcher] asking 
us these questions [referring to audit in AC1] and we did not know the 
answer, now we know…  
Ma Yin PG director:  
Yes, I understand the constitution. It is very detailed… the training I have 
received, and the responsibilities placed on me as a director of the PG 
makes me feel empowered and motivated to make our PG successful… 
Shin Myat Taung PG: 
... This is new to me and a lot to remember. I do not think that I will be 
able to explain it alone to the members in the PG… 
 
When referring to the constitution and the process of constituting groups in the FGDs, many of the PG 
directors used the word ‘empowerment.’ The use of this term suggests that this process provided both 
the PGs and their directors with a sense of legitimacy, particularly in the day-to-day management of 
the group’s affairs. The evaluation also signalled that the directors lacked confidence in their ability to 
implement the constitution and by-laws. This finding highlighted the need for the ART to mentor the 
directors as they developed and implemented their management processes. 
While constituting the groups, it became evident that at least three of the PGs (Shin Myat Taung, Ban 
Chin Taung and Kywe Nan Tai) would not comply with Myanmar’s Cooperative Law because they had 
appointed directors who were younger than the minimum age required for full membership. Two of 
the three non-compliant groups (Shin Myat Taung and Ban Chin Taung) replaced their under-aged 
directors. Kyae Nan Tai PG made no changes to their BoD on the basis that the under-aged director 
would soon meet the minimum age requirement and the group had no intention of registering as a 
legal entity within the next 12 months. Most of the PGs had to reduce the size of their initial leadership 
team to comply with the maximum number of directors specified in their constitution. Participants 
agreed that the remaining leaders, all of whom were chosen when the groups were first formed, would 
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continue to serve as directors for a period of one-year. They, or new candidates, could be nominated 
for election at the group’s inaugural Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
By the end of August 2019, 30 PGs had adopted a formal constitution. Together, they enrolled a total 
of 833 registered members. At the end of 2019, membership had increased by more than 20%. 
Increases in membership were observed primarily in PGs that immediately offered their members 
services such as access to training, bulk purchase of inputs, and opportunities to produce high quality 
seed paddy, hybrid breeding pigs, and social services such as grief support to members. Seventy-nine 
percent of the registered members were women. Many of these women managed their own farming 
enterprises (piggeries in particular). Others farmed paddy with a spouse whose interests they 
represented in the PG. Table 4.6 provides a summary of membership information for the constituted 
PGs as at the 31st of December 2019. 


















% PGs with 
female 
chairperson 
1008 79% 1129 2182 43% 7 58% 40% 
On average, the boards were comprised of seven directors, most of whom were women. While women 
were in the majority, most of the chairs and deputy chairs were men. Women directors were often 
appointed to positions of secretary and treasurer. In groups where women occupied the role of 
chairperson, they were either highly educated, had previously trained in leadership and management, 
or played an influential role in the community as a respected teacher or small business owner. This 
was not always the case in PGs where the chairperson was a man.  
The PG directors were given ongoing technical support and mentoring by the CDFs to implement their 
management processes and to conduct general meetings and board meetings. While training 
delivered to PG directors focused mainly on leadership and management, training delivered to PG 
members focused on farm management and production (Table 4.7). The in-field team collaborated 
with local officials from the Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the Livestock Breeding and 
Veterinary Department (LBVD) to provide the PGs with technical training in paddy and pig production 
and management. The directors indicated that these training sessions helped to maintain member 
interest in the PGs and to build a sense of member solidarity.  
Interviews with key informants from the commercial banks established that a PG could open a savings 
account in its name, but only if it was formally registered as a legal entity such as a company or 
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cooperative. However, groups could choose to establish a joint savings account with a minimum of 
three signatories from their BoDs. By the 17th of December 2019, 17 PGs had established savings 
accounts with either the Myanmar CB bank or Yoma bank. 
Table 4.7 Training provided by WVM to constituted PGs in AC2 
Training topic Target Duration 
• Leadership and management PG directors 1 day 
• Logistics training for collective buying 
and selling 
PG directors 1 day 
• Start your business  PG directors 2 day 
• Book keeping PG directors 1 day 
• Paddy production PG members 5 days spread over the 
paddy production 
season. 
• Soil testing PG members 1 day 
• Paddy post-harvesting PG members 1 day 
• Agriculture extension worker (AEW) PG members 2 days 
• Basic swine management and disease 
prevention 
PG members 2 days. Repeated on a 
needs basis 
• Livestock extension worker (LEW) PG members 2 days 
• Local animal feed making PG members 1 day 
Source: In-field team. 
In all cases, the directors selected their chairperson, secretary, and treasurer as account signatories. 
Helping the PGs to set up a bank account was fundamental in stimulating their functionality. In all of 
the PGs with bank accounts, the directors indicated that they felt empowered and motivated to start 
activities to generate funds for their group. Some of the more active PGs introduced membership fees 
to finance services provided by the PG. As one PG director from Ma Yin PG explained: 
… Most of us do not have bank accounts of our own so setting up the bank 
account was a big deal for us. To open the account, we had to deposit a 
minimum of MK15,000.6 The three of us [signatories] contributed MK6,000 
each ... At a director meeting, we agreed that each member should pay the 
same, so we introduced a membership fee of MK500 per month or MK6,000 
per year ….  
When asked what the funds were used for, the director responded:  
We use it to pay for transportation costs for the directors when they go to 
meetings on behalf of the group, to buy stationary for the group, and to 
help our members who are sick or lost a family member … I think this has 
brought us closer as a group. When we have meetings, the members 
always want to know how much money we have in the bank...   
 
6 1USD is equivalent to 1400 Myanmar Kyats (MK)  
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In one of the PGs that had yet to introduce a membership fee, members interviewed explained that 
they would not contribute membership fees if the group was not performing. In one member’s words: 
I do not think that they [referring to directors] should introduce 
membership fees now because the group is not performing …. What will 
they do with the money that they are collecting. When they can tell us what 
they will do for us and how we will benefit, I will pay membership fees… 
4.5.5 Implementing preliminary transactional value chain recommendations 
It was evident from the FGDs in AC1 and the PG meetings in AC2 that most PG members faced 
challenges accessing high quality inputs (paddy seed and hybrid pigs) and lacked knowledge about 
new paddy and pig production techniques. Typically, paddy farmers would recycle seed for more than 
five years (Agricultural Specialist, personal communication, February 2019) although this practice 
ultimately resulted in decreased productivity and purity of yields. The TRRILD project’s value chain 
research indicated that only 20% of farmers in the target areas had access to high quality paddy seed. 
High quality paddy is more responsive to appropriate fertiliser applications, and, owing to better grain 
shape and colour consistency, the resulting yields are more acceptable to larger mills (Din, 2016, pp. 
269-276). Preliminary results from the value chain research indicated that larger commercial mills paid 
a premium of 5-10% for quality paddy based on moisture content and the purity of the grain.  
With regards to swine production, more than half (57%) of the pigs raised by PG members were 
indigenous breeds reared with little investment in housing and feed. Pig rearing provides a low-cost 
option for farm-households to diversify their income away from paddy, rubber, areca nut, and betel 
leaf. Indigenous pigs are often viewed as a form of savings to offset temporary cash flow problems 
and to finance inputs for paddy rice and other short-term cash crops (Min Htein PG director, personal 
communication, June 2019). At the time of member registration, farmers indicated that one of the 
main reasons for joining a PG was to access hybrid pigs and knowledge of improved techniques in 
swine production. Most (80%) of them wanted to replace their local breed with hybrid pigs because 
the hybrids were more marketable and fetched a higher price. These concerns featured strongly in 
participatory value chain workshops hosted by the TRRILD value chain research team. These 
researchers recommended that PG members should focus on a two-tier hybrid pig production system 
– farrow-to-fatten (FF) and wean-to-fatten (WF). They proposed that the project should introduce 
hybrid breeding sows and boars to some of the PGs to produce high quality piglets for sale to breeders 
and fatteners in these and other PGs.  
The PAC accepted the recommendation and supported the introduction of a paddy seed multiplication 
pilot programme and a hybrid pig breeding programme with some of the PGs. The aim of the pilot was 
three-fold: first, to improve PG members’ access to quality inputs (seed and breeds); second, to 
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facilitate technical training in good farming practices; third, to mentor PG directors to manage 
transactions with their members. 
For the seed multiplication programme, 16 of the constituted PGs were selected by the in-field team 
to produce seed paddy in the 2019/2020 season, the output of which would be available to other PG 
members for the 2020/2021 planting season. Selection of these PGs was based largely on participant 
interest and recommendations from the team’s Agricultural Specialist. Two seed varieties, Shwe Bo 
Paw San and Sin Thaw Lat, were selected for cultivation based on market data obtained in AC1 and 
participatory planning workshops conducted by the in-field team with PG members and commercial 
millers in Myeik. Both varieties are popular with consumers in the region. Sin Thaw Lat is favoured by 
farmers due to its robust nature, minimal land preparation requirements, and high yield. Shwe Bo Paw 
San is a high quality cultivar that is not widely grown in the Tanintharyi region. PG members attributed 
this to its lower yield, susceptibility to excessive flooding, and their lack of technical knowledge about 
how best to grow it. However, in one of the target villages close to Myeik town, the variety was 
becoming a popular choice among farmers. As a farmer from the Kwye Kue PG explained: 
We [referring to paddy farmers in the village] have been growing Paw San 
for almost two years. It became popular because the DoA introduced the 
certified seed and provided land preparation for farmers who were 
interested … even though Paw San does not produce the same amount of 
baskets compared to the local varieties we get a higher price for it from the 
millers so most of us will continue to cultivate it... 
According to WVM’s Agricultural specialist, Shwe Bo Paw San can fetch a price approximately 30-63% 
higher than the price paid for lower quality varieties. This gap in prices tends to widen 6-8 months 
post-harvest as the supply of paddy declines. 
The Project financed demonstration plots on one farm in each of the six administrative clusters. These 
plots were used to facilitate interactive learning and equip PG members with the knowledge and skills 
needed to produce high quality seed. All demonstration plots were purposefully situated on farms 
owned by enthusiastic PG members or PG directors. Although paddy farms are usually managed by 
men, a significant percentage (40%) of the demonstration farmers were women (Image 4.9).  
One thousand, five hundred and sixty-six kgs (sixty-nine baskets) of certified seed were sourced from 
the DoA and distributed among the 16 paddy PGs for cultivation. Initially, WVM’s approach was to 
distribute the certified seed directly to farmers for cultivation with a written agreement between 
WVM’s field manager and the seed recipients. The ART challenged this inappropriate arrangement 
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because it disempowered the PGs and subsequently replaced it with seed production agreements 
between the PG and each participating member (Appendix H).  
 
These agreements emphasised the terms of the relationship rather than creating a legal means to hold 
the parties accountable in the event of a breach. Directors were encouraged to negotiate terms 
collectively with their participating farmers, and to share this information with other members. In 
most of the participating PGs, the directors chose to negotiate the agreements in the presence of 
members at a general meeting. As one director from the Pyin Gyi PG explained: 
Negotiating the agreement in the presence of all the members ensures that 
the farmer [seed receiver] will comply with the agreement. If he does not 
pay back the seed he received, the other members will look down on him as 
dishonest… 
The process of negotiating the agreement provided a significant opportunity to empower PG directors 
to manage transactional relationships with their members. In total, 39 farmers were contracted by 
their PGs to cultivate improved paddy seed crops. Reflecting on the negotiated agreements, the ART 
realised that the agreed terms mirrored local customs. In most PGs, the parties agreed that upon 
harvesting, growers would return twice the amount of seed received. In some instances, growers were 
expected to repay in cash the market value of the seed received. A group in Palaw township known 
Image 4.9 Farm owner (right) and Agricultural Specialist (left) in seed multiplication 
demonstration plot (Palaw township) 
Source: In-field team (September 2019). 
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for achieving high yields agreed to reimburse three times the amount of seed received from their PG. 
In all cases, the growers retained the right to transact the balance of their seed crop at their own 
discretion.  
With regard to the pig breeding programme, the ART– guided by the Livestock Specialist – selected 
four PGs (two in Myeik township and two in Palaw township) to establish demonstration farms. The 
PGs were selected based on observed compliance with their good governance arrangements and the 
availability of members with suitable housing to raise hybrid pigs. A sow breeding unit with three 
hybrid sows and a boar demonstration farm with two hybrid boars was established in each of the 
townships. Again, the PGs outsourced these operations to members.   
Like the paddy seed multiplication pilot programme, a contract was introduced to govern a mutually 
beneficial business relationship between the parties to increase the stock of quality pigs. Armed with 
the knowledge that local customs are relevant to these arrangements, the ART designed a prototype 
contract to aid the directors in negotiating the terms with participating farmers. For the sow breeding 
units, the parties agreed that the farmer would, within 24 months, return five weaned and vaccinated 
piglets to the PG for each sow received. For the boar demonstration farms, the farmer was expected 
to repay three weaned offspring for each boar to the PG within 24 months. The aggregate value of 
piglets to be repaid was approximately equal to the value of the parent stock provided to the 
participating farmers. Again, the farmers retained the right to keep or sell the remaining offspring and 
the parent stock after the agreement had ended. In all cases, the participating farmers voluntarily 
agreed that PG members would be given priority if they wanted to purchase the hybrid offspring. A 
copy of the agreement is provided in Appendix I. 
The contracts included good farming practices that contracted farmers were required to adopt to 
safeguard against African Swine Fever (ASF) and other diseases, and a tagging system to register the 
high quality pigs and their offspring. The guidelines and biosecurity measures were also used as inputs 
in the design of loan products offered by VFM to establish hybrid pig enterprises. As part of activities 
to provide ongoing support services to PG members, one Livestock Extension Worker (LEW) was 
trained in each PG to provide advisory and vaccination services to pig farmers. These LEWs were 
equipped with veterinary kits to treat pigs reared by PG members. Fees charged for these services 
were used to purchase replacement kits from the LBVD. 
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4.5.6 Initial results of the paddy seed multiplication and hybrid pig breeding 
programmes  
The paddy seed multiplication and hybrid pig breeding programmes not only taught farmers how to 
produce quality paddy seed and hybrid pigs, but improved the PG directors’ capacity to negotiate 
contracts, delegate responsibility, and manage transactions with their members. These activities 
empowered directors to source training services and quality inputs for all of their PG members. By the 
end of December 2019, each of the 30 PGs had at least one trained LEW and one AEW able to provide 
extension services. In addition, 238 paddy farmers and 316 pig producers had participated in paddy 
production and swine management training organised by their PGs. The training attracted other 
farmers who later registered as PG members. Twelve out of the sixteen PGs that participated in the 
paddy seed pilot programme witnessed a significant increase in membership applications. In four of 
the PGs, interviewed members indicated that they knew very little about the paddy seed agreements 
and the status of the paddy seed crop. The in-field team explained to the Researcher that these PGs 
seldom held group meetings and that their directors were not proactive. They had not established a 
bank account, nor had they organised training for their members. Three of these PGs were from 
remote areas in the Palaw township where neither paddy nor pigs were significant livelihood 
supporting activities. All PG directors and members interviewed indicated that organising farmer 
training was a valuable first service offered by the PGs. For most members, it was the first time that 
they had received technical training and extension advice from the DoA or the LBVD. Box 4.3 recounts 
some direct responses from PG directors and members about the importance of access to training as 
a PG service.  
The demonstration farms gave farmers first-hand experience with improved techniques, and allowed 
them to make visual comparisons of crop performance (Image 4.10). According to WVM’s Agricultural 
Specialist, the improved techniques implemented on the demonstration farms resulted in significantly 
higher yields (35% and 30%) above average local yields achieved for Sin Thaw Lat and Shwe Bow Paw 
San varieties respectively. The increase was attributed mainly to the improvement in land preparation 
and planting methods (transplanting instead of broadcasting). PG members who implemented the 
new techniques during the season also reported higher yields than normal (WVM’s Agricultural 





Box 4.3 Participant responses obtained from the PG directors and members on access to training 
PG director from Yae Cho PG in Palaw: 
This activity [referring to training on demonstration farms] is very good for us. It is 
very difficult to make farmers change their farming technique … they use the same 
paddy seed over and over and do not know what type of fertiliser to use. Some of 
them do not use any fertiliser. With this demonstration farm and the training, all 
the farmers can see for themselves the benefits of better techniques and becoming 
a registered member in the group… 
Newly registered member from Let Mae PG in Myeik: 
I have been producing paddy rice for over 20 years, and this was my first time 
learning new techniques on how to produce good quality seed. After attending 
the first training at the demonstration farm, I decided to register as a member 
of the PG and pay my membership fee… 
PG director from Let Mae PG in Myeik:  
When we organise training in the village, we only invite the registered members 
but on the day of the training, we get a lot of farmers that are non-members. 
They come because they want to learn the new farming techniques. Most of 












Image 4.10 PG members inspecting the paddy demonstration farm and applying 
fertiliser during a practical training session facilitated by the DoA and in-field 
team (Myeik township) 
Source: In-field team (September 2019). 
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With regards to the pig chain, by December 2019, four hybrid pig breeding farms had been established 
and were in operation, providing a medium for interactive learning for PG members and LEW training. 
The breeding farm owners had all invested in upgrading their pig housing to satisfy the biosecurity 
protocols specified in the PG agreements. The directors maintained close contact with the breeding 
farms and kept a list with piglet orders from members. A PG director from Taung Pu PG in Myeik 
township stated: 
From the time we received the hybrid sows and signed the agreement with 
the farmer, we have been getting a lot of request from members that are 
interested in purchasing piglets. The secretary has a list of all the names. 
We have told the members that we will give priority to members that 
participate in our group activities and pay their membership fee…  
The ART observed upgrades in pig housing and biosecurity on individual farms (Image 4.11). While 
some of the members financed these investments using their personal savings, others borrowed from 
the Project’s micro-finance partner. Along with the Livestock Specialist and LBVD staff, the newly 
trained LEWs provided vaccination services to PG members and monitored their implementation of 
basic biosecurity measures. 
 
  
Image 4.11 A PG member’s upgraded pig shelter (Myeik township) 
 (left to right: farm owner and Researcher) 
Source: Researcher (taken in January 2020, built in December 2019). 
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The farm owner featured in Image 4.11 stated that she had:  
… always been interested in rearing pigs as a side business. However, it was 
difficult to get good quality hybrid pigs. At a PG meeting, the director said 
that they will be getting access to good quality piglets from Taung Pu PG 
breeding farm. That is when I made the decision to expand my pig house. I 
also learned a lot about rearing hybrid pigs and disease prevention at the 
swine management training… 
She explained that she financed the investment entirely through her savings. By December 2019, 
seven PGs, particularly those in Myeik township, had members who used VFM loans to purchase 
quality piglets and to upgrade their pig housing. The farmers typically borrowed USD179 (MK250000), 
using USD72 (MK100000) to buy a hybrid piglet and the remaining USD107 (MK150000) to upgrade 
their pig housing to meet basic biosecurity requirements. These emerging outcomes suggest that the 
PGs were providing meaningful services that motivated individual members to make on-farm 
investments. The next component of the research was to identify functional PGs that could be 
upgraded to POs  
 
4.6 Mini-cycle 2: Identify functional producer groups to undertake value 
chain upgrading actions 
Once constituted, the PGs focused on extending their transactional activities to include the bulk 
purchase of inputs and collective marketing of members’ products. These transactional activities 
contributed to group cohesion and helped to establish a firm foundation for undertaking the Project’s 
value-adding interventions. To achieve this outcome, PGs would need to finance durable assets in 
partnership with lenders, investors, and donors. However, a second mini-cycle was considered 
necessary before PGs could be upgraded to PO status. The purpose of MC2 was: 
1. To present and explain the recommended value chain upgrading interventions to the in-field 
team and to help the team transfer this information to PG directors. 
2. To take stock of the PGs’ activities and achievements in order to assess their level of 
functionality. This, and other PG-specific information was needed to select PGs that could pilot 
transition to PO status for different types of POs. 
4.6.1 Methods and resources used 
Table 4.8 summarises value chain interventions that were recommended by the value chain research 
team and approved by the PAC. These interventions were inferred from the results of computer-aided 
system dynamics models of the paddy and pig chains. Both models showed that the long-term benefits 
of value chain interventions were significantly higher when implemented by well-functioning PGs and 
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POs (Jared Berends, personal communication, November 2019). The interventions in Table 4.8 are 
listed chronologically and show a transition from transactional activities undertaken by PGs to capital 
intensive value-adding activities undertaken by POs. As argued in Chapter 2, such a transition requires 
institutional arrangements that help POs to comply with supply contracts and to attract capital and 
expertise from members, strategic partners, and private lenders. Some of the transactional 
interventions listed in Table 4.8 were initiated in AC2. 
The ART worked closely with the value chain research team, providing information for its models and 
feedback on their results. The lead researcher (Jared Berends) presented the recommended 
interventions to the PAC for approval in January 2020. The recommendations listed in Table 4.8 
became the blueprint for the ART’s work plan to provide ongoing support to the PGs and to upgrade 
some of them to POs with institutional arrangements capable of supporting value-adding enterprises. 
Table 4.8 Summary of key upgrading interventions recommended for the paddy and pig value chains 
in the TRRILD project 
Paddy value chain Pork value chain 
• Train PG members in the production of high 
quality seed and paddy  
• Undertake soil-testing to understand paddy 
variety target yields and appropriate fertiliser 
rates 
• Concentrate on the production of high quality 
paddy varieties and seed farms 
• Organise PGs around contiguous land 
packages planted in the same variety to 
facilitate mechanical harvesting 
• Establish supply shops for high quality inputs 
(seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides) 
• Establish supply contracts with commercial 
millers for high quality paddy  
• Investment in farm machinery (tractors, 
combine harvesters) and land-levelling 
• Investment in paddy driers, de-huskers and 
storage facilities 
• Train PG members in hybrid pig production 
• Establish LEW network  
• Concentrate on high quality hybrid pigs and 
improve housing and biosecurity  
• Establish supply shops for commercial pig 
feed, equipment, and medicines 
• Undertake systematic pig production to 
ensure genetic integrity of hybrid pigs, i.e., 
establishment of high quality breeder sow 
and boar units  
• Produce animal feed using locally available 
raw materials (broken rice, rice bran, and 
fish by-products) 
• Establish contracts with slaughterhouses to 
supply high-end restaurants, hotels, and 
supermarkets in Myeik town 
• Upgrade a local slaughterhouse in order to 
access premium markets in Yangon  
• Improved access to microcredit for PG members 
• Tailored loan products for PGs that allow them to invest in movable assets and make fixed 
improvements 
From the 21st of January to the 26th of February, 2020, the ART revisited all 30 constituted PGs in their 
respective villages and conducted FGDs with the PG directors and members. The field visits and FGDs 
were exploratory, with the dual objective of documenting each PG’s activities, achievements, and their 
intended business goals, and assessing their compliance with the institutional and governance 
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arrangements specified in their respective constitutions. The ART used this information to gauge each 
PG’s level of functionality using the key dimensions of functional PGs described in Section 2.4. The ART 
then reviewed the data in a reflection and planning session held during the last week of February 2020 
and grouped the functional PGs into four intervention categories based on their observed level of 
functionality, intended business strategy, and resources:  
1. PGs that engage in value-adding activities (Category A) 
2. PGs that engage in paddy or pig supply contracts (Category B) 
3. PGs that engage in bulk purchase and retailing of inputs at scale (Category C) 
4. PGs that engage in collective purchase of inputs (Category D) 
The categories are listed in descending order based on their need for capital and investor-friendly 
institutional arrangements to support the strategy. While some PGs appeared in more than one 
category, the directors settled on the category they felt most comfortable with when the value chain 
interventions were discussed at two half-day workshops held during the first week of March 2020 in 
Myeik and Palaw. Each PG’s chairperson was given the opportunity to voluntarily share their group’s 
experiences and its intended business goals with the participants. Two PGs in Myeik township (Kwye 
Kue and Ma Yin PG) gave detailed PowerPoint© presentations of their achievements, the services they 
offered to their members, and their future aspirations of pursuing value-adding enterprises (Image 












Image 4.12 A PG director sharing his group’s experience and future plans with 
other PG directors from Myeik township 
Source: Researcher (February 2020). 
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The ART then met with input suppliers and product buyers in Yangon and Myeik – most of whom were 
interviewed in AC1 – to apprise them of the status of the PGs and to engage them in dialogue about 
future business relationships with functional PGs. Table 4.9 provides a summary of the methods 
employed in MC2. 
Table 4.9 Summary of methods and resources used in MC2 
Purpose Introduce the value chain interventions to the PGs and identify PGs  
well-suited to pilot the transition from PG to PO status 
Fieldwork approach Field trip 3: eight weeks on-site 
Method(s) Face-to-face interviews with key informants, workshops, FGDs with PG 
directors and members, participant observations 
Participants (No. of 
participants) 
PG directors (210), members (90), input suppliers and buyers (10), 
commercial rice millers (2), in-field team and VFM’s field staff 
Reflection ART and participant reflection sessions  
How action was 
achieved and records 
kept 
In person and through the in-field team. Field notes, journal, WVM’s 
project database 
 
4.6.2 Assessment of producer group functionality  
The functionality of the PGs was assessed using the five key dimensions of functional PGs outlined in 
Figure 2.1. A three-point rating scale (0, 1 and 2) was used to denote the presence of indicators 
observed for each of the five dimensions, where 0 = no observed indicators present, 1= at least one 
indicator present, and 2 = all indicators present. PGs were considered functional only if they achieved 
a positive score for every dimension. This implied that functional PGs could achieve a maximum score 
of ten and a minimum score of five. Table 4.10 lists the indicators observed for each of the five 
dimensions of functional PGs. Table 4.11 presents the scores assigned to each of the 30 constituted 
PGs.  
By the end of February 2020, 20 of the constituted PGs were considered functional. Although all of 
them were adhering to their group’s constitution, eight of them were conducting regular director and 
membership meetings, and documenting meeting minutes (Image 4.13). The other 12 functional PGs 
were less formal and conducted sporadic meetings in local teashops or at a director’s residence when 
the need arose. According to the in-field team’s CDFs, these informal meetings were not always well 









(activities and achievements) 




1- PG has an agreed collective action plan to provide services 
to members 
2- PG members are aware of the benefits of joining the PG 
3- PG provides social services to members 
• Group cohesion 1- High member attendance and participation in PG meetings 
2- PG members pay membership fees 
3- PG members help each other to perform farm-related 
activities 
4- PG engaged in non-farm related activities that benefit 
members 
• Dynamic leadership 1- PG directors negotiate with input suppliers 
2- PG directors organise meetings (BoD and membership) 
3- PG directors motivate members and mobilising them to 
participate in PG activities 
• Good governance 
and adherence to 
constitution  
 
1- PG has regular BoD and membership meetings 
2- PG has recorded meeting minutes 
3- PG has an updated membership register 




1- PG use bank account 
2- Members contribute towards PG activities  
3- PG facilitate members’ access to training  
4- PG engaged in contracts with members 
5- PG engaged in collective selling of members’ products 
(paddy and pigs) 
6- PG engaged in bulk purchase of inputs (animal feed, 
fertiliser, pesticides, medication, piglets, and seed) 
7- Members make investments in PG assets 
8- PG has a plan to invest in value-adding assets 
9- PG engaged in negotiating supply contracts with buyers  
Source: ART (February 2020). 
 
All of the functional PGs were facilitating access to training for their members, and were engaged at 
the transactional level, through the bulk ordering of quality inputs, collective marketing of members’ 
products, or engaging their members in contracts. However, variation was observed in the level of 
transactional services that PGs offered to their members, their willingness to pursue value-adding 
strategies and supply contracts, and their members’ aggregate resource endowments. In August 2019, 
Kywe Kue PG raised USD2857 (MK4 million) to finance a bulk order of fertiliser from a retailer in Myeik. 
In March 2020, Pyin Gyi PG collected member contributions to purchase 15 tons of fertiliser for the 
2020 paddy season. Eight PGs pooled their capital to purchase commercial feed in bulk from retailers. 
These PGs bagged the feed into smaller containers and sold them to members and non-members.   
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1- Ma Yin 2 2 2 2 2 10 
2- Kywe Kue 2 2 2 2 2 10 
3- Pyin Gyi 2 2 2 2 2 10 
4- Pa Yi Taung 2 2 2 2 1 9 
5- Kin Tat 2 2 2 2 1 9 
6- Taung Pu 2 2 2 2 1 9 
7- Ban Ching 
Taung 
2 2 2 2 1 9 
8- Let Ku 2 2 2 2 1 9 
9- Let Mae 2 2 2 1 1 8 
10- Let Khont 
Taung 
2 2 2 1 1 8 
11- Yae Myit 
Gyi 
2 2 2 1 1 8 
12- Wun Hpoet 2 2 2 1 1 8 
13- Tha But 2 2 2 1 1 8 
14- Shin Myat 
Taung 
2 2 1 1 1 7 
15- Ma Daung 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16- Min Htein 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17- San Pya 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18- Pyin Nge 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19- Yae Cho 1 1 1 1 1 5 
20- Lae Pyin 
Tan 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
21- Du Yu Pin 
Shaung 
0 1 1 1 0 3 
22- Khon Maw 0 1 0 1 1 3 
23- Kyae Nan 
Tain 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
24- Kyaung Naik 0 0 0 1 0 1 
25- Peit Htuk 0 0 0 1 0 1 
26- Wun Mea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27- Hmaw 
Kyaung 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
28- Gyint Gar 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29- Gyin Ni 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30- Ta Hmyar 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: 0 = no observed indicators present, 1= at least one indicator present, and 2 = all indicators 
present 













Three of the PGs (Ban Ching Taung, Let Khont Taung and Payi Taung) in Cluster 2 negotiated 
collectively with one supplier from Myeik and received a 5% bulk purchase discount. At the time of 
the FDGs, these eight PGs were jointly transacting over ten tons of commercial feed per month and 
receiving bulk discounts of 3.5% to 5% from their suppliers. Benefits from the bulk discount and 
savings in unit transport costs were distributed to patron members as reduced prices on inputs. Non-
members did not benefit from the discount and paid the market price for inputs purchased from the 
PG. To finance their retail operations, the eight PGs issued shares to their members that were 
redeemed every 12 months, with a dividend (profit share) paid every six months. Patrons who 
committed to purchasing larger quantities of inputs from the PG were required to make made larger 
contributions to the pool of capital used to finance the inputs, implying that patronage benefits were 
roughly proportional to investments. However, there was no share certificate. Shareholders were 
given a receipt as proof of their contribution. This arrangement was initiated by the Ma Yin’s PG 
directors and swiftly adopted by the other seven PGs. As one director from Ma Yin explained: 
…We sell shares of MK20,000 [USD14.29] to the members once a year. Each 
member can purchase a maximum of five shares because we do not want 
one member to invest too much and take control … Every six months we 
share the profits with the shareholders as dividends … shareholders receive 
50% of the profits as dividends and the PG retains 50%. At the end of the 
year, we pay them back the full value of their shares … 
The more favourable the prices charged to patrons, the smaller the dividend paid to shareholders. 
This creates misalignments between member interests as patrons and investors. In the eight PGs that 
Image 4.13 PG directors sharing information from their membership 
register and meeting minutes with the ART (Myeik township) 
Source: Researcher (January 2020).  
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issued redeemable shares, the bulk purchases of inputs were driven and financed primarily by the 
larger users in the PG. While these PGs did more to encourage investment by rewarding investors with 
dividends, investment was still constrained by some of the institutional problems discussed in Chapter 
2.  
Although the PGs settled these transactions in cash, both input suppliers interviewed expressed their 
willingness to negotiate credit terms and bulk discounts if these trading relationships were 
strengthened over time. As an input supplier from Myeik explained: 
I do not offer credit to the PGs because I do not know them that well. If they 
are consistent buyers, I can consider providing them goods on credit and 
even offer them a larger discount…  
All of the functional PGs welcomed the idea of larger bulk purchasing discounts. However, directors 
from two of the functional PGs were reluctant to venture into credit transactions because they were 
concerned about the risks associated with such transactions. At the FGDs, the functional PGs indicated 
that their members were committed to the group. Most importantly, they reported that they had not 
yet experienced a situation where a member had not honoured their transactions with the PG. Box 
4.4 provides some direct responses from the directors of functional PGs about the transactional 
services offered and their future business goals.  
The PGs involved in providing access to training for their members and engaging them in contracts to 
produce seed and hybrid pigs did not have a need to activate investor-friendly institutional 
arrangements because they had little need for capital. However, good governance arrangements and 
practices played a key role in legitimising the PGs and helping them build credibility and group 
solidarity which in turn enabled them to provide their members with meaningful services. Those that 
were engaged in bulk purchase of inputs had introduced some proportionality between the benefits 
of investment and the benefits of patronage. These outcomes are discussed in Section 5.2. 
Table 4.12 provides a summary of the data elicited from the interviews with input suppliers and 
product buyers in Yangon and Myeik, some of whom were already trading with the functional PGs 
offering transactional services to their members. In addition to the business relationships developed 
with the private firms supplying quality inputs, the functional PGs also engaged with several public 
agencies to improve their service offerings (for example, through the provision of member training 
and land preparation). These agencies include the MMOALI - Extension and Mechanisation 
Department in Myeik - and the LBVD.  
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Box 4.4 Participant responses obtained from directors of functional PGs about the transactional 
services offered and future business goals 
 
The pig demonstration farms established as part of the hybrid pig-breeding programme were all 
operational. The PG directors were monitoring the contracted farmers to ensure compliance with 
biosecurity protocols. Directors of other functional PGs were cooperating with the contractual parties 
to access high quality piglets for their own members. PG members were also mating their own high 
quality sows with hybrid boars at the demonstration farms. Unfortunately, the tagging system 
included in the hybrid pig breeding agreements was not implemented. Although farmers were in 
favour of ear tagging to improve traceability and the integrity of the food safety attributes they 
Pyin Gyi PG: 
Yes, we would like to get a larger discount but taking goods on credit is 
risky for us [referring to directors] … Not every farmer can afford to pay 
for inputs upfront. Some of them often take small loans or purchase their 
inputs on credit and repay when they sell their pig or harvest their paddy 
… for now, our plan is to purchase inputs in bulk with our own funds and 
sell it in the village …  
Future plans: 
… Most of our members are paddy farmers so we plan to produce high 
quality paddy and sell it collectively to a miller in Myeik instead of selling 
to middlemen…  
Ma Yin PG: 
Some farmers cannot buy a whole bag of animal feed that cost 
MK35,000 [USD25] or MK45,000 [USD32]. Therefore, we [referring to 
PG] decided to buy it in bulk and retail it in small bags of MK3000 
[USD2], MK5,000 [USD3.6] and MK15,000 [USD10.7] … last week we 
hired someone to work in the shop fulltime because it is doing well. We 
plan to extend the shop so that we can store more inputs and produce 
local feed…  
Of course, we would like to get a larger discount but for now we don’t 
want to take the goods on credit because we don’t know what will 
happen … for example, if we cannot sell all the feed on time or members 
have not paid, the responsibility is on us directors...  
Kwye Kue PG: 
We did not have any issue in collecting the money from members for the 
collective fertiliser purchase. However, there was not much benefit from 
this activity since our village is close to the supplier in Myeik and farmers 
purchase fertiliser at different times ... Therefore, we don’t do it as a PG 
business but some members organise among themselves to save on 
transportation cost … For the coming paddy season our plan is to invest 
in a combine harvester and tractor to provide services to our members… 
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invested in, WVM staff opposed the system for cultural reasons.7 This meant that other ways of 
differentiating hybrid pigs raised by PG members under biosecurity conditions would have to be found 
to warrant a premium above the price of other hybrid pigs.  
Table 4.12 Summary of meetings with strategic partners (February 2020) 
Prospective business 
partners 
Core business Location 
 
Potential benefit for PGs 
City Mart 
Supermarket 
Supermarket Yangon Wholesale weekly buyer for pork 
products, quality control, cold 
transportation and logistics, and 
training for master butchers 
Premium  Buyer of premium 
meat products 





Rice miller Myeik Improved seed, contract buyer of high 
quality paddy grain, technical advice, 
supplier of broken rice and bran for 
animal feed  
OK Millers Company 
Limited 
Rice miller Myeik Buyer of paddy grain, supplier of 
broken rice and bran for animal feed 
Private abattoir Slaughterhouse Myeik Wholesale buyer of fattened pigs, 
slaughterhouse license, equity 
finance, expertise to operate and 
upgrade abattoirs and the cold chain 
Myeik Hotels and 
Restaurant 
Association 
Association Myeik Local buyer of quality pork 
Tun Feed Shop Animal feed 
retailer  
Myeik  Local supplier of animal feed and 






Myeik Supplier of farm machinery, credit 
financing, and technical advice 




Myeik  Local supplier of animal feed and 
medication, bulk discounts, and 
technical advice 
 
At the time of the FDGs, all of the 20 active PGs were providing their members with social services 
(supporting families who had suffered a bereavement or financial setback). One PG which managed 
water reticulation services to the village had a bank balance of USD3572 (MK5 million). The directors 
indicated that these funds would be used to improve road access to their village, which would 
ultimately enable their members to use mechanical harvesters in their paddy fields. Similarly, the 
 
7 A WVM staff member explained that the procedure is perceived as animal cruelty. 
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directors of Shin Myat Taung PG successfully lobbied their municipal authority for better road access 
to their village. These outcomes indicate that functional PGs were not only generating ongoing 
benefits to members and facilitating their members’ inclusion in the respective value chains, but had 
also improved the welfare of members and their local community. 
At the time of the FGDs, ten of the PGs were not functional. Five of them exhibited no signs of 
functionality (total functionality score=0). There was no evidence of them working collectively with 
their members. Moreover, these PGs had low membership rates (an average 17 members) and/or 
were stagnant. The directors had not called board meetings or general meetings. Furthermore, they 
relied on the in-field team to organise activities for their group. Members stated that they only met 
when WVM or VFM hosted training or meetings in the village. In two of these PGs, only three of the 
seven directors showed up for the FDGs. The other five non-functional PGs maintained their 
membership register and had conducted at least one general meeting. However, the directors 
explained that member participation was low. There was no evidence of collective activities or 
services. The in-field team’s CDF explained that while the members were interested the leadership 
was weak and the directors were not proactive. Box 4.5 provides some of the other reasons given for 
the poor performance of these PGs. The ART encouraged the members of the non-functional PGs to 
merge with the other functional PGs within their administrative clusters.  
Box 4.5 Participant responses on the lack of PG functionality 
PG directors Gyin Gar, Gyin Ni and Wun Mea: 
We do not have any experience with farmer groups and it is difficult 
getting members to work together because paddy and pigs are not the 
main livelihood supporting activities in the village … 
PG member Ta Hmyar: 
Our village is very small. We have less than 100 households in the village 
and not all of them are involved in farming. Most of us join the PG 
because we wanted to get hybrid pigs and knowledge of how to raise 
them systematically… 
In-field team CDF on Wun Mea: 
The village is segregated because of religion. Some are Muslims and 
some are Buddhist. In the PG, the Buddhist are interested in rearing pigs 
and the Muslims are interested in growing paddy. Neither of them have 
sufficient capacity to sustain collective activities in the PG ...  
PG directors Khon Maw, Kway Nan Tai, Gyin Ni and Kyaung Naint: 
Most of the members are subsistence farmers. They grow paddy to feed 
their family or a rear one or two local pigs. They do not want to take risks 
by investing in hybrid pigs ... 
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4.6.3 Identification of pilot cases to upgrade groups to producer organisation 
status 
The Project had a minimum target of upgrading four PGs to PO status. However, there was no 
intention of limiting the number of PGs that pursued value-adding interventions. The selection of the 
POs to pilot the transition to PO status was based on the individual PG’s functionality, the feasibility 
of their intended business strategies, their resource endowment, and the learning that could be 
gained by piloting different types of POs. The ART developed a generic concept note template 
(Appendix J) to help PG directors formulate proposals for their intended enterprises. The ART selected 
the three PGs that demonstrated the highest level of functionality (Ma Yin, Kywe Kue and Pyin Gyi) as 
candidate POs to pilot value chain upgrading interventions in Category A to C. Lessons learnt from 
upgrading the chosen PGs to PO status would then be applied to other functional PGs in the Project 
with viable enterprise proposals. In April 2020, the candidate POs were assisted by WVM to develop 
concept notes for their intended value-adding enterprises. These concept notes were submitted to 
the PAC and endorsed during the last week of April 2020. The PAC’s endorsement of the proposals 
was necessary to provide financial support to the POs and to mobilise VFM to develop a new loan 
product to help the POs finance their capital-intensive strategies. Table 4.13 presents a summary of 
the candidate POs’ intended business strategies.  
 Table 4.13 Intended business strategies of candidate POs 
PG name Intended business strategy  Key investments required 
Kywe Kue Provision of farm machinery 
and transportation services  
- Purchase of farm tractor and implements 
Ma Yin Expansion of input supply 
shops and the production of 
local animal feed 
- Seasonal financing to purchase inputs in bulk 
- Warehouse/storage space 
- Feed mixing equipment 
- Working capital 
Pyin Gyi Paddy supply contract - No significant investment required 
 
Kywe Kue PG was planning to invest in machinery to offer its members and other paddy farmers land 
preparation, harvesting, and transportation services. This enterprise would require substantial capital 
investment in moveable assets, certainly more than the members could provide. Ma Yin PG was 
planning to specialise in the production of feed rations using locally available raw materials, and retail 
other inputs required by its members and other pig farmers. This enterprise required a modest 
investment in equipment and additional retail and storage space. The third candidate PO, Pyin Gyi, 
intended to develop a long-term trading relationship with a miller that specialised in processing, 
packaging, and branding high quality paddy. Although theisPG did not confront any significant need 
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for capital, its intended strategy required institutional arrangements that would encourage members 
to comply with delivery contracts. All three test cases called for the issue of appreciable class-B shares 
linked in some way to patronage. The actions involved and outputs generated to upgrade the three 
candidate POs to PO status are discussed in AC3. 
4.7  Action cycle 3: Upgrading producer groups to producer organisations 
The primary purpose of AC3 was to upgrade functional PGs to PO status by developing and activating 
investor-friendly institutional arrangements that would help them to attract capital to finance their 
value-adding strategies and to sustain supply contracts with downstream buyers. The three candidate 
POs selected in MC2 were used as test cases to develop and embed new institutional arrangements, 
and to strengthen the in-field team’s capacity to upgrade other functional PGs with plans for viable 
value-adding enterprises. The actions described in this cycle were implemented jointly by the ART and 
the directors of the test cases. These actions were informed by the theoretical propositions outlined 
in Section 2.7. A key proposition is that proportionality between the benefits of investment and 
patronage encourages members to finance their PO’s strategy and to comply with its supply contracts.  
4.7.1 Resources, methods, key actions and outputs   
This section reports the action research components of AC3 conducted between January 2020 and the 
end of March 2021 when the research was scheduled for completion. While the Researcher worked 
on-site with the in-field team in January and February 2020, three return trips planned over the 
subsequent 12 months had to be cancelled owing to travel restrictions introduced in March 2020 to 
curb the spread of Coronavirus. Guidance and monitoring activities continued remotely via monthly 
skype meetings and regular email correspondence with the in-field team. An in-country research 
assistant was recruited to oversee the first annual general meetings (AGMs) called by the directors of 
the candidate POs, and to equip the in-field team members with the knowledge and skills needed to 
support other PGs with their inaugural AGMs. Methods used in AC3 were the same as those employed 
in the previous cycles. Key informants included PG directors and members of the three test cases, two 
commercial rice millers, a reputable farm machinery supplier, and professional staff employed by 
WVM and VFM.  
Enterprise plans were developed for Kywe Ku PG (test case 1) and Ma Yin PG (test case 2). These plans 
served three purposes: first, to help the directors assess the profitability of their proposed enterprise 
and to communicate its value proposition to members, strategic partners, donors, and financiers; 
second, to determine the business’ capital requirements; and third, to design investor-friendly 
institutional and governance arrangements to support the PO’s value-adding strategy. 
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Work on the enterprise plans was delayed by COVID-19 restrictions on meetings and travel within 
Myanmar. When field activities resumed in August 2020, it soon became apparent that WVM did not 
have a formal process to help directors develop a viable enterprise plan for their patron-shareholders. 
WVM’s standard approach to business development involved training sessions attended by individuals 
interested in establishing or growing their own businesses. As an in-field team member explained: 
Typically, we provide two-day business facilitation training to participants 
on how to start a business and how to develop a business plan. For PGs, we 
only have experience with helping them develop plans for collective buying 
and selling ... We have never done enterprise plans for POs that want to 
invest in value-adding activities to provide services to their members… 
To address this deficiency, the Researcher created templates for a concept note (Appendix J) and 
enterprise plan (Appendix K) to help the in-field team develop credible proposals for value-adding 
activities. The Researcher held an online workshop with the team to discuss the templates and to 
demonstrate how they could be used to prepare business plans. The team then conducted a three-
day workshop with directors from Kwye Kue and Ma Yin to populate their templates and to assess the 
initial capital requirements, profitability, and cash flow feasibility of their proposed enterprise plans.  
Investor-friendly institutional arrangements were devised for each of these plans (Sections 4.7.2 and 
4.7.3). These arrangements focussed on tradable class B shares issued within a scheme that offered 
larger investors better prices for the PO’s value-adding services. This incentive scheme was introduced 
to strengthen proportionality between the benefits of investment (dividends and capital gains) and 
the benefits of patronage (favourable prices) in order to mitigate free-rider problems that discourage 
patrons from investing in a shared business. A unique share certificate (Appendix L) was designed to 
formalise members’ financial interests in the PO and to simplify share trading between members. Each 
certificate includes a ledger to record approved changes in ownership, making it easier for the PO to 
maintain its share register and to adjust shareholders’ dividend distributions and price entitlements. 
If members sell their shares (or some of their shares) to a new shareholder, the PO will issue a 
certificate to the new shareholder to record his or her purchase.  
WVM was concerned that proportionality between investment and patronage would discriminate 
against poorer farmers. At the same time, it recognised the role of donors, formal lenders, and 
strategic partners as stakeholders in IBMs, and was willing to help POs finance creditworthy 
investments in value-adding enterprises by awarding them cash grants. To ease concerns about PO 
elitism, the shareholding scheme allocated WVM’s grant funding equally to each registered member 
to ensure that even the poorest members had a meaningful financial interest in their shared business. 
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This additional equity capital would also help POs to leverage debt capital to co-finance investments 
in fixed improvements and durable assets. 
The PAC reviewed and supported Kywe Ku PG and Ma Yin PG’s proposed enterprise plans in October 
2020, with agreement in principle that VFM would extend its range of financial products by offering 
term loans to creditworthy PGs. The Researcher conducted a second online workshop with in-field 
team members before they took the plans back to the directors for further explanation and 
negotiation. The directors approved their plans in November 2020. 
4.7.2 Test case 1: Investment in farm machinery – Kywe Kue Producer Group 
Test case 1 is situated in Myeik township. Most of Kywe Kue’s 28 registered members relied on 
seasonal crop farming and paddy production as their main source of income. The PG’s location and 
surrounding topography made it a suitable candidate for commercial paddy production and trading. 
However, the directors expressed concerns about inadequate land preparation, farm labour 
shortages, and poor access to affordable finance. As the chairman of Kwe Kue PG explained: 
The land in our village is ideal for paddy. However, most farmers practice 
traditional farming and get low yields. The paddy demonstration farm 
showed that if we do better land preparation, we can double our yield and 
grow better varieties. Therefore we decided as a PG to invest in land 
preparation machinery and equipment to provide services to our members. 
Right now [August 2020], the DOA is the only one providing land 
preparation services for farmers… 
In December 2020, Kywe Kue’s directors adopted their enterprise plan to purchase a tractor and 
implements for land preparation services. The plan provided for an outlay of USD27,857 (MK39 
million), of which USD20,714 (MK29 million) was to be financed with equity capital and the remaining 
USD7143 (MK10 million) with a loan from VFM and credit from the supplier in the form of a three-
year hire purchase agreement. The PO’s members were expected to contribute USD12,714 (MK17.8 
million) of the equity capital from their own pockets, and a further USD8000 (MK11.2 million) from a 
grant awarded to them by the Project. The grant was to be shared equally by the members to ensure 
that every member had a meaningful financial interest in the PO’s business, regardless of their ability 
to pay for additional shares.  
The proposed equity scheme requires member to purchase non-redeemable, tradable class B shares 
with price discounts linked to the number of shares purchased. Larger investors who buy more shares 
will benefit from larger price discounts on machinery and equipment services hired from the PO. The 
shares carry no voting rights. If the BoD sells shares to non-members, these investors will purchase 
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the same shares as those purchased by members. Non-members, however, are not entitled to vote at 
general meetings called by the PO. 
The directors agreed that shares would be issued at a low unit price of USD7.14 (MK10,000) per share 
to encourage investment by poorer members and to promote liquidity in the market for shares. The 
directors were also in favour of a three-tier discount scheme to promote proportionality between the 
benefits of investment and the benefits of patronage. In terms of the plan, shareholders will receive a 
share certificate, along with either a personalised bronze, silver, or gold discount card that entitles 
them to progressively higher discounts on the price of hiring machinery services from the PO, 
depending on the number of shares purchased (Appendix M). For example, shareholders with at least 
100 shares will qualify for the highest discount relative to the price that a non-shareholder pays for 
the PO’s machinery services. Shareholders who purchase at least 60 shares will qualify for an 
intermediate discount, and those with at least 40 shares will qualify for a modest discount. The 
Project’s grant will purchase 40 shares for each of the PO’s initial 28 members, allowing even those 
who are unable or unwilling to invest to benefit from a price rebate. Non-members and new members 
will have to purchase and accumulate at least 40 shares to qualify for a discount.   
The logic underpinning this equity scheme was that larger patrons would purchase more shares 
because they had more to gain from higher discounts. As a further incentive to purchase shares, any 
profit distributed by the board at the end of the PO’s financial year will be returned to shareholders 
as a dividend on each and every paid-up share. Figure 4.4 illustrates the share and incentive scheme 
proposed for test case 1.8 
To raise the initial equity capital of USD12,714 (MK17.8 million), the directors agreed on three share 
issues (Table 4.14). These shares were issued and purchased by members between the 1st of 
December 2020 and the 31st of March 2021. The equity capital raised in the first issue covered the first 
instalment on the PO’s first tractor (Image 4.14), which was acquired at the end of 2020. The second 
and third issues raised sufficient capital to finance the next two instalments due in June and December 
2021, respectively. At the time of writing, neither the grant nor the loan had been disbursed by the 
Project’s implementing partners. WVM and VFM intended to make these funds available in June 2021, 
allowing the directors to issue share certificates and personalised discount cards to all of the PO’s 
members in time for the 2021 planting season. Table 4.14 shows that without the grant, only ten of 
the PO’s 28 members would qualify for discounted prices. This highlights the importance of grant 
 
8 The price discounts shown in Figure 4.4 were not firm recommendations. The BoD will set the prices and 
discount rates for service transactions. 
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funding applied in a way that improves both the creditworthiness and inclusiveness of a business 
proposal. Seventeen of the 28 members invested even though they did not, or could not, buy sufficient 
shares to qualify for a price discount. This emphasises the importance of issuing shares with affordable 
denominations.  
The investor-friendly institutional arrangements adopted by the PO prompted an unexpected 
outcome. Ownership of a tractor purchased privately in October 2020 by four farmers (Image 4.14), 
including two of Kywe Kue’s directors, will be later transferred to the PO in exchange for its class B 
shares. This acquisition gives all of the PO’s shareholders better prospects for dividends and capital 






MK 39 million 
Owners’ equity = MK29 million 
28 members 
Debt capital from VFM = MK10 million 
Equity shares issued 
(2,900 shares @ MK10,000/share) 
Project contribution = MK11.2 million 
Finances = 1,120 shares, 40 shares per 
member  
Member and non-member investments = MK17.8 million 
Finances = 1780 shares 
 
Shareholders with 100 or more 
shares 
Shareholders with 60 - 99 shares 
2% price discount 
Bronze discount class 
6% price discount  
Gold discount class 
 
5% price discount 
Silver discount class 
Members and non-members with 
0-39 shares 
No price discount for hired services 
Shareholders with 40 - 59 
shares  
Figure 4.4 Share scheme with price discounts for machinery services proposed for test case 1 
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3rd issue  




1 100   90 190 
2 100   90 190 
3 100   90 190 
4 100   90 190 
5 100   90 190 
6 100   90 190 
7   100 90 190 
8   60 70 130 
9     50 50 
10     40 40 
11     30 30 
12     30 30 
13     30 30 
14   10   10 
15   10   10 
16   10   10 
17   10   10 
18   10   10 
19   10   10 
20   10   10 
21   10   10 
22   10   10 
23     10 10 
24     10 10 
25     10 10 
26     10 10 
27     10 10 
28       0 
Total  600 250 930 1780 

























4.7.3 Test case 2: Expansion of retail space and mixing of animal feed – Ma Yin 
Producer Group 
Test case 2 is located in Ma Yin village, located approximately 70 kilometres from Myeik. Households 
in the village rely primarily on seasonal crop farming and livestock (mainly pigs) to sustain their 
livelihoods. More than 80% of the PG’s 42 registered members raised pigs, of whom 45% reared 
indigenous pigs as a savings mechanism to cover household expenses, debt, and unexpected events 
such as funerals and personal emergencies (Ma Yin PG director, personal communication, June 2019). 
Lack of coordination between farmers in the village resulted in high costs of sourcing and transporting 
commercial feed from Myeik to raise hybrid pigs. In August 2019, the PG’s directors started a retail 
business that organised bulk purchase and retail of animal feed for members and other farmers (Image 
4.15).  
 Within six months, the PG had transacted over USD9000 (Mk12.6 million) in animal feed, and hired a 
fulltime clerk to oversee daily operations in its retail shop. This not only indicate the PGs ability to hire 
an external manager but also signal that they had adopted good governance arrangements that allow 
the PG to separate ownership from control. To stock the shop, the directors issued redeemable shares 
that rewarded investors with a profit share based on shareholding. The bulk of the benefits were 
passed on to patrons as favourable prices for inputs.   
 
 
Image 4.14 Farm machinery and equipment financed by Kwye Kue PO 



















The PG’s intention was to expand the feed retail operation and to upgrade it to PO status by mixing 
and selling their own animal feed using locally sourced ingredients. Their plan required an initial 
investment of USD4517 (MK6.4 million) in equipment, machinery, stocks, and retail space. The 
financial arrangements required to upgrade Ma Yin to PO status included member equity 
contributions totalling USD2186 (MK3.06 million) and USD2400 (Mk3.36 million) in grant funding. The 
grant was to be shared equally by the PG’s 42 registered members, with an equity scheme similar to 
that adopted by Kywe Kue. Figure 4.5 illustrates the equity scheme with price discounts proposed to 
upgrade Ma Yin to PO status.9 
To raise the equity capital required, the PO will issue 321 shares at a share price of USD14.29 
(MK20,000) per share, of which the Project’s grant will finance four shares per member. The remaining 
153 shares will be issued to PO members who wish to invest more of their own capital to benefit from 
dividends, capital gains, and larger discounts on the price of feed and other inputs purchased from the 
PO. 
 
9 The price discounts shown in Figure 4.5 were not firm recommendations. The BoD will set the discount rates 
for transactions with smaller and larger investors. 
Image 4.15 Ma Yin PG's commercial feed retail shop 
Source: Researcher (January 2020). 
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 Investment required 
MK6.42 million 
 
Owners’ equity (100%) = MK6.42 million  
42 members 
 
Debt capital: No debt capital required 
Equity shares issued 
(321 shares @ MK20,000/share) 
 
Project contribution = MK 3.36 million  
Finances = 168 shares, 4 shares per member 
Member and non-member investments = MK3.06 million 
Finances = 153 shares 
 
Shareholders with 10 or more shares Shareholders with 7-9 shares 
2% price discount 
Bronze discount class 
6% price discount  
Gold discount class 
 
4% price discount 
Silver discount class 
Non-members and shareholders 
with less than 4 shares 
No price discount on inputs 
Shareholders with 4-6 shares  
Figure 4.5 Share scheme with price discount on inputs proposed test case 2 
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Shareholders who purchase at least ten shares will qualify for the highest discount relative to the 
amount paid by non-shareholders for the same transaction. Shareholders who purchase at least seven 
shares will qualify for an intermediate discount, and shareholders with a minimum of four shares will 
receive the lowest discount. The directors will adjust retail prices and price discounts – as they do in 
their current operation – to maintain the PO’s profitability. At the time of writing in March 2021, Ma 
Yin had still not upgraded to PO status. Although the directors were in favour of the plan and its 
institutional arrangements, they decided to postpone its implementation owing to uncertainty 
resulting from Covid-19 and the military coup in February 2021. These events disrupted the local 
hospitality industry with adverse effects on the demand for hybrid pigs and commercial pig feed. 
Nevertheless, the PG continued to operate at a transactional level with its existing institutional 
arrangements. 
4.7.4 Test case 3: Paddy supply contract – Pyin Gyi Producer Group 
Test case 3 is situated in Myeik township. The PG had 63 registered members, all of whom relied on 
paddy production as their main source of income. The PG’s directors were very proactive and, within 
months of signing their group’s constitution, began providing their members with services. In AC2, the 
directors indicated that their short-term goal was to encourage members to produce high quality 
paddy that would allow the PG to market their produce collectively to a premium miller. 
In February 2020, the ART met with the owners of two commercial milling companies in Myeik to 
explore opportunities to establish supply contracts with the PG for a high quality paddy variety. 
Although both companies expressed interest in engaging with the PG, one of them was not 
enthusiastic about formalising a supply contract. As that company’s manager explained: 
… No matter the variety, I will accept all the paddy that they can supply if it 
is of good quality, no need for contracts because paddy prices are too 
unpredictable ... The pricing issue will be too difficult to agree on in a 
contract … currently we have verbal agreements with the farmers and it 
does not dictate when they should sell their paddy. Some choose to sell 
immediately after harvesting because of lack of storage and some sell later 
during the year when the supply is low and prices increase… 
The other milling company was smaller in terms of processing capacity and had been operating in 
Myeik for less than five years. This company specialised in branding and packaging two high quality 
paddy varieties (Sin Thu Ka and Shwe Bo Paw San) and was very interested in forging a supply 
relationship with a producer group in Myeik township. As the Managing Director explained: 
We welcome the idea of a supply contract with a PG. Currently we have 
contracts with over 300 individual farmers and that is quite difficult to 
manage. We have tried to organise some of them into groups but that 
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never took off. I don’t think the group lasted more than a month … To make 
the contract worthwhile, the PG needs to have farmers that can produce at 
least 100 acres [40 hectares] of the same variety... 
When questioned about the pricing mechanism, he responded: 
Of course pricing is a problem; it always is … we pay our contracted farmers 
a higher price for their paddy. Last year [referring to 2019 season] the price 
for Shwe Bow Paw San was MK8,000 per basket and we paid them 
MK10,000 because we wanted to gain their trust and differentiate our 
contracted suppliers from ordinary suppliers. In addition, we purchase all 
their paddy first before we purchase from other farmers… 
This claim was validated by PG directors from Pyin Gyi and three other PGs during the FGDs in AC2. 
These discussions triggered the development of an innovative paddy supply contract in April 2020 
(Appendix N). The supply contract acknowledged the milling company’s existing contracts with 
farmers and incorporated terms identified in the literature as significant determinants of farmer 
compliance.  
The draft contract was revised three times in negotiation with the miller and the directors before the 
parties settled on its terms. The ART played a critical role this process, underscoring the importance 
of an informed and credible broker willing and able to carry some of the transaction costs. The three 
most contentious issues related to the pricing mechanism, quality specifications (paddy moisture 
content), and access to quality inputs and mechanical harvesters. The agreed pricing mechanism 
included a minimum (floor) price that protected the farmers from a downturn in paddy prices after 
planting, and a contract price that increased if paddy prices increased after planting. The approach 
used to compute the contract price at harvest time was based on movements in the price of a well-
traded local reference variety. A brochure (Appendix O) was produced to help the in-field team explain 
the terms of the supply contract to the PG members. Participation in the supply contract was not 
compulsory for members, and it was important that farmers made informed decisions about their 
participation and the quantity of paddy they would commit to the PG if they did participate. Box 4.6 
presents an extract from the brochure explaining, by way of a worked example, how the contract price 
would be calculated at harvest time. With regards to the pricing mechanism, the PG’s chairman 
explained: 
We like the idea of the floor price. Before planting, we can at least tell members a 
minimum price to expect … If the floor price is good enough [relative to market 
price] most of them will agree to the contract. However, when they harvest their 
paddy, they may decide to sell it to whoever pays them a better price … with the 
contract price, they can get higher price if the price increase at harvest time, so 




Box 4.6 Example of how the contract price was to be determined at harvest time 
• The contracted variety: Sin Thu Ka 
• The reference variety: Zeegar 
• The floor price that will be paid for Sin Thu Ka after this year’s harvest = USD3.29 (MK4,600) 
per 22.7kg basket 
• The price that was paid for Sin Thu Ka by local millers after the previous year’s harvest was 
USD3.43 (MK4,800) per 22.7kg basket 
• The price that was paid for Zeegar by local millers after the previous year’s harvest was USD 
3.14 (MK4,400) per 22.7kg basket 
• The difference between the prices paid for Sin Thu Ka and Zeegar after the previous year’s 
harvest was therefore USD3.43 - USD3.14 = USD0.29 (MK4,800 - MK4,400 = MK400) 
If, at the end of the present season when the crop is harvested, the price paid for Zeegar by local 
millers increases to USD3.29 (MK4,600), then the contract price for Sin Thu Ka will be USD3.29 + 
USD0.29 = USD3.58 (MK4,600 + MK400 = MK5,000). Therefore, farmers who participate in the 
contract will be paid USD3.58 (MK5,000) per 22.7kg basket of Sin Thu Ka paddy after this year’s 
harvest because paddy prices increased and the contract price exceeds the floor price. 
On the other hand, if the price paid for Zeegar after the present year’s harvest falls sharply to 
USD2.86 (MK4,000), the contract price for Sin Thu Ka would be USD2.86 + USD0.29 = USD3.15 
(MK4000 + MK400 = K4400). However, since the contract price is lower than the floor price, 
participating farmers will receive the floor price of K4,600 for their Sin Thu Ka paddy even though 
paddy prices have fallen sharply. 
 
Regarding paddy quality, the contract required the miller and directors to agree on a percentage 
discount in the price paid for paddy delivered with moisture content higher than 16%. As one of the 
directors explained: 
The moisture content depends on the weather at the time of the harvest and the 
ability of some farmers to dry their paddy after harvest. Not everyone will be able 
to supply paddy with 14-16% moisture content immediately after harvesting. 
Some of them need to sell immediately even if the moisture content is high 
because they need to pay debts.  
Regarding provisions made in the contract for participating farmers to access inputs and machinery 
services supplied by the miller, the PG’s chairman stated: 
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Typically brokers [referring to middlemen] provide inputs to the farmers on credit 
which they repay after harvesting by selling their paddy to them. If we want to 
engage them in contracts, we have to provide our farmers with the inputs on 
credit otherwise they will accept credit from the broker.  
At a subsequent meeting held late in April 2020, the miller and the PG reached agreement on the 
particulars of the supply contract and signed it in the presence of the in-field team’s Market Facilitator 











Although the contractual terms were specifically designed to encourage farmer compliance, both the 
miller and the directors expressed concerns about side-selling. To further incentivise farmer 
compliance with the PG’s supply contract, the ART introduced TDRs that the PG issued to participating 
farmers in direct proportion to the quantity of paddy that each participant had agreed to contribute 
towards the total amount of paddy that the PG needed to fulfil its contractual obligations with the 
miller. The TDRs were issued in the form of delivery right certificates (Appendix P). Since this was a 
new concept for the in-field team and the PG, the Researcher hosted two online training sessions with 
the in-field team and the PG’s directors to explain the delivery rights system.  
The directors agreed that for each delivery right held, the farmer was obliged to deliver 795kgs (35 
baskets) of paddy rice to the PG. For future contracts, the directors could adjust the quantity of paddy 
obligated by each delivery right to a level above or below the base level of 795kgs (35 baskets) in order 
Image 4.16 The miller and Pyin Gyi PG directors negotiating the terms of 
the paddy supply contract 
Source: In-field team (April 2020). 
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to accommodate changes in the total quantity of paddy negotiated each year with the miller. In such 
a case, all delivery rights would be adjusted by the same amount.  
Members who held these delivery rights benefited from the terms specified in their PG’s supply 
contract with the miller. These benefits included a guaranteed floor price and a contract price that 
could exceed the floor price if paddy prices increased, access to inputs on credit with no interest 
charges, and any additional premium paid by the miller at the end of the harvest. Other farmers would 
have to buy or lease delivery rights from those who held them if they saw value in these benefits. 
These transactions give the delivery rights a market value that can be realised when the right is sold. 
The PG issued 100 delivery rights to 45 participating farmers to meet its contract to supply the miller 
with 79.45 tons (3,500 baskets) of Sin Thu Ka paddy.  
The paddy supply contract was concluded successfully in December 2020, five weeks after all the 
paddy was harvested and delivered to the miller (Image 4.17). The PG delivered a total of 73.45 tons 
(3,236 baskets) of Sin Thu Ka paddy to the miller with a gross value of USD18,357 (MK25.7 million). 
USD3621 (MK5.07 million) was withheld to cover the cost of seed and fertiliser sourced from the 
miller. The miller paid a rebate of USD231 (MK323,550) as a premium to be shared with the right 
holders in proportion to their deliveries. Payments were deposited in the PG’s bank account on the 
same day that deliveries were made to the miller, and the PG’s treasurer and secretary settled 
payments with each farmer on a weekly basis (Image 4.18). 
The TDR system produced two key outcomes. First, the PG met its contractual obligation with the 
miller, even though some participating farmers lost their entire crop due to excess flooding. These 
farmers were able to lease delivery rights to or buy paddy from other participants who had excess 
paddy. Data provided by the in-field team showed that eight farmers engaged in temporary 
transactions of delivery rights. Second, the premium paid by the miller added to the delivery rights’ 
value. The capitalised value of the premium amounted to USD2.86 (MK4000) per delivery right, a 
rough estimate of the market price that buyers would pay for a delivery right if they expected this 
relationship with the miller to persist. This opportunity for right holders to realise capital gains by 
honouring and extending the PG’s trading relationship with the miller strengthens their incentive to 
meet their delivery obligations even if it means buying in paddy or leasing out rights. The PG directors 
in test case 3 intended to negotiate another paddy supply contract for the 2021 season. This presented 































The final action in AC3 was to guide functional PGs in conducting their inaugural AGM. A training 
manual was developed for the in-field team to train PG directors and guide them through the AGM 
process (Appendix Q). In mid-January 2021, an in-country research assistant supported the in-field 
Image 4.17 Delivery right holders loading their paddy onto a truck in 
the village to deliver to the miller 
Source: In-field team (December 2020). 
Image 4.18 Pyin Gyi directors organising a weekly cash payment to 
contracted farmers 
Source: In-field team (December 2020). 
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team to pilot the AGMs with the three PO test cases. Despite restrictions on local gatherings, the 
AGMs were conducted successfully, with over 85% of members attending. No new candidates were 
nominated for election in any of the test cases and the founding directors were duly elected to serve 
for their first full term as PG directors.  
4.8 Summary of the action research process, outputs, and key outcomes 
involved in establishing functional PGs and POs 
This chapter has presented the action research components of the thesis, the key actions taken, and 
the outputs generated to establish functional PGs and POs. Figure 4.6 illustrates the activities that 
preceded the action research process, the three action cycles, and interconnecting mini-cycles. The 
major action cycles and interconnecting mini-cycles are presented as cogs to illustrate the iterative 
and evolving nature of the research and to show how theory and practice were combined to achieve 
the research objectives. The key outcomes of the research are summarised in Figure 4.10.  
AC1 laid the platform for the action research conducted in this study. The reconnaissance, reflections, 
observations, and actions in this cycle helped the Researcher to contextualise the research problem 
stated in Section 1.3, and to engage smallholders and other value chain stakeholders in the process of 
identifying changes required to develop functional PGs. Interaction with the in-field team and project 
participants helped the Researcher to reconcile differences between the perceived and actual realities 
of smallholders. This resulted in changes to the interview guides, shifting the emphasis away from 
investigation towards actions intended to establish functional PGs. Information elicited in interviews, 
FDGs, observations, and reflection sessions suggested that there was significant potential for 
smallholders to benefit from collective action.  
However, farmer groups established earlier by WVM had weak institutional and governance 
arrangements, membership was not defined, and most of the groups relied on WVM for direction. 
This finding reinforced the need for informed action-taking to develop PGs with their own goals and 
appropriate institutional and governance arrangements. The key actions taken and key outputs 


































Drivers of action cycles  
• TRRILD value chain selection 
• WVM erects farmer groups 
in target villages 






AC1: August 2018 - April 2019 AC2: May 2019 - December 2019 AC3: January 2020 - March 2021
Figure 4.6 Overview of the action research process to establish functional PGs and POs  
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The findings and outputs from AC1 triggered the first mini-cycle (MC1), where a template was 
designed to streamline the task of constituting the PGs with well-defined institutional and governance 
arrangements. This ‘master constitution’ included information gathered from farmer groups in AC1. 
Its by-laws observed local legislation and regulations governing cooperative societies in Myanmar. The 
master constitution was the main input used in AC2.  
The main purpose of AC2 was to constitute the PGs and to guide WVM’s (and to a lesser extent, VFM’s) 
efforts to improve the newly established PGs’ capacity to function at a transactional level. Preliminary 
findings confirmed that the process of negotiating and adopting a formal constitution with PG leaders 
and members lent credibility and legitimacy to the PG and its directors. Once constituted, the PGs 
started to provide meaningful services that helped them demonstrate the benefits of membership.  
Some of the more progressive PGs opened bank accounts and, with the help of the Project, began to 
implement preliminary value chain interventions. Sixteen PGs contracted members to produce high 
quality paddy seed, and four contracted members to produce hybrid pigs. These interventions created 
opportunities for PG directors to negotiate agreements with their members. They also encouraged 
members to make on-farm investments, often with finance provided by VFM. Figure 4.8 summarises 





AC1: Examine existing situation 
Exploratory appraisal of PGs 
and key agribusiness firms in 
Myeik and Palaw 
Participatory FGDs to help PGs 
define their own purpose and 
goals 
Key outputs 
• The Action Research Team (ART) 
• Baseline data for all 32 PGs 
(membership, products, and 
institutional and governance 
arrangements) 
• Key themes relating to PG 
objectives and business aspirations 





Once constituted, the PGs extended their transactional activities to include bulk purchases of inputs 
and collective marketing of members’ products. The farmers that benefited the most were those who 
made greater use of the PG’s services. Although such arrangements create free-rider problems, this 
did not prevent the PGs from functioning well at a transactional level, a level that did not require 
significant investment. Nevertheless, some variations in institutional arrangements were observed in 
PGs that purchased inputs in bulk for retailing. These PGs sold redeemable shares to members to 
finance their operations. The shares created some proportionality between investment and benefits, 
alleviating some of the institutional problems (discussed in Section 5.2). Good governance practices 
played a key role in legitimising the PGs and helping them to build credibility and group solidarity, two 
necessary features of PGs seeking partnerships with other chain actors to explore value-adding 
opportunities.   
MC2 showed that two-thirds of the initial 32 PGs were functional. Three of the functional PGs were 
selected as test cases to pilot investor-friendly institutional arrangements for different value-adding 
enterprises in AC3. Each case offered the in-field team nuanced learning opportunities that they could 
apply to other functional PGs. Test case 1 adopted a shareholding scheme developed for PGs that 
intended to offer machinery services to member and non-member clients. At the time of writing, this 
PO had already purchased two tractors and implements financed with equity capital contributed by 
members. Test case 2 approved a shareholding scheme developed for PGs that intended to offer feed 
mixing and input retailing services to member and non-member clients. However, the directors 
Key actions 
AC2: Establish functional PGs 
Build the in-field team 
members’ capacity to mentor 
PGs 
Key outputs 
• In-field team capable of 
constituting and mentoring 
PGs 
• Customised PG constitutions 
• Templates for seed 
multiplication and hybrid pig 
breeding agreements 
Constitute PGs and introduce 
good governance practices  
Mentor PGs and encourage 
activities that promote group 
cohesion and performance 
towards objectives 




decided to postpone the implementation of their enterprise plan owing to uncertainty in the market 
for quality pork cuts caused by Covid-19 lockdowns and civil unrest following the military coup in 
February 2021. Test case 3 adopted a value-adding strategy that did not require much capital, but 
which called for a predictable supply of high quality paddy to meet orders placed by a premium miller. 
A smart supply contract (that protected farmers from downside price risk while allowing them to 
benefit from rising paddy prices) was developed with the PG and the miller, and implemented 
alongside a system of tradable delivery rights to encourage farmer compliance. This PG met its 
contractual obligations, thanks largely to the tradability of its delivery rights. The test cases were also 
used to pilot procedures for the PGs’ first Annual General Meetings. Figure 4.9 summarises the key 
actions taken and outputs generated in AC3. 
  
 
The key outcomes of this action research are summarised in Figure 4.10. Chapter 5 elaborates on these 
outcomes and seeks to answer the first two research questions posed in Section 2.8. The third 
research question relating to lessons learned is addressed in Chapter 6 as part of the study’s 
recommendations.
Key actions 
AC3: Upgrade PGs to PO status 
Key outputs 
• Enterprise plans for POs 
• Investor-friendly shareholding 
schemes for POs offering 
machinery and retail services  
• Smart paddy supply contract linked 
to tradable deliver rights 
• Training manual for PGs to conduct 
AGMs 
• Field staff empowered to help PGs 
upgrade to PO status 
Develop value-adding enterprise plans 
with PGs  
Develop and apply institutional 
arrangements to support value-adding 
strategies 
Help PGs to negotiate contractual and 
financial arrangements with partners 
to implement their enterprise plans 





• POs invested in value-
adding activities  
• Institutional arrangements 
that encourage 
investment and patronage 
Phase 3 
Upgrade PGs to PO 
Key outcomes 
• PGs with well-defined 
purpose and members 
who share a common goal 
Phase 1 
 Examine existing situation 
Key outcomes 
• Process to establish 
functional PGs 
• PGs operating at a 
transactional level facilitating 
members’ access to quality 
inputs, training, and services 
• Trained field staff capable of 
establishing and mentoring 
functional PGs 
Phase 2  
Establish functional PGs 





Discussion of research outcomes 
This chapter draws on outcomes of the action research process described in Chapter 4 to address two 
of the three research questions posed in Section 2.7. The chapter is presented in two sections. Section 
5.1 reflects on the process of establishing functional PGs and POs. It addresses the first research 
question, ‘What processes should be followed to establish functional PGs for smallholders?’ Section 
5.2 reflects on the institutional and governance arrangements introduced to establish functional PGs 
capable of operating at a transactional level, and POs capable of sustaining value-adding enterprises. 
This section addresses the second research question, ‘What institutional arrangements are required in 
PGs to facilitate and sustain collective marketing and value-adding by smallholders in partnership with 
agribusiness firms and financiers?’ The third research question relating to lessons learned is addressed 
in Chapter 6 as it leads directly to evidence-based recommendations for development practitioners 
and donors seeking ways to create mutually beneficial partnerships with smallholders, agribusiness 
firms, and financiers.  
5.1  Reflection on the process of establishing functional producer groups and 
producer organisations 
The benefits of collective action and the importance of PGs in linking smallholders to markets are well 
documented in the literature (Maijers et al., 2019; Mukindia, 2014; Mwambi et al., 2020; Penrose-
Buckley, 2007). Most development efforts that seek to facilitate these linkages focus on creating 
producer-owned groups. However, there are very few evidence-based guidelines in the literature to 
assist smallholders and practitioners with the difficult task of establishing groups that can operate 
independently to provide smallholders with meaningful services and help them capitalise on value-
adding opportunities. This research was driven by the need to identify pragmatic and evidence-based 
guidelines related to the establishment of functional PGs and POs.  
The research followed Tuckman and Jensen’s (1977) stages of small group development and built on 
Penrose-Buckley (2007), McKague and Siddiquee (2014), and Mishra and Swanson’s (2009) 
recommendations (outlined in Table 2.2). The processes and actions taken in this study (summarised 
in Table 5.1) were adapted to fit the parameters of action research where action is informed by theory. 
McNiff and Whitehead (2001, p. 16) emphasise that in action research, actions generate reflection, 
which influence further actions in a cyclical process intended to generate gradual change and practical 




where significant time was invested in developing a competent team of facilitators to guide and 
mentor newly established PGs.  
Table 5.1 Summary of process and actions involved in establishing functional smallholder PGs and 
value-adding POs 
Process Actions (role of external actor) 
Start-up 
(Forming) 
- Equip a team with knowledge about how to establish functional groups 
-  Identify value chains with potential to link smallholders to preferred markets 
- Initiate PGs in areas where value chains feature strongly and contribute 
meaningfully to smallholder livelihoods 
- Engage active producers to jointly identify common problems, identify a 
shared vision, goals, and strategies  
Firming-up 
(Storming)  
- Define members and group directors’ rights and responsibilities  
- Help directors and members to define their group’s purpose and objectives  
Setting-up 
(Norming) 
- Help PGs to develop constitutions with broad provisions for investor-friendly 
institutional arrangements that can be nuanced and applied when needed to 
support evolving business strategies  
- Constitute PGs with governance practices that embed accountability and 
transparency, and which provide for separation of ownership and control 
when this becomes financially feasible  
- Mentor PGs and initiate activities that generate ‘quick wins’ to foster group 
solidarity and performance towards objectives  
Acting upon 
(Performing) 
- Help PG directors to engage with prospective trading partners (buyers, input 
suppliers, banks) and other strategic value chain actors (extension and 
veterinary services) 
- Provide training that deepens PG directors’ understanding of their 
administrative and governance responsibilities, and which improves their 
administrative, budgeting, enterprise planning, record keeping, and reporting 
skills 
Scaling-up  
(PG to PO) 
- Help PGs to achieve their value-adding goals by working with directors to 
develop creditworthy enterprise plans 
- Assist directors in developing institutional arrangements to support value-
adding strategies 
 
Of the 32 groups initiated by WVM, two dropped out within the first six months of start-up and ten 
were not functional at the time the research ended. The primary reason was that neither paddy nor 
pigs were significant livelihood supporting activities in the villages where these groups were initiated. 
They struggled to retain and attract new members and relied on WVM for guidance and support to 
organise group activities. This research suggests that PGs rarely self-organise without external support. 
Hellin et al. (2009) and Mishra and Swanson (2009) echo this view, arguing that the process takes time 
and resources that smallholders typically lack. These deficiencies can result in PGs over-relying on 
external support – a pattern that is very common in rural development projects. To avoid over-
dependency, external actors must ensure that firstly, smallholders take ownership of the initiative and 




aggravating this over-reliance. From the outset, PGs should be not be initiated unless there is a clear 
value proposition for smallholders.  
A PG is more likely to rely on external support if its members do not have a shared goal to support 
their common challenges. Stockbridge et al. (2003) stress the importance of establishing a common 
purpose from the outset, but caution against participatory decision making as it incurs high 
transactions costs that dilute the benefits of collective action. AC1 revealed that the groups struggled 
to define their goals and objectives because all of their members were encouraged to participate in 
decision-making. This problem was resolved by clearly defining the rights and roles for group leaders 
and members. It also required working with them, from inception, to discover a shared vision that 
contributed to mutual trust building and group solidarity.  
The next action was to help the groups formulate their constitution and by-laws. This process required 
all members to participate. The constitution needs to be easily understood and flexible enough for the 
group to introduce institutional arrangements (and a formal business structure) suited to their future 
business strategies. All members should be given the opportunity to negotiate and agree on the 
particulars of their group’s constitution. This helps to ensure that the by-laws are understood, 
particularly the sections relating to members’ and directors’ rights and roles. Procedures for 
constituting the PG should also meet legal requirements to formalise later as a cooperative or 
company. In Myanmar, these requirements include proof of a constitution that is broadly accepted by 
members, an updated membership register, and minutes of the decision taken by members to form a 
PG. At the time of writing, none of the PGs had shown interest in formalising as a legal entity, 
presumably because their operations were still too small to benefit from registration. Ferguson (2013) 
provides another explanation, pointing to the tarnished reputation of agricultural cooperatives in 
Myanmar.  
Although the PGs in this research could not establish savings accounts in their own name, all 20 
functional PGs operated joint savings accounts, with their directors acting as signatories. Despite their 
informal status, test cases 1 and 2 secured a formal micro-lender’s approval (VFM) in principle for loans 
to finance their value-adding investments. Test case 1 bought a tractor on credit from a farm 
machinery dealer, and test case 3 negotiated a paddy supply contract with a commercial milling 
company. The other functional PGs were operating their PGs at a transactional level, dealing regularly 
with input suppliers, some of whom were willing to offer the PGs credit. These findings suggest that 
acceptance of a written constitution and the adoption of good governance practices lent credibility to 
the directors, in the eyes of both members and the chain actors they were dealing with. For example 
VFM’s new loan product for POs explicitly requires a written constitution with documentary evidence 




along with the training and mentoring provided to the PGs, helped to empower the directors in their 
transactions with members, business partners, and local government agencies. It is noteworthy that 
all of the functional PGs provided their members with social services. Ruben, Fort, and Zuniga Arias 
(2009) found that such indirect effects can be equally or more important to smallholders than the 
direct benefits of collective action. 
Once the PGs were constituted, their primary focus was to provide their members with useful services 
that would encourage them to participate in the PG’s activities. The functional PGs began to operate 
at the transactional level, facilitating access to training and organising the bulk purchase of inputs for 
their members. They had a multi-product focus (both paddy and pigs) and required little member 
investment. The directors introduced a nominal membership fee to cover administrative costs. At this 
stage, the role of the in-field facilitators shifted to mentoring and training to build the PG directors’ 
capacities and deepen their understanding of their administrative and governance responsibilities. In 
newly established PGs, it is inevitable that directors will also act as managers. Training that provides 
directors with a range of management and administrative skills is therefore important at this 
‘performing’ stage. However, directors need to be aware of the distinction between ownership and 
control when the organisation grows to a point where it can afford to pay managers. 
A preliminary set of project interventions was introduced to improve members’ access to quality 
inputs, facilitate technical training, and to provide PG directors with hands-on experience to manage 
transactions with their members. In these early stages of chain upgrading, facilitators should take care 
to leave control in the hands of the directors. WVM’s initial approach to reproducing high quality paddy 
seed and hybrid pigs was to write contracts between PG members and WVM itself. Replacing this 
inappropriate arrangement with agreements negotiated between PG directors and members not only 
empowered the directors to manage their group’s affairs, but also allowed the PGs to take ownership 
of these upgrading activities.  
Engaging PG members in transactional activities that generate quick results was a key action in helping 
the PGs to retain and attract new members, and to work towards their objectives. Another important 
outcome of this action was that it promoted horizontal coordination between farmers and PGs. 
Directors were beginning to form linkages with the breeder farms and seed producing PGs to source 
hybrid piglets and improved seed for their members. Some PGs diversified their service offerings and 
altered their business strategies to focus on a single product (paddy or pigs), and to develop market 
relationships with value chain actors. Although the PGs’ need for capital was still relatively low, 
members began making on-farm investments in high quality paddy seed, land preparation services, 




The last process in Table 5.1 (scaling up) coincides with the advanced stage in Penrose-Buckley’s (2007) 
PG development path. This is where functional PGs, with creditworthy value-adding strategies, 
upgrade to PO status. During this stage, a PG’s need for capital intensifies. The findings from test case 
1 showed that not all PG members were willing or able to invest in the PO. Without grant capital to 
give poorer members a financial interest in the PO, only ten members would have met the 
requirements for full membership, meaning that poorer farmers would have been excluded from the 
benefits of ownership. Groot Kormelinck et al. (2019) also found that PGs operating at this level tend 
to have fewer members compared to those operating at the transactional level because they tend to 
require member investment that not all smallholders can afford. The outcomes of AC3 indicate that 
grants channelled through PG members as equity contributions in a PO improve smallholder inclusivity. 
At this stage, the role of the external actor is to help PG directors develop creditworthy enterprise 
plans to support their intended business strategies. These plans need to explain the proposed 
enterprise’s value proposition, demonstrate that it is both profitable and cash-flow feasible, and 
recommend institutional arrangements to support its financing. The arrangements proposed for the 
POs in this research are discussed in the next section. One of the key outcomes that emerged from the 
processes used to establish functional PGs was a well-trained team with valuable knowledge about 
how to establish and mentor PGs and POs. 
5.2 Reflections on the institutional and governance arrangements introduced to establish functional 
producer groups and producer organisations 
The overarching theoretical proposition that guided this study was that PGs established with 
appropriate institutional and governance arrangements could develop into organisations that provide 
their members with viable transactional and value-adding services. This proposition was based on the 
premise that the institutional arrangements that govern producer-owned organisations are 
fundamental to their performance and ability to sustain value-adding activities (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
2000). Table 5.2 summarises the unique institutional features of PGs and POs established in this 
research to drive smallholder inclusion and value chain upgrading interventions. The outcomes of AC2 
and AC3 indicate that well-defined institutional and governance arrangements are not only necessary 
to support a PG’s strategy, they also help to legitimise the PG and improve the director’s credibility, 
particularly in the organisation’s formative stage. Members must first agree on their PG’s business 
objectives, before a constitution that records these objectives, and which makes provision for 
appropriate institutional and governance arrangements, is explained and negotiated with them.  
The constitutions and by-laws developed for the PGs in this research were triggered by the findings in 
AC1 which revealed that the groups initiated by WVM had no stated objectives or well-defined rights 




PG directors to activate investor-friendly institutional arrangements when it became advantageous to 
apply them. This included provisions to issue tradable class B shares.   
Table 5.2 Unique institutional features of PGs and POs introduced to drive smallholder 
inclusion and value chain upgrading 
Unique features Description 
• A flexible and progressive constitution • A flexible constitution that allows a PG’s 
directors to introduce investor-friendly 
institutional and governance arrangements 
• By-laws that are easily understood, interpreted, 
and consistent with national legislation  
• Investor-friendly institutional 
arrangements 
• Tradable equity shares that create 
proportionality between a member’s 
investment, patronage, and financial benefit 
and allow members to enter and exit the PG, 
adjust their level of investment, and to realise 
capital gains when they sell their shares 
• A share issue that uses grant funding to give 
each member an equal initial shareholding and 
which leverages debt capital from formal 
lenders and additional equity contributions 
from smallholders and strategic partners 
• Smart contracts that encourage 
compliance  
• A forward paddy supply contract that protects 
paddy farmers from downside price risk while 
allowing them to benefit from price increases 
post-planting 
• Issue of tradable delivery rights to PG members 
to facilitate and incentivise compliance with 
their PG’s paddy supply contract 
Class B shares can be issued in proportion to patronage to incentivise investment and patron 
compliance with supply contracts. They can also be issued to non-patron investors to raise external 
equity capital. Although the constitutions separate ownership from control and give directors the 
power to hire and fire managers, these provisions - aimed at reducing influence problems and 
promoting accountability - are seldom financially feasible in the early stages of an organisation’s 
development when it cannot afford to hire managers.  
Making the constitution flexible acknowledges that PGs develop over time and will have to adopt more 
ambitious strategies and more complex institutional arrangements to maintain their competitiveness 
and to provide members with value-adding services. When members are poor farmers, it is quite likely 
that PGs will have to seek equity capital from strategic partners and adopt hybrid structures that 
involve trade-offs between patron ownership and patron control (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). van Bekkum 
and Bijman (2006) caution that such trade-offs can lead to less cost-efficient supply contracts because 
the benefits of investment and the benefits of patronage are not well aligned. While non-patron 




products, inputs, and services. The shareholding scheme introduced in test case 1 was aimed at 
aligning the interests of investors and patrons by encouraging larger patrons to invest more in order 
to qualify for more favourable prices. This arrangement would also tend to discourage non-patron 
investment, and would therefore call for another category of class B shares or ordinary shares if a PO 
wanted to attract investment from a strategic business partner. 
All of the PGs opted for democratic voting rights when they negotiated their constitutions. WVM also 
preferred this approach to control. The principle of democratic control has obvious appeal to 
development agencies and still underpins legislation governing cooperative societies in many 
countries. Democratic voting is not considered to be investor-friendly in a business organisation as it 
shifts control away from majority investors and exposes them to influence problems (Royer, 1999). 
However, it is unlikely that democratic control would have a detrimental effect on the early 
performance of a PG when investment levels are low, and this study produced no evidence to suggest 
that it did. Empirical evidence presented by Rosairo et al. (2012) suggest that democratic voting may 
not be a significant source of influence problems in POs that clearly separate ownership from control.  
At the time of writing, none of the PGs or POs in this study required more equity capital than what 
their patron members were willing to invest. This situation could well change if successful POs pursue 
more capital intensive value-adding business strategies. Conceptually, a PO could raise additional 
equity capital by selling class B shares to non-patron members but this would result in the 
misalignment of patron and non-patron interests. Moreover, democratic voting combined with 
ongoing recruitment of non-patron members will gradually shift control of the organisation away from 
its patrons. In all cases, the constitutions adopted by the PGs included a safeguard (Clause 10.1 - 
Appendix F) that gives ‘farmer members’ majority representation on their organisation’s BoD. While 
this safeguard does not provide watertight protection against the loss of patron control, the likelihood 
of majority control shifting to non-patron investors is low when a substantial part of the benefits of 
membership accrues to investors who patronise the PO - an outcome created by the shareholding 
scheme introduced in test cases 1 and 2.  
The primary objective of Clause 10.1 was not to prevent a take-over by non-patrons. Rather, the 
intention was to give directors room to attract investment from strategic partners by offering them 
class B shares, conferring both benefit and voting rights without conceding control of their PO. While 
such a decision might well be in the best interests of all parties, it would require two-thirds of the 
patron members to agree to the removal of democratic voting rights from the PO’s constitution. Non-
democratic voting rights are a common feature of cooperatives in New Zealand where ‘non-transactor’ 
voting power is capped at a maximum level of 40%, even if they are majority shareholders (Woodford, 




two-thirds of the members to vote in favour of removing the restriction on non-patron board 
representation specified in Clause 10.1. 
Section 2.7 postulated that ill-defined benefit rights are unlikely to prevent a PG from operating 
successfully at a transactional level, particularly those which do not require significant investment in 
value-adding assets. However, the findings of this research cast some doubt on this proposition. Eight 
of the ten PGs that operated successfully at a transactional level, purchasing bulk inputs bulk to sell to 
members and non-members, introduced their own innovative shareholding scheme that rewarded 
members as patrons (discounted prices for inputs) and as investors (regular redemption of shares plus 
a dividend comprising the retail profit per share). This went some way towards addressing the internal 
free-rider problem as larger patrons were obliged to make larger contributions to the pool of capital 
required to finance the bulk order. The external free-rider problem was resolved by removing price 
discounts from inputs sold to non-members. The scheme also alleviated control and portfolio problems 
as frequent redemption of shares and distribution of dividends gave members reliable information 
about the value investment and provided them with regular opportunities to adjust their 
contributions. Clearly, this arrangement would not suffice if the PG required equity capital to finance 
durable assets as it does not address the critical horizon problem and would expose the PG to 
redemption risk. Nevertheless, it shows that these smallholders had an intuitive appreciation of these 
problems and were able to devise and implement institutional arrangements that helped to address 
them, at least at the transactional level. This is an arrangement that implementing agencies should 
actively facilitate in the formative stages of establishing a PG rather than purposefully discouraging 
PGs from rewarding investment. Concerns about elitism can be addressed in more productive ways as 
demonstrated in test cases 1 and 2. 
The NIE literature suggests that beyond the transactional level, institutional arrangements that address 
the free-rider and horizon problems become more critical for investment and contract compliance 
(Chaddad & Cook, 2004). Although the value-adding enterprises were different in test cases 1 and 2, 
they shared similar institutional innovations because their strategies required significant investment 
from patron members. The institutional arrangements in their shareholding scheme needed to 
facilitate proportionality between investment benefits and patronage benefits. To reduce the 
organisation’s exposure to redemption risk and to address the horizon and portfolio problems that 
discourage investment, the class B shares proposed were non-redeemable, appreciable and tradable. 
The latter would allow members to enter and exit the PG, adjust their level of investment to match 
their risk preferences, and to realise capital gains when they sell their shares (Sykuta & Cook, 2001).  
The grant component proposed as part of the innovative institutional arrangements in test cases 1 and 




company – VFM, and the smallholders themselves to co-finance an inclusive business owned and 
controlled by smallholders. Using donor capital to provide each member in the PO with an equal initial 
shareholding has three key advantages. First, it guarantees that even the poorest members have a 
financial interest in the PO’s performance, and - more importantly - that they can capture benefits 
associated with upgraded value chains beyond the farmgate. Second, increasing smallholders’ equity 
decreases the PO’s debt-to-equity ratio. In test case 1, the debt-to-equity ratio was less than 60%. This 
helped to improve the creditworthiness of the PO’s enterprise plan by reducing the risks associated 
with financing durable assets. Finnemore et al. (2004) note that leveraging debt capital from formal 
lenders ensures due diligence on part of the lender which provides an expert check on the financial 
feasibility of the enterprise plan proposed by the PO. Third, administering the grant as equity rather 
than a cash grant to the PO means that the equity in the PO’s asset/s is fully allocated to members. 
Although WVM’s grant and VFM’s loan had not been disbursed at the time of writing, this finance had 
been approved and the tractor had been purchased with a first instalment covered by equity capital 
contributed by the PO’s members and credit provided by the machinery retailer.  
Test case 3’s supply contract was unique in that the pricing mechanism protected farmers from 
downside price risk while allowing them to benefit from price increases post planting. Uptake of the 
paddy supply contract by a large majority of the PO’s members suggests that the terms of the contract 
were attractive. Abebe et al. (2013) found that smallholders’ willingness to participate increased when 
the contract allows for variable pricing. In this case, the miller’s willingness to offer an attractive 
contract was influenced by the PO’s decision to issue tradable delivery rights (TDR’s) to facilitate and 
incentivise participants’ compliance with their delivery obligations. These TDRs are similar to the 
delivery rights issued by NGCs (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000). On reflection, the PG met all of the conditions 
recommended by Moore and Noel (1995) to support a secondary market in delivery rights (Table 5.3).  
Delivery rights acquire market value as right holders benefit from reduced risk, lower labour costs, and 
possible price premiums if they continue to satisfy the quantity and quality requirements of high end 
buyers. The estimated market value of USD2.86 per delivery right was based solely on the price 
premium paid by the miller and is therefore a conservative estimate of market value because it did not 
account for the risk-reducing or cost-saving aspects of the delivery rights. Participating farmers were 
able to make efficient use of combine harvesting services as they produced the same variety in 
contiguous fields. This labour cost advantage is particularly important for smallholders in Myanmar 
who are finding it increasingly difficult to compete for labour owing to rising wages in the non-farm 





Table 5.3 Conditions necessary to support a secondary market for TDRs 
Conditions necessary to form and 
sustain a secondary market for TDRs 
Observed indicator 
• The delivery rights are perceived to have 
value by potential buyers 
• USD2.86 (MK4,000) per delivery right 
• Reduced price risk at planting time, a 
guaranteed market, and improved access 
to machinery because farmers produced 
the same variety in contiguous fields 
• Labour cost advantage of using machinery 
• There are willing  buyers and sellers • Eight farmers engaged in short-term 
transactions of delivery rights 
• Transaction costs are low relative to the 
perceived value of the delivery rights 
• Minimal search costs for farmers to find 
buyers and sellers for delivery rights 
• Delivery rights must be permanent   • Delivery rights are tradable. New members 
have to pay market prices to own delivery 
rights from existing holders  
• The number of delivery right certificates 
issued is fixed 
• The PG can adjust the quantity of paddy per 
delivery right annually to match the 
aggregate quantity of paddy negotiated with 
the buyer 
• The cooperative’s constitution and by-laws 
allow for tradable delivery rights 
• Clause 13.4 in the PGs’ constitution makes 
provision for members to trade shares. 
• Delivery rights were tradable 
Source: Adapted from Moore and Noel (1995) 
 
The number of farmers that engaged in short-term delivery rights transactions highlighted the 
importance of the secondary market in reallocating delivery rights to those more able and willing to 
meet the delivery requirements. The search cost of finding willing buyers and sellers of delivery rights 
was relatively low because the participating farmers knew each other. The PG could further reduce 
search costs by maintaining a list of willing buyers and sellers which they could circulate to members 
at general meetings. To sustain the market value of the delivery rights, the number of delivery rights 
must be permanent. If the directors decide to issue more delivery rights, this will dilute their market 
value (Moore & Noel, 1995). However, the directors can adjust the quantity of paddy per delivery right 
annually to accommodate growth or shrinkage in the aggregate quantity of paddy negotiated with the 
buyer. Lastly, delivery rights must be tradable. The delivery rights introduced in test case 3 gave holders 
the right to transfer, sell, or lease their delivery right to other registered members of the PG. This 
investor-friendly arrangement is supported by Clause 13.4 of the PG’s constitution.  
A problem encountered with the pricing mechanism in the supply contract (and the reason for the 
miller’s price rebate) was that the reference variety matured later than the contracted variety. 
Consequently, the reference variety’s market price was not known when the farmers harvested their 




supplementary payment to right holders to ensure that they received a premium price for their high 
quality paddy. As a result of these issues, a more appropriate reference variety will be specified in the 
next supply contract. A second problem emerged in that some participants received the premium for 
paddy delivered in excess of their delivery rights because temporary transactions in rights and portions 
of rights made it difficult for the PG to monitor the number of rights participants actually held when 
they delivered their paddy. Efforts to record temporary transactions were abandoned owing to their 
short notice and short duration. If this situation persists in future contracts, it will dilute the perceived 
value and weaken the secondary market for the delivery rights. A potential solution to this problem is 
to issue plastic tokens to right holders that can be exchanged when rights are traded temporarily. 
These tokens must then be displayed when paddy is delivered. 
Table 5.3 summarises the organisational and institutional characteristics of functional PGs and the 
hierarchy of outcomes observed in this research. The hierarchy is consistent with Penrose-Buckley’s 
(2007) proposition that PGs follow a progressive development path and that their strategies and 
structures evolve over time.   




Table 5.3 Summary of the outcomes and characteristics of the functional PGs and POs 
Outcomes and 
characteristics of PGs 
and POs 
PG development path 
 
Early stage Intermediate stage Advanced stage 
- Outcomes • Group solidarity, 
access to training, 
quality inputs and 
markets, bulk 
















• Investment in 
value-adding 
assets, IBMs 
- Membership size • Large • Medium to large  • Small to medium  




• Low  • Low investment 
in PO, on-farm 
investments by 
members 




• Low • Low • Low 
- Institutional 
characteristics 
• Open membership, 
benefits accrue to 
patrons, democratic 
voting rights 
• Benefits accrue 





























Conclusions and lessons learned 
The main purpose of this research was to establish producer groups (PGs) and producer organisations 
(POs) capable of sustaining smallholder inclusion in higher value markets. More specifically, the 
research aimed to (a) guide the establishment, training, and mentoring of PGs and value-adding POs, 
(b) design institutional and governance arrangements to support their business strategies, and (c) 
monitor, refine and adapt their structures to better support their strategies, and report lessons learned 
for best practice. Each of these objectives was related to a specific research question. 
This study was conducted within the parameters of action research to account for the active nature of 
the research’s objectives. An orthodox and purely investigative research approach would not have 
been adequate to achieve the research’s objectives because ongoing actions were required 
throughout the research process to bring about incremental change. Herr and Anderson (2015, p. 107) 
claim that the actual account of the processes, actions, and methods used in action research studies 
represent a significant part of a study’s findings and contributions. The interpretations and conclusions 
drawn in this chapter were derived from data verified by key research participants. Chapter 4’s 
description of the action research process, outputs, and outcomes provide the material and evidence 
necessary to answer the research questions and satisfy the research’s objectives. Chapter 5 addressed 
the first two questions relating to the process of establishing PGs and their institutional structure. 
These two research questions provide the practical and theoretical underpinnings of the research, and 
the basis upon which the lessons learned for best practice and the study’s contribution to literature 
are derived. As alluded to in Section 2.8, the research questions were not answered by testing 
theoretical propositions that relate the performance of producer-owned organisations to their 
institutional arrangements. Instead, they were addressed by applying theoretical propositions to guide 
the establishment of functional PGs and value-adding POs. 
The first section of this chapter summarises the previous chapters’ findings and offers six general 
conclusions. Section 6.2 addresses the third research question about lessons learned for best practice. 
More specifically, it provides six pragmatic, evidence-based recommendations for facilitators seeking 
to create mutually beneficial partnerships between smallholder PGs, agribusiness firms and financiers. 
The final section outlines the study’s contribution to literature, its limitations, and recommendations 





6.1 Conclusions  
The first research question was addressed by documenting the process, actions, and outputs involved 
in establishing smallholder PGs and value-adding POs. Table 5.1 provides pragmatic, evidence-based 
guidelines to help practitioners with the difficult task of establishing PGs capable of operating 
independently to undertake transactional and value-adding activities. The guidelines and outputs 
generated from the process can be applied in other similar contexts by rural development 
practitioners.  
• The process of establishing functional PGs is gradual and should be spearheaded by 
knowledgeable facilitators that can guide, train, and mentor newly established PGs to operate 
at the transactional and value-adding level. The research process provided WVM’s in-field 
facilitators with knowledge and experience that they could apply to other PGs. The findings 
suggest that smallholders are unlikely to self-organise without external support because 
smallholders lack the expertise, time, and resources needed to establish functional PGs. While 
external actors absorb these transaction costs, caution should be taken to ensure their roles, 
actions, and inactions do not unintentionally result in smallholders over relying on external 
support. This can be avoided by training, mentoring, empowering PG directors, and initiating 
activities through the PG that generate ‘quick wins’, foster group solidarity, and performance 
towards their common goal. Activities that generate quick wins also help PGs retain and attract 
new and committed members. The guidelines and findings highlight important roles for 
external actors who facilitate the establishment of PGs and value-adding POs.  
• The findings reveal that the acceptance of a negotiated constitution and the process of 
embedding it gave the PGs credibility from the perspective of both members and chain actors. 
This process also empowered their directors to manage their group’s affairs and provide 
members with valuable services. In most of the functional PGs, the directors acted as 
managers. While this outcome is expected in newly established groups, directors should be 
made aware of the implications of separating ownership from control, particularly at advanced 
stages where an organisation pursues value-adding interventions that are capital intensive and 
look outward to non-patron investors for capital. These findings support the conclusion that 
newly established PGs should not only be equipped with a constitution that members can 
understand, but one which is also flexible enough to allow directors to introduce investor-
friendly institutional and governance arrangements that suit their business strategies.  
The reflection in Section 5.2 satisfies the second research question and objective relating to the 




necessary to facilitate and sustain collective marketing and value-adding by smallholders in 
partnership with agribusiness firms and financiers.  
• The research outcomes revealed that from inception, PGs should develop common goals and 
institutional arrangements that align their members’ expectations and which accommodate a 
shift from transactional activities to value-adding. This study presents evidence contrary to the 
proposition that ill-defined property rights are unlikely to deter newly established PGs from 
operating successfully at the transactional level. To finance the bulk order of inputs, larger 
patrons were required to make larger contributions to the pool of capital and non-member 
patrons did not receive discounted prices on inputs. These arrangements alleviated the 
internal and external free-rider problems. Some PGs addressed control and portfolio problems 
by introducing frequently redeemable shares and profit-sharing arrangements. While the 
more successful PGs did more to attract investment from patron members by creating 
proportionality between the benefits of investment and the benefits of patronage, they were 
still confined by the horizon problem. These findings support the conclusion that at the 
transactional level, PGs that pool their members’ capital to finance collective activities such as 
bulk purchase of inputs have to address free-rider problems by rewarding members who 
contribute more capital with greater patronage and financial benefits. 
• The proposed shareholding scheme for the POs that pursued capital intensive enterprises 
addressed the horizon problem by introducing Class B shares that were tradable and 
encouraged proportionality between a member’s investment, patronage, and financial 
benefit. To help the candidate POs finance their value-adding strategies, a grant component 
was incorporated as part of their shareholding scheme. This facilitated blended value investing 
by using donor capital to leverage debt capital from formal lenders and additional private 
equity capital from smallholders. The one-off grant was intended to give each registered 
member an equal initial share in the PO’s assets. In addition, applying the grant as equity not 
only reduced the high risks associated with financing durable assets, it encouraged formal 
lenders to carry out due diligence checks which ultimately improved the creditworthiness of 
the PO’s business strategies. These findings led to the conclusion that without the grant 
component used as smallholders’ equity in the PO, resource-poor smallholders would be 
excluded from the benefits of value-adding in their PO beyond the farmgate.  
• The third test case involved a PO that pursued a supply contract with a commercial miller. 
Although the PO’s business strategy did not require capital, the directors introduced unique 
institutional arrangements in the form of TDRs to encourage members to comply with the PO’s 




the terms of the contract were attractive. Smallholders that participate in the supply contract 
with delivery rights stand to benefit from reduced levels of income risk, lower labour costs, 
and possible price premiums if they continue to satisfy high-end buyers’ quantity and quality 
requirements. The paddy supply contract’s outcomes affirm the proposition that to incentivise 
agribusiness firms to offer attractive supply contracts to POs, POs must introduce 
arrangements that mitigate member side-selling. In particular, these arrangements should 
address the free-rider and horizon problems.  
• All of the PGs opted for governance arrangements that conferred democratic voting rights to 
registered members. Although such arrangements are not investor-friendly, this study 
produced no evidence to suggest that these arrangements hindered the PGs’ early 
performance and/or the POs’ ability to attract capital from their patron members. This could 
be attributable to the fact that member interests in the PO as patrons and investors were 
homogenous and also because the POs did not have to look outwards to non-patrons and 
strategic partners for equity capital. If a PO were to find itself in such situation, they could 
mitigate potential influence problems by separating ownership from control. PO directors 
could also assign non-patron investors limited voting rights. Following due process, this would 
require them to remove the democratic voting clause from their constitution. In that case, the 
patron members would still retain control and ownership because of the limitation on voting 
rights. If they intend to pursue a company-like structure, the POs would have to remove the 
caps and restrictions relating to board representation from their constitution. 
6.2 Lessons learned and recommendations for best practice 
This section addresses the third research question ‘What lessons can be shared with facilitators seeking 
ways of creating mutually beneficial partnerships between smallholder PGs, agribusiness firms and 
financiers?’ This question is related to the third research objective. It is presented below as pragmatic 
and evidence-based recommendations for rural development planners, practitioners, investors, and 
donors:  
• NGOs play a critical role in smallholder development. They need to ensure that their facilitators 
are equipped with the institutional knowledge necessary to support well-structured PGs. They 
need to be cognisant that the process of establishing functional PGs which can operate 
independently towards their objectives is gradual. This process should be spearheaded by 
knowledgeable facilitators that can guide, train, and mentor newly established PGs to operate 
at the transactional and value-adding level. They must also ensure that their practices do not 
encourage the smallholders to become dependent on external support. Their internal 




they address procurement obstacles that delay or prevent facilitators from making grants to 
finance member equity PGs that have already demonstrated good performance at a 
transactional level.  This requires NGOs and donor agencies to be more flexible in terms of 
their internal procedures. This flexibility is better suited to agencies that apply adaptive aid 
management principles where change is achieved through systematic and iterative use of 
emergent knowledge.  
• Value chain facilitation agents, donors, and rural development practitioners working at 
improving value captured by smallholders through the agricultural value chain should not just 
focus on forming PGs. While there is pressure from development projects and donors to cover 
larger target populations by creating a multitude of PGs, this research demonstrates that there 
is greater value in focusing efforts and limited resources on fewer PGs. From the outset, 
external actors should initiate PGs in areas where there is a clear value proposition for 
smallholders.  
• Supporting agencies must give consideration to the purpose, objectives, and constitutional 
arrangements of the PGs. This study shows that facilitators typically lack experience 
establishing PGs with well-defined constitutions, purposefully designed to accommodate their 
strategies. Before developing a PGs constitution, members should come to a common 
understanding of their group’s goals and objectives and claim ownership of it. External actors 
should be aware that even at the transactional level, the PGs institutional arrangements must 
address the institutional problems that discourage members from investing in shared assets; 
In particular, they must address the free-rider, portfolio, and horizon problems. This research 
shows that smallholders have an instinctive appreciation of these problems. Functional PGs 
were quick to devise and implement institutional arrangements that helped to address these 
problems. External actors should actively facilitate these arrangements in the formative stages 
of establishing a PG rather than purposefully discouraging PGs from rewarding investment. 
• To address concerns related to the exclusion of poor smallholders participating in value-adding 
activities, project organisers should consider using donor capital to award grants that give 
smallholders an equal initial financial share in the PO’s value-adding investment. This ensures 
that a PO’s assets are allocated to its patron members. It also decreases the organisation’s 
debt-to-equity ratio which helps to attract formal lenders whose due diligence checks can 
improve the creditworthiness of the POs’ value-adding endeavours. In addition, using donor 
capital as a contribution towards smallholders’ equity can facilitate blended value investing by 
helping leverage additional financial resources from smallholders and the private sector to co-




• To encourage members to participate in supply contracts, the contract’s pricing mechanisms 
should protect farmers from downside price risks and account for price variations post 
planting. To encourage members to comply with supply contracts, POs can issue TDRs to 
contracted farmers. The study showed that the miller’s willingness to offer an attractive 
contract to the PO was influenced by PO’s decision to issue TDRs. To preserve the market value 
of these rights, delivery rights issued need to be permanent and matched to the aggregate 
quantity of paddy negotiated in the POs supply contract. The value of these rights should not 
be based solely on price premiums, but must also take into account other factors such as 
reduced income risks and labour cost savings. 
• Although at the research’s conclusion the PGs and POs had not expressed an interest in 
becoming legal entities, from a policy perspective it is important that the prevailing legislation 
governing producer-owned organisations supports organisational models that allow POs to 
adopt investor-friendly institutional and governance arrangements, particularly at the ‘scaling 
up’ phase where their need for capital intensifies. 
6.3 Contributions to literature, limitations, and future research 
The actual detailed account of the research’s processes, actions, and methods represent a significant 
part of the study’s contribution to the literature. This study was the first to use action research to 
document the process of establishing functional PGs and value-adding POs in Myanmar. The research 
provided pragmatic and evidence-based outcomes and recommendations to satisfy the two research 
gaps identified in Section 2.8. Firstly, this action research introduced unique institutional arrangements 
that are critical for PGs to function at a transactional level and to upgrade into organisations that can 
undertake value-adding strategies. The institutional and governance arrangements developed in this 
research can help newly established PGs transition into POs that can finance capital intensive assets 
and engage in IBMs with strategic partners, donors, and financiers. The unique institutional features 
identified in this study are critical for smallholder inclusion and value chain upgrading. This is 
particularly important in Myanmar and other developing countries where financial services are lacking 
and smallholders have limited access to term loans that allow them to invest in value-adding assets.   
Secondly, this research has shown that following a systematic and iterative process that takes into 
consideration participatory actions and emerging knowledge can have far-reaching benefits for 
smallholders, while simultaneously empowering them to take ownership of their initiatives. It 
highlights the importance of partnerships in delivering development aid that directly benefits the rural 
poor. The research component of this study not only complemented WVM and VFM’s work with the 
Project’s beneficiaries, but also enhanced their field staff’s institutional knowledge to establish, 




the role of external actors in establishing PGs and POs. In addition, NGOs and other development 
practitioners can draw on this action research’s outputs and apply them to other initiatives with a 
similar context.  
6.3.1 Limitations  
This action research faced two key constraints. Firstly, the research approach used and some of the 
unique features introduced to establish the PGs and POs were new to WVM and its in-field facilitators. 
While they played a key role in executing the research and bridging the gap between the Researcher, 
the research setting and participants, in some instances they were hesitant to implement particular 
activities that were outside of their comfort zones. In reflection, lengthier and more frequent field 
visits by the Researcher could have enhanced the capacity of the in-field team to engage with key 
stakeholders, particularly private sector actors in the respective value chains.  
Secondly, although the Researcher spent a total of twenty-two weeks in the field (spread over three 
separate field trips in AC1 and AC2), critical scheduled field visits in AC3 were not possible due to 
COVID-19 restrictions on international travel. This restricted face-to-face interactions with the in-field 
team and research participants could have enhanced the effectiveness of the actions in that cycle. 
While these actions were implemented remotely, field activities were impacted by domestic 
restrictions on gatherings designed to curb the spread of COVID-19. In addition, the thesis was not able 
to report on some key outcomes of AC3 because fieldwork was suspended on the 1st of February 2021 
following civil unrest in Myanmar as result of a military coup. At the research’s conclusion, WVM and 
VFM had not managed to disburse the grant and loan components to the POs to help finance their 
value-adding enterprises. While these unfortunate events affected the action research in the late 
cycles, their consequences do not negate the fundamental findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations reported in this thesis. Furthermore, due to the research’s nature, the findings are 
context specific to smallholders in the target areas and cannot be generalised to other settings. 
6.3.2 Considerations for future research 
Many rural development projects involve elements of action research but seldom apply its processes 
in a systematic and comprehensive way. However, the case for project designers to provide for well-
executed action research needs to be built on evidence of its impact on smallholder incomes and 
livelihoods. Unfortunately, the double-difference impact assessment planned for the TRILLD project 
was put on hold following the outbreak of civil unrest in Myanmar. The Project revealed two other 
issues that require further research. The first stems from the difficulty that PO directors have in 
accessing term loans to finance value-adding investments owned and managed by their organisation. 




repayment schedules associated with conventional term loans seldom align with cash flows generated 
by PO investments, and this increases the risk of default. Finnemore et al. (2004) contend that cash 
flow problems created by this misalignment can be alleviated by offering loan products that have 
graduated repayment schedules. The second issue stems from the need to find acceptable and 
effective ways of providing credible traceability for high quality products sourced from PO members 
who adopt good agricultural practices. The success of value chain interventions invariably depends on 
the confidence that producers and consumers have in the systems that distinguish value-added 
products from other products, and which allow for quick identification and resolution of breaches in 
the value chain. Many value-adding attributes are credence attributes that cannot be detected by 
visual inspection of the product. For example, hybrid pigs raised by members of POs that apply strict 
biosecurity protocols are not visibly different from hybrid pigs raised without such protocols. Without 
credible traceability, consumers will not pay a premium for pork sourced from POs, and farmers will 
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Figure A 1 TRRILD project’s results framework, outputs and intended 
outcomes  
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research in Myeik and Palaw districts of Myanmar 
 
• I have read and understood the description of this project;  
• I agree to take part in the project;  
• I consent to the interview being recorded using a digital recording device for use during this 
research. 
• I understand that the information I have provided can be withdrawn at any time within 90 days 
of this interview.  
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Lincoln University, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce 
Research Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled: 
Establishing producer organisations to sustain smallholder inclusion in agri-food value chains: 
Action research in Myeik and Palaw districts of Myanmar 
This research forms part of the Tanintharyi Regional Rural Income and Livelihood Development 
(TRRILD) project, and fulfilment of my Doctor of Philosophy at Lincoln University, New Zealand. The 
Project and research is funded by New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and jointly 
implemented by World Vision Myanmar, Vision Fund Myanmar, the International Livestock Research 
Institute, and Lincoln University. The overall objective of this research is to design and nurture 
producer organisations that will facilitate smallholder inclusion in the Project’s upgraded agri-food 
value chains. 
 
Your participation in this research will involve a personal interview or group discussion that should last 
no more than one hour, at a time and place that is convenient for you. The interviews will focus on 
collective marketing and smallholder participation in the paddy and pig value chains in Tanintharyi. 
With your permission, the interviews and discussions will be recorded for use within this study. You 
will be asked to sign a consent form to acknowledge your voluntary participation in this study, and 
your right to withdraw information provided within 90 days after signing. 
 
The results of the research will be used within the TRRILD project and may be published or presented 
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and all consent forms will be kept under lock and key and password protected 
 
If you have any questions please contact me at +642102210805 (New Zealand), or by email at 
randel.esnard@lincolnuni.ac.nz. You can also contact my primary supervisor, Associate Professor 












Outline of topics for interviews and FGDs 
• Producer group characteristics  
- Brief background of cooperation/group formation/history of PGS in the area 
- Purpose and function of PG 
- Strategic objectives, goals, vision, and mission  
- Membership characteristics 
- Services offered  
- Organisational structure  
- Core business activities  
- Major successes/achievements and challenges encountered 
- Financing, growth in assets, financial position  
• Institutional arrangements  
- Membership requirements  
- Voting entitlements of members  
- Nature of benefit rights accrued to members  
• Governance arrangements  
- Organisational structure  
- Selection and election of directors   
- Procedure for electing directors and chairman  
- Procedure for reporting to membership  
- Duties, power, and composition of the board of directors  
- Performance based measurements  
• Group factors 
- Composition of membership, average age, shareholding, level of patronage, and investment  
- Membership commitment and trust 
- Product categories produced by members (single product or multi-product)  
- Level of participation in policy and managerial decision making  
- Level of on-farm investment   
• Management factors  
- Portfolio, qualifications and experience of senior management/leadership  
- Leadership qualities of senior management  
- Senior executive modus operandi  
- Management/leadership perceptions of constraints with regards to value-adding  
• Business strategy value-adding ability  
- Intended business strategy 
- Supporting environment (infrastructure, extension, public training, NGOs) 
- Perceived challenges 
- Capital adequacy 
- Funding sources   
- Growth in membership  
- Credit worthiness: ability to secure private funds, donor capital and loans from a commercial 
bank 
• Partnership arrangements 
- Relationship with business partners, government officials, and NGOs 
- Requirements of partners and ability to meet these requirements 
• Community/village characteristics 
- Community involvement (village authorities) 




- Community acceptance of business venture 
• Strategic partners 
- Experience dealing with farmers and producer groups 
- Purchase order requirements (size, timing of orders, delivery and transport, prices and cost, 
contractual arrangements, and guarantees) 
- Services offered (training and extension) 














Standardised interview guides for key respondents 
Guide questions for interviews with WVM Staff 
Background: Establishment of PG 
- Provide a brief background of the formation of the PG and the level of cooperation between staff 
and producers and among producers themselves.   
- What services were (are being) offered to the PGs? (training, mentoring, technical advice) 
- Comment on the current status of PGs (growth/shrinkage of membership, performance, 
independence, dropouts) 
- Comment on the membership characteristics of the PGs (size, average age, composition, gender 
etc) 
- What were the major successes/achievements and challenges encountered during group 
formation? 
Partnership arrangements 
- What is the nature of your relationship with the PGs and relevant government and village 
officials? 
- What are the current requirements of PGs? Comment on their ability to meet these 
requirements 
- What are the PG’s expectations of WVM staff? 
- What type of information is shared between WVM staff and how is that information shared? 
Community/village characteristics 
- What percentage of the farming households in the village are members of the PGs? 
- What is the perceived impact on community and non-farming households? (positive and 
negative) 
- Comment on the community acceptance of business venture 
Guide questions for interviews with managers/leaders of PG 
PG details 
- Could you outline a brief history of this PG? 
- What was the overall purpose and function of the PG? 
- What activities does the group currently undertake? 
- What other activities/functions does the group intend to undertake? 
- Where does the group envision itself in the next 2-5years? 
- How often does the executive/leadership of the group meet? 
- Ask about bookkeeping experience, management experience of group leaders 
- What percentage of the (rice/paddy) farming households in the village are members of the PG? 
(Comment on average age, level of participation, registered, growth and shrinkage of 
membership) 
- Does the group have a registered list of members? 
- Has the group done any transactions with input suppliers collectively? 
- Has the group collectively sold any products? 
- Does the group have any relationship with business partners, government officials, and NGOs? 
- What are some of the major success and challenges faced by the group? Past and present? 
- How do you think the group can be improved or strengthened? 
- Institutional arrangements 




- Is there a subscription fee or registration fee? (is it a one-off payment or an annual payment, are 
members required to purchase shares?) 
- What are the fees used for? 
- If a member decides to leave the PG, are they allowed to redeem/recover these fees? 
- What do farmers gain by becoming a registered member of the PG? (ask about voting and 
benefit rights) 
Governance arrangements 
- How do members of the group select and elect group leaders? 
- If members have to vote, how is that conducted? 
- Is there a limited term for group leaders to serve? 
- What are duties, power, and composition of the board of directors/management committee(s)? 
- Are all group leaders patron members of the PG? 
- How often do the group leaders meet with the group? 
- What are the audit and reporting requirements of the group (in theory and practice)  
Group attributes 
- Are all members required to pay the same amount to join the group?  
- What percentage of the membership specialise in paddy/pigs? 
- What are the main services desired/required by members? 
- What are the main inputs needed vs. inputs purchased by members?* 
- Who are the current suppliers of inputs and finance in the area? 
- Who are the current buyers of paddy and or pigs in the area? 
- Do members participate directly in strategic and management decisions? 
- What is the total land acreage of paddy under cultivation by PG members? * 
- How many pigs are being produced by PG members? * Answer in table provided 
- How many pigs are being sold by PG members? * Answer in table provided 
Business strategy and value-adding ability 
- What is the group’s intended business strategy? 
- Are supporting services in the area adequate to achieve the intended business strategy? 
(infrastructure, extension, public training, NGOS) 
- Does the group purchase or intend to purchase multiple products from its members? 
- What resources would the group need to achieve these strategies? 
- Does the group have a group savings or bank account? 
- How does the group obtain information on member’s requirements? 
Contract performance 
- (If the group is involved in collective activity) How do members pay for these inputs? Cash, 
contractual terms etc. 
- Does the group use contracts to secure inputs/products? 
- Comment on the types of contracts used (in theory and in practice, characteristics, and past 
experiences) 
- How are these contracts negotiated? (ex-ante) 
- How does the group enforce these contracts (in theory and practice) 
- What are the existing and anticipated challenges in implementing and enforcing these contracts 
(existing and anticipated challenges) 
Management/leadership attributes 
- Comment on the experience of group leadership in conducting business transactions 
- Can you provide a brief background of your training and experience as a manager/group leader? 
- Is there anything else that you have thought of during the course of this interview that may be of 
interest to this research? 






Guide questions for interviews with farmers/ PG members 
Member details  
- Provide a brief background of your farming operations? (land acreage, main crops cultivated, 
number of pigs) 
- Have you made any significant investments on the farm in the past few years? 
- How long have you been a member of this group? 
- Why did you join this PG?  
- How much did you pay to join?  
- What services do you get or expect to get from the group? (ask about labour) 
- Which of the services offered are most useful to you? 
- What type of training or services would you like to receive from the PG? 
- Where do you currently purchase your farm inputs? (quantity, frequency, time of year, 
accessibility, and cost) 
- How do you usually pay for these farm inputs? (cash on purchase, or contracts) 
- What conditions would make you purchase inputs from the PG? 
- Where do you sell your farm outputs? 
- Do you have any contracts with buyers/input suppliers? If yes, elaborate on the terms and 
conditions. 
- What conditions would make you sell your produce through the PG? (cash on delivery, through 
written or verbal contract) 
- How do you think the group can be improved or strengthened? 
Shareholder benefits  
- What are the main benefits you currently receive or expect to receive from being a member of 
the PG? 
- If this PG was to be successful, do you think that new members should pay more to become 
registered? 
- If it was possible to gain more benefits from the PG, would you be willing to increase your 
investment/shareholding in the group? What type of benefits? 
Governance arrangements 
- How often are group meetings held? 
- How often do you attend group meetings? 
- How do you receive information about these group meetings? 
- Who nominates group leaders and how often? 
- How does the group elect group leaders? 
- Do you get a report on the group’s financial status?  
Management and group attributes 
- Do members conduct similar levels of business with the group? 
- Does the group purchase or intend to purchase multiple products from its members? 
- Do members participate directly in policy making decisions?  
- Do you discuss the group’s matters with other members and non-members? 
- Will you continue your membership? 
- Given the current circumstances, do you think new members will join the group? 
- Do you believe members have the volumes required to support and sustain value-adding 
activities? 
Contract performance 
- Does the group use contracts to secure inputs/products? 
- Comment on the types of contracts used (in theory and in practice, characteristics, and past 
experiences) 
- How are these contracts negotiated? (ex-ante) 
- Are there any requirements/standards for participating in these contracts? 
- How does the group enforce these contracts (in theory and practice) 
- What are the existing and anticipated challenges in implementing and enforcing these contracts 




- Is there anything else that you have thought of during the course of this interview that may be 
of interest to this research? 
- I may need to come back to you for further data or clarification – would that be okay? 
 
Guide questions for interview with strategic partners (input suppliers, buyers, and processors) 
Company details 
- Could you outline a brief background of your company, and experience dealing with small 
producers and PGs? 
- What are the core services offered to small producers and PGs? 
- Does your company provide extension advice and training about use and application of inputs 
(finance, technical advice, quality control, training and extension)? 
- Does your company currently offer services in the rural areas of Myeik and Palaw? If not, please 
state the reasons why  
- Where do you obtain your inputs from?  
- Are there any certification or product quality requirements for your products? 
- How do you respond to queries from farmers about product usage? Who is responsible?  
Contract performance 
- Does your company use contracts for sale/purchase of inputs/products?  
- What is the full range of terms and services in these contracts? 
- How are contracts negotiated? (ex-ante) 
- What are your past experiences using contracts? 
- How does the company enforce these contracts?  
- Comment on the existing and anticipated challenges in using contracts 
- What are your purchase order requirements? (minimum size, timing of orders, delivery and 
transport, prices and cost, payment order guarantees, deposits and discounts, and interest 
charges?) 
- What are your payment terms when dealing with small producers, suppliers, PG? (cash on 
delivery, deferred payments, credit) 
Partnership arrangements 
- Does your company have business relationships with other similar partners, government, and 
NGOs? Please elaborate.  
- What are the key your requirements and the requirements of these partners?  
- How do you obtain/share information with these partners? 
- Under what condition would your company enter into equity sharing arrangements with PG? 
 
Guide questions for interview with government/cooperative official 
- Can you outline a little about your background and experience working with agricultural 
Cooperatives/PG 
- What is your department’s role in promoting agricultural Cooperatives/PG? 
- Based on your experience, what do you think are the major challenges faced by the 
agricultural cooperatives/PG?  
- What is the process of registration of cooperatives/PG in Myanmar/Tanintharyi region? 
(approval time ) 
- What are the requirements for registration? 
- Are there any successful PG/cooperatives operating in the area? 
- Do agricultural cooperatives/PG receive any assistance/subsidies from the government?  
- What are the three main factors that that hinder PG development?  
- Is there anything else that you have thought of during the course of this interview that may 
be of interest to this research? 
- I may need to come back to you for further data or clarification – would that be okay? 
 
Guide questions for interviews hotel/restaurants in Myeik and Palaw 
- How long has your establishment been in operation? (1-2, 3-5, 5+) 




- Where do you currently obtain your pork? (Myeik, Palaw, imported, other)  
- What are some of the major success and challenges faced by the group? Past and present? 
- How do you think the group can be improved or strengthened? 
- What are the main services desired/required by members? 
- What are the main inputs needed vs. inputs purchased by members? 
- Who are the current suppliers of inputs and finance in the area? 
- Who are the current buyers of paddy and or pigs in the area? 
- How many pigs are being produced by members of the PG?* Answer in table provided 
- How many pigs are being sold by members of the PG?* Answer in table provided 
- Does your company currently offer services in the rural areas of Myeik and Palaw? If not, 
please state the reasons why.  
- Where do you obtain your inputs from?  
- Are there any certification or product quality requirements for your products? 
Contract performance 
- Does your company use contracts for sale/purchase of inputs/products?  
- What is the full range of terms and services in these contracts? 
- How are contracts negotiated? (ex-ante) 
- What are your past experiences using contracts? 
- How does the company enforce these contracts?  
- Comment on the existing and anticipated challenges in using contracts 
- What are your purchase order requirements? (minimum size, timing of orders, delivery and 
transport, prices and cost, payment order guarantees, deposits and discounts, interest charges) 
- What are your payment terms when dealing with small producers, suppliers, PG? (cash on 






PG Master constitution and by-laws 
“PG Name” 
Constitution and By-laws 
 
1. PREAMBLE 
We, the members of “PG Name” ordain and acknowledge this constitution and its by-laws as 
binding to govern the collective activities and operations of the “PG Name”.   
2. INTERPRETATIONS 
In the interpretation of this constitution and its by-laws, the following words and expressions will 
have the meaning given hereunder: - 
“Producer group” means an assembly of individual producers who work collectively to achieve 
a common goal. In this constitution and by-laws hereafter, the term refers to the “PG Name”.   
“Associate member” refers to a person or organisation whose application for membership has 
been approved by the directors but who has not satisfied all of the requirements for 
membership. 
“Member” refers to a person or organisation whose application for membership has been 
approved by the directors and who has satisfied all of the conditions necessary for membership. 
Notwithstanding this definition, the term ‘member’ refers to both members and associate 
members unless associate members are explicitly excluded.  
“Non-member” refers to a person or organisation that is not registered as a member or 
associate member. 
“Board” refers to the directors elected by members, plus any person appointed by the elected 
directors as a director, to represent the interests of members in the affairs of the producer 
group. 
“Chairperson” refers to the director who chairs the Board. 
“Appointed director” means any person appointed to the Board by the elected directors. 
“Representative” means a person who has written authority from a member to represent their 
interests at a meeting of the producer group. 
“Agricultural produce” refers to farm products that the producer group transacts on behalf of 
its members and associate members. 
“Farmer” refers to a member of the producer group who produces agricultural produce.  
3. NAME AND LOCATION 
The name of this producer group will be the “PG Name”, and its principal place of business will be 
“Village name and business address”.  
 
4. VISION OF PRODUCER GROUP 
To promote the economic and social welfare of our members through collective agricultural 
marketing activities. 
5. OBJECTIVES 
5.1. The general objective of this producer group is to increase farm income of members by 




5.2. More specifically, the producer group will: 
5.2.1. Encourage coordination among farmers, buyers, and other key value chain actors to 
improve market linkages, access to market information, training, and other services. 
5.2.2. Arrange for collective purchase of inputs, storage, grading, transportation and selling 
of agricultural products through the producer group. 
5.2.3. Encourage and disseminate among members, knowledge on the use of modern 
farming techniques to promote profitable and sustainable methods of farming. 
5.2.4. Where necessary, enter into contractual arrangements with members to grow and 
supply agricultural products that meet market safety and quality standards. 
5.2.5. Facilitate members’ access to individual and group loans to improve and grow their 
farming business. 
6. MEMBERSHIP 
6.1. The Board will review all applications for membership to “PG Name”.  
6.2. Adults and organisations are eligible for membership provided that: 
6.2.1. Their membership is approved by a simple majority of directors present at a Board 
meeting. 
6.2.2. They complete and sign the member registration form appended to this constitution. 
6.2.3. They pay fees that may be introduced by the Board to register as a member and/or 
acquire shares issued by the producer group. 
6.2.4. Where such fee structures exist, approved applicants who have not paid their fees in 
full, or who have not met the minimum contributions stipulated in Sub-clause 12.2, will 
be registered as associate members.  
6.2.5. Associate members are not entitled to vote for directors or to serve on the Board. 
 
6.3. A person or organisation ceases to be a member of the producer group: 
6.3.1. Upon death. 
6.3.2. Upon dissolution of the producer group. 
6.3.3. If they no longer satisfy the eligibility requirements specified in Sub-clauses 6.2.3 and 
6.2.4.  
6.3.4. If they apply in writing to discontinue their membership and their application is 
approved by a simple majority of directors present at a Board meeting.  
6.3.5. If they act in a way that is detrimental to the interests of the producer group. In this 
case, at least two-thirds of the directors present at a Board meeting must vote in favour 
of expulsion. The member will be given due notice of the meeting, together with reasons 
for termination, and the opportunity to respond at the meeting. 
7. Duties of a Member 
7.1. To comply with the law, rules and procedures of the producer group. 
7.2. To comply with decisions taken by the Board. 
7.3. To subscribe to any fees and shares introduced by the Board. 
7.4. To attend all meetings where members are required to vote for directors or on a particular 
decision.   
7.5. To participate in producer group activities and to patronise its services. 
8. Rights of a Member 
8.1. To utilise services offered by the producer group. 
8.2. To be nominated for, and elected to, a position on the Board subject to the provisions of Sub-




8.3. To nominate and vote democratically for Board members subject to the provisions of Sub-clause 
10.1.  
8.4. To acquire benefits generated by the producer group whether through patronage, dividends or 
capital gains. 
8.5. To transfer shares and to transact tradable shares subject to Sub-clause 13.4. 
8.6. To have access to the producer group’s annual financial statements at least 14 days prior to its 
annual general meeting. 
8.7. In the event of death of a member, any shares held by the deceased member will transfer to the 
member’s lawful heirs. If the heirs do not meet the eligibility requirements specified in Sub-
clause 6.2, they can transfer or sell the shares to other current and/or eligible members subject 
to Sub-clause 13.4.   
8.8. To request a general meeting to discuss matters of the producer group provided they represent 
at least ten per cent (10%) of members. 
8.9. Associate members are entitled to these rights with the exception of those rights specified in 
Sub-clauses 8.2 and 8.3. 
8.10. Non-members can utilise the services of the producer group provided they pay a service fee 
determined by the Board. 
9. GENERAL MEETINGS 
9.1. The supreme authority of the producer group is vested in general meetings where every 
member has a right to attend and where members, other than associate members, are entitled 
to vote for directors and on issues that require member approval. 
9.2. General meetings will be chaired by the Board’s Chairperson, or by another director delegated 
by the Chairperson. 
9.3. The Secretary will give members at least 14 days’ notice of any general meeting. The notice of 
the meeting will include the place, time, date, and the purpose for which the meeting is called. 
9.4. A quorum equal to at least one-half (50%) of the producer group’s members must be present 
for a general meeting to proceed. 
9.5. If within one (1) hour after the time fixed for any meeting, the members present are not 
sufficient to form a quorum, such meeting will be considered as dissolved if convened on the 
demand of members; in all other cases, it will stand adjourned to a date no less than three days 
or not more than seven days thereafter. At least three days’ notice will be given for this meeting. 
If at the adjourned meeting a quorum is not present for the meeting, the members present will 
constitute a quorum with the agenda of the original meeting. 
9.6. A resolution put to the vote will be decided upon by show of hands of those members entitled 
to vote unless voting by secret ballot is demanded by at least five (5) members present before 
declaration of the results by show of hands. In such case, voting will be conducted by secret 
ballot. 
9.7. In the event of an equality of votes, the director who chairs the meeting will be entitled to a 
casting vote. 
9.8. Annual General Meeting (AGM): The first AGM of the producer group will be held within one 
calendar year from the date of establishing the producer group, and every year thereafter within 
three months of the producer group’s financial year-end. The function of the AGM will be: 
9.8.1. Presentation and discussion of annual report presented by the Board. 
9.8.2. To consider the financial statements presented by the Board for the preceding year. 
9.8.3. To review the constitution and to vote on resolutions to amend the constitution subject 
to Clause 14. 
9.8.4. To nominate and elect directors to the Board of the producer group. 
9.8.5. To discuss any other business of the producer group. 
9.9. The order of business at the AGM will include: 
9.9.1. Ascertainment of quorum 




9.9.3. Review minutes of the last AGM. Adoption of minutes must be proposed by a member 
and seconded by any other member. 
9.9.4. Presentation and review of reports. 
9.9.5. Consider amendments to the constitution and its by-laws. 
9.9.6. Election of new directors. 
9.9.7. Any other business. 
Adjournment. This motion must be proposed a member and seconded by any other 
member. 
9.10. Special General Meeting: The Board may call a special general meeting to discuss matters of 
urgency and importance. It will also call a special general meeting at the request of at least ten 
per cent (10%) of members. 
10. BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
10.1. Nomination, election and term of directors 
10.1.1.  “PG Name” will be controlled by a Board of Directors.  
10.1.2.  The Board will comprise no less than five (5) directors and no more than ten (10) 
directors.  
10.1.3. Members or their authorised representatives (not including associate members) 
attending the AGM will nominate and elect directors. 
10.1.4. At least five (5) of the elected directors must be members nominated for election by 
members who are farmers. Associate members are not eligible for nomination. 
10.1.5. If the membership includes one or more organisations that transact with the producer 
group, these strategic partners are entitled to nominate no more than four (4) directors 
for election.  
10.1.6. Elected directors will choose, among themselves, a Chairperson and Vice-chairperson of 
the Board. The procedure to select the Chairperson and Vice-chairperson will be by show 
of hands at a meeting of the elected directors. 
10.1.7. Elected directors may appoint additional directors who are not members of “PG Name” 
but who bring business experience and expertise to the Board. The number of elected 
and appointed directors may not exceed a total of ten (10). 
10.1.8. Directors are eligible to serve a three-year term of office commencing from the day of 
election or appointment. They may hold office for no more than three (3) consecutive 
terms before retiring from the Board for at least one (1) year. 
10.2. Rights and duties of the Board  
10.2.1.  Appoint directors in accordance with the provisions of Sub-clause 10.1. 
10.2.2. Establish, approve and account for strategies implemented to achieve “PG Name’s” 
objectives. 
10.2.3. Make decisions on contracts and agreements required for the business of the producer 
group. 
10.2.4. When necessary, appoint committees to facilitate the work of the Board in accordance 
with the provisions of Clause 11. 
10.2.5. When necessary, employ managers to perform duties authorised by the Board. 
10.2.6. Terminate the employment of managers who do not perform satisfactorily. 
10.2.7. Approve an annual budget to implement the producer group’s strategies. 
10.2.8. Set the rate at which any fee, fine, or commission is imposed on members and non-
members, and establish prices paid for products transacted by the producer group 
with its members. 
10.2.9. Issue shares, and approve share transfers and transactions in accordance with the 




10.2.10. Examine a monthly financial report presented by the Treasurer. 
10.2.11. Ensure that members have access to the producer group’s annual financial statements 
before the AGM. 
10.2.12. Admit new members to the producer group, and act on the suspension or expulsion of 
members. 
10.2.13.  Summon general meetings.  
10.2.14. Recommend amendments to the constitution and by-laws subject to Clause 14. 
10.2.15. Assist anyone authorised to inspect the books and accounts of the producer group in 
doing so. 
10.2.16. Perform any other duties as the members in a general meeting authorise. 
10.3. Board meetings 
10.3.1. Board meetings will be convened as often as the business of the producer group 
requires. These meetings will be at least bi-monthly at a time and place agreed upon 
by the Board. 
10.3.2. A quorum equal to at least one-half (50%) of the producer group’s full complement of 
directors must be present for a Board meeting to proceed. 
10.3.3. If there are vacancies on the Board such that the minimum number of five (5) farmer-
elected directors is not satisfied or a quorum cannot be achieved, the remaining 
directors will call a special general meeting for the purpose of electing members to fill 
the vacancies. 
10.3.4. A director will be deemed to have vacated his or her position on the Board if they fail 
to attend three (3) consecutive Board meetings without giving satisfactory explanation 
to the Board within seven (7) days of their absence from the third meeting. 
10.4. Roles and responsibility of directors  
The Chairperson will: 
10.4.1. Preside at Board meetings and general meetings, or delegate this authority to another 
director. 
10.4.2. Along with the Secretary, jointly represent the producer group in all contracts and 
agreements approved by the Board. 
The Vice-chairperson will: 
10.4.3. Assume the office of the Chairperson in his or her absence, or when called upon by the 
latter to assume the post. 
Other Board members will: 
10.4.4. Assist with the functions of the Board.  
10.4.5. Accept roles such as Secretary or Treasurer delegated to them by the Chairperson if 
these positions are not filled by employees of “PG Name”. 
 
10.5. Roles and responsibility of the Secretary and Treasurer 
The Secretary will: 
10.5.1.  Sign and execute jointly with the Chairperson all contracts and agreements as the 
Board specifies. 
10.5.2. Attend all Board meetings and general meetings. 
10.5.3.  Keep minutes of all Board meetings and general meetings. 
10.5.4.  Keep copies of all reports prepared by or for “PG Name”. 




10.5.6. Maintain an accurate register of members, indicating whether they are farmer-
members, associate members, or strategic partners. The register must also record the 
products that members and associate members transact with the producer group. 
10.5.7.  Issue notices of Board meetings and general meetings in accordance with the 
provisions of this constitution. 
10.5.8. Conduct any correspondence on behalf of the producer group. 
 
The Treasurer will: 
10.5.9. Oversee the funds of the producer group.  
10.5.10. Receive funds and make payments for the producer group provided such transactions 
are authorised in a manner deemed appropriate by the Board. 
10.5.11. Raise invoices, and issue and receive receipts for all financial transactions conducted 
by or with the producer group.   
10.5.12. Record all transactions of the producer group in books or software intended for that 
purpose. 
10.5.13. Keep a register of all shares issued, of shares taken up by each member, of shares paid 
for by each member, and of approved share transactions between members. 
10.5.14. Present a monthly financial report to the directors and prepare annual financial 
statements for the AGM. 
10.5.15. Present an annual budget to the directors for approval by the Board. 
10.5.16. Oversee any other financial duties, analyses, or projections requested by the Board. 
11. COMMITTEES 
11.1. The Board will appoint a coordination committee for key products that it transacts with 
members. 
11.2. Coordination committees will be comprised of no less than three (3) members and no more than 
five (5) individuals. These committees may include individual experts who are not members of 
the producer group. 
11.3. These committees will formulate business strategies for their product in consultation with 
members and other stakeholders, and will make proposals to be considered by the Board for 
adoption and implementation. 
11.4. Prior to the election of directors at an AGM, the general meeting will appoint an election 
committee. It will be the duty of the election committee to take charge of all matters pertaining 
to elections, nominations, casting, and counting votes.  
11.5. Current directors and members nominated for Board membership are not permitted to serve 
on the election committee.  
12. FUNDS 
The finances of the producer group will come from: 
12.1. Membership fees: The Board may introduce a membership fee to help finance operating and 
other costs.  
12.2. Shares (equity capital):  
  
12.3. The price and number of shares issued by the Board will be determined by its directors based 
on the amount of additional equity capital that is required by the producer group to finance 
investments in support of its approved business strategy.  
12.4. The Board may allow members to pay for their shares over a period not exceeding two (2) years, 
and may withhold up to 20% of any payment due to a member whose shares are not fully paid 




above, members will be permitted to pay as many instalments as they desire before the two-
year period ends. 
12.5. Loans (debt capital): The Board can approve applications submitted by the producer group for 
loans from registered banks and micro-finance companies.  
12.6. Retained earnings: Profits earned after accounting for expenses, depreciation, amortisation and 
dividends. 
12.7. Subsidies, grants, and donations: The Board can accept funds from any lawful organisation 
provided that cash received is deposited in a bank account registered in the name of “PG Name”. 
12.8. The funds of the producer group may be applied to the following purposes only: 
12.8.1. Authorised operational expenses. 
12.8.2. Investment required to implement “PG Name’s” approved business strategy. 
12.8.3. Redemption of debt and any redeemable fees.  
12.8.4. Any other purpose as stated in the constitution and its by-laws. 
12.9. The financial year of the producer group will be “MONTH” each year.  
13. SHARES AND DIVIDENDS 
13.1. The Board may declare dividends in years when the producer group earns a net surplus but 
the dividend distribution may not account for more than 50% of the net of surplus after 
accounting for expenses, depreciation, and amortisation. 
13.2. Dividends declared by the Board will be paid only on shares that are paid up before the period 
for which dividends are paid. 
13.3. A member holding shares that are not paid up at the end of the two (2) year probationary 
period will not receive price discounts and premiums offered to members whose shares are fully 
paid up. 
13.4. Members may transfer shares to, or transact shares with, other approved members of “PG 
Name” if they accept all obligations imposed by the shares and if the transfers or transactions 
are approved by the Board and recorded by the Secretary. 
13.5. The Board will not prevent a share transfer or transaction unless it has good reason to do so. 
14. AMENDMENTS 
The Board may extend or modify all or any provisions of this constitution and its by-laws 
provided that any proposed amendments are approved by a two-thirds majority of members 
present at a general meeting. All approved amendments must be recorded in the constitution 
and its by-laws and communicated to members within thirty (30) days. 
15. DISSOLUTION OF PRODUCER GROUP 
The Board may dissolve “PG Name” provided that a proposal to dissolve the organisation is 
approved by a two-thirds majority of members present at a general meeting. Any remaining 
assets, or the proceeds thereof, will be distributed among members in proportion to their 






Person Member Registration Form 
 
Name ________________________          Phone number _____________________ 
Gender ________________________   
Age ________________________       Main occupation _____________________ 
National registration card number _________________________ 




I would like to register for membership as a paddy farmer            and /or a             pig farmer 
 
Paddy details 
Total number of acres of paddy farmed ______________   
Paddy acres owned               and/or paddy acres rented   
Pig details 
 
I have sufficient space for pig housing:  Yes       No 
How many pigs did you raise last year:             Local breed and/or            Hybrid breed?   
            Sows   Boars   Piglets   Fatteners 
 
I agree to become a member of “PG NAME” and acknowledge that, by registering as a member, I must 
abide by its Constitution and by-laws, and with the decisions of its Board and Managers. 
 
Applicant’s signature ______________________  Date ________________________ 
 
The Board approves/declines this application for membership/associate membership. 
 
Chairman’s signature ______________________   Date _________________________ 
   
    
   
      
   
   




“PG Name”  
Organisation Member Registration Form 
 
Name of organisation  __________________________________________________________  
Phone number________________________ 
Core business _________________________________________________________________  
Business address ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Business registration number _________________________ 
 
Representative ________________________       Phone number____________________ 
Representative’s title or role in the organisation _____________________________________ 
 
 
“Name of organisation” agrees to become a member of “PG NAME” and acknowledges that, by 
registering as a member, it must comply with the producer group’s Constitution and by-laws, and with 
the decisions of its Board and managers. 
 
Representative’s signature ______________________ Date _____________________ 
 
The Board of “PG NAME” approves / declines this application for membership / associate 
membership. 
 







PG membership register and brochure of constitution 
 
G.1 Membership register template 
  






Name in full Gender 








Paddy acres Number of pigs    
Owned Borrowed Local pigs 
Hybrid 
pigs 
   
            
            
            
            
            
            













PG seed production agreement template 




SEED PRODUCTION AGREEEMENT 
 
 
This agreement is between ‘’PG NAME’’ and “NAME OF FARMER” (hereafter referred to as “the grower”) 
whose current membership number is “FARMER’S PG MEMBERSHIP NUMBER”. The purpose of this 
agreement is to produce improved paddy rice seed for ‘’PG NAME’’ and for “NAME OF FARMER” in the 
“INSERT YEAR” planting season.   
Particulars:  
1. The terms and conditions of this agreement are binding on both parties, where ‘’PG NAME’’ is 
governed in accordance with its approved constitution and by-laws.  
2. The seed variety and quantity to be planted is agreed upon by the grower and ‘’PG NAME’’ as recorded 
in the schedule below. 
3. The grower will comply with seed production practices prescribed by technical experts recommended 
by ‘’PG NAME’’.  
4. The grower is responsible for all costs of producing, transporting and financing the seed crop. 
5. Upon harvesting, the grower shall reimburse to ‘’PG NAME’’ XX the amount of seed received for 
planting as specified in the schedule below.  
6. These terms can be renegotiated between the parties to account for unforeseen natural events such 
as floods and droughts that prevent either party from honouring this agreement. 





Quantity of seed received for planting (basket/bags)  
Variety of seed  
Class of seed (certified/registered/stock)  
Approximate area to be planted (acres)  
Expected harvest date  
Expected quantity of seed to be reimbursed to the 















































PG hybrid pig breeding agreement template 
Agreement number: ________________ 
 
“PG NAME” 
Hybrid pig breeding agreement 
 
 
This agreement is between ‘’PG NAME’’ (hereafter referred to as “the producer group”) and “NAME OF 
FARMER” (hereafter referred to as “the farmer”) whose current membership number is “FARMER’S PG 
MEMBERSHIP NUMBER”. The purpose of this agreement is to establish a mutually beneficial business 
relationship between the producer group and the farmer aimed at improving the quality of pigs over the 
period ‘INSERT PERIOD Month, Year to Month, Year’.   
Particulars:    
1. The terms and conditions of this agreement are binding on both parties, where the producer group is 
governed in accordance with its approved constitution and by-laws.  
2. The producer group is satisfied that the farmer meets the eligibility criteria in Section 13 of this 
agreement. 
3. The pig breed, gender, age and weight are agreed upon by the farmer and producer group as recorded 
in the schedule below. 
4. The farmer will comply with the husbandry practices and biosecurity guidelines for pig rearing 
appended to this agreement, and the advice of technical experts recommended by the producer 
group.  
5. The farmer is responsible for all operational costs associated with housing, rearing, breeding and 
transacting of the animal and its offspring. 
6. For each hybrid sow received from, or on behalf of the producer group, the farmer will return XX 
hybrid, weaned and vaccinated piglets of that sow to the producer group per year for the duration of 
this agreement. The weight and gender of the weaned piglet are agreed upon by the farmer and the 
producer group in the schedule below. However, if both parties agree, the farmer may keep all of the 
piglets and refund the producer group the equivalent cash value of the piglets on each annual 
anniversary of this agreement. 
7. For each hybrid boar received from, or on behalf of the producer group, the farmer will return XX 
hybrid, weaned and vaccinated piglets of that boar to the producer group per year for the duration of 
this agreement. The weight and gender of the weaned piglet is agreed upon by the farmer and the 
producer group in the schedule below. However, if both parties agree, the farmer may instead refund 





8. These terms can be renegotiated between the parties to account for unforeseen natural events and 
diseases that prevent either party from honouring this agreement. 
9. If any of the animals recorded in this agreement are infected with disease, the farmer must inform 
the producer group immediately before decisions are taken to sell or cull the animal. Failure to inform 
the producer group may result in the farmer having to refund the PG 100% of the initial value of the 
animal received. 
10. If any of the animals recorded in this agreement are infected with disease, harmed or lost due to 
negligence, the PG may require the farmer to refund 100% of the initial value of the animal received. 
11. Subject to clause 6, 7and 9, the farmer retains the right to transact offspring of hybrid sows and/or 
boars received from the producer group at their own discretion. The farmer also retains the right to 











Ear tag ID number Breed Age Weight Value 
     
     
     
     
     
Ear tag ID number Expected date of first 
farrowing 
Expected date of first weaning 
   
   
   
   
Expected weight of weaned piglets to be repaid  
Gender of piglets to be repaid Males Females 
 
Boar details 
Number of boars 
received 
 Date received: 
Ear tag ID number(s) Breed Age Weight Value 
     
     
     
     







Eligibility criteria checklist 
 
The farmer:  
Is a registered member in a TRRILD project producer group  
Is strongly motivated to raise hybrid pigs  
Has prior experience raising hybrid pigs  
Has satisfactory housing and capacity to raise hybrid pigs  
Has sufficient capital to raise hybrid pigs in accordance with prescribed guidelines   
Implements biosecurity protocols on his or her farm  
Can keep farm records  





























Appendix 1: Biosecurity recommendations to prevent ASF and other animal diseases 
 
Swill feeding:  
- Swill feeding is a very high risk source of disease and should be avoided.  
- If pigs are fed with swill, it must not contain pork, and the swill should be boiled for 30 minutes 
before feeding. 
 
Containment of pigs: 
- Farmers who raise hybrid pigs should ensure that they are housed to minimise contact with other 
domestic, feral, or scavenging pigs.  
- Pig housing should be constructed in a way that facilitates cleaning, and must be kept clean and 
hygienic. 
- Perimeter double fencing is encouraged to prevent the spread of disease.  
- Bush around the pig housing should be cut to improve lighting and reduce mites. 
 
Cleaning and disinfection: 
- Equipment and premises should be cleaned at least three times per week with disinfectant. Effective 
disinfectants include detergents, chlorine, vircon, alkalis, and glutaraldehyde.  
- Pig waste and organic matter must be removed from sheds, equipment, vehicles, etc. before 
disinfecting. Equipment that cannot be easily disinfected should be exposed to sunlight and sprayed 
with detergent mixed in boiling water. 
- Footbaths should be installed at the entrance and exit of the pig housing. 
- Vehicles, equipment, boots, and shoes should be disinfected when people enter and leave the 
premises.  
 
Other biosecurity measures: 
- Visitors to the pig farm should be kept to a minimum. 
- Pigs should be loaded and off-loaded outside the perimeter fences.  
- All incoming pigs should be washed and disinfected outside the perimeter fences.   
- Sharing of equipment among farms/villages is discouraged. Where equipment is shared, the farmer 
should ensure that it is cleaned and disinfected before use.  
- People working with pigs should avoid contact with other pigs. If this happens, workers should wash 
and change into dedicated work clothing and footwear before entering the premises.  
- All replacement breeding stock must come from trusted sources.  
- Effluent and discarded parts of slaughtered pigs, castrations, and farrowed sows should be buried or 
burned to prevent scavenging by feral pigs. 
- All dead animals should be buried or burned away from perimeter fences.  
 
Awareness and surveillance: 
- The farmer should attend training courses that help them to recognise the symptoms of ASF and to 
prevent the spread of ASF and other animal diseases. 
- If a pig shows signs of illness, the farmer must immediately separate it from other pigs and inform 
the nearest AHW or LBVD office. 




Appendix 2: Biosecurity requirements that must be satisfied 
 
No Criteria for checking Requirement 
1. Pig housing, tools, and equipment used in the pigsty 
1 Location   Isolate from residential areas and from drinking water source 
2 Boundary/separation 
• Have a fence to separate the pigsty site from living house and other 
animal housing systems 
• Have the entrance to pigsty with lockable doors 
• Have an antiseptic system (footbath) in front of the entrance 
3 Floor Have no standing water  
4 Roof, walls, blinds  Does not leak and is not drafty  
5 Waste management Have systems to collect and treat solid and liquid waste  
6 Tools and equipment Have separate tools and equipment used for pig production only 
2. Breed 
7 Sources Have clear origins and be fully recorded 
8 Animal health  Be fully vaccinated  
9 Livestock management  
• Raise in quarantine for newly purchased pigs and record information 
(3 days) 
• Keep different litters of pigs separate 
• Do not keep with other animals  
3. Feed 




• Feedstuff must be hygiene, not mouldy 
• Kitchen waste, like leftover food, must be cooked before feeding 
12 Technical requirements 
• Concentrate feed must be mixed in accordance with instructions for 
pig species, ages 
• Complete feed mixture must be marked with stamp 
13 Preservation 
• Feed must be stored on shelves to avoid mould 
• Feed must be packed in sealed bags to avoid spillage 
• Have separate storing place, protect from insects and rodents. 
4. Water 
14 
Water for livestock 
production  
Drinking water/treated water 
15 Waste water Must be processed through a treatment system  
5. Hygiene 
16 
Disinfection of pig 
housing 
• Disinfect entire pig pen 7 days before and after sale 
• Periodically spray disinfectant around the pens  
17 Sanitary of pig housing Daily clean, collect solid and liquid waste 
18 Labor protection 
• Protective equipment and clothing must be regularly cleaned and 
disinfected 
19 
Control of access to pig 
housing 
• Disinfect footwear at entrance and exit of the pig housing 
• Tools and equipment must be disinfected before and after entering 
the pig housing 
20 Vaccination 
• Full vaccination for compulsory vaccination diseases 




21 Veterinary medicine 
• All veterinary medicine, including antibiotics, when purchased and 
used, must follow instructions of an animal health worker   
• Have preservation place for veterinary medicine 
22 Prohibited substances 
Do not use prohibited substances (banned antibiotics, and other 
substances) in pig production 
23 Diseases 
• Immediately notify the authorised agency (LBVD), veterinary or LEW 
when diseases or epidemic occur 
• Keep records on all diseases 
6. Marketing 
24 Selling time 
• After the withdrawal period as prescribed on the label of medicine 
• Pigs are healthy, not sick 
25 Records of sale Adequate records must be provided   
26 Identification Fattening pigs for sale must have ear tags  
7. Environment 
27 Handling of dead pigs 
• Dead pigs must be collected and handled in accordance with the 
stipulations of the veterinary authority (LBVD) 
• Keep record of dead pigs 
28 Inorganic waste 









PO concept note template  
 
A. PG DETAILS 
 This column to be filled out by the directors. 
PG Name:  
PG address village/township:  
Contact name(s) for this 
proposal:  
(Director(s) of the PG 
 
Number of directors   
Contact numbers:  
(Chairman, secretary) 
 
E-mail address of a contact 
person: (if available) 
N/A 






B. PROPOSAL DETAILS 
Proposal description   
Objectives?   
Activity(s)   
What resources are needed 
to achieve the stated 
objectives? 
 
How will the PG finance this 
proposal? 
From members (%)  Loan capital (%) Other (%) 
   
 
C. FINANCIAL DETAILS 






PO-business model canvas template 






















Paddy supply contract template 
Agreement number: ________________ 
 
This agreement is executed between “Insert buyer” (hereafter referred to as “the Miller”) and “PG 
name’’ (hereafter referred to as Producer Group”) from “Insert village location” for the purpose of 
producing high quality “Insert variety(s)” rice for the “Insert year” season.   
Particulars:  
1. The terms and conditions of this agreement are binding on both parties, where - on one side - the 
Miller is represented by “Insert name” as a Director of “Tanintharyi Light Industries Company 
Limited”, and - on the other side - the Producer Group is represented by “insert Chairperson’s 
name”, as Chairperson of “PG name”, a producer group constituted with by-laws approved by its 
members on “Insert date”.  
2. The seed varieties, quantities to be planted and types of fertiliser and pesticide used are agreed 
upon by the Miller and the Producer Group as recorded in the Schedule 1 below. 
3. The Producer Group will coordinate its participating producers (listed in Schedule 4 below) to 
ensure that it supplies the agreed quantity and quality of paddy upon harvesting to the Miller as 
stated in Schedule 1. 
4. Participating producers may not transfer, or trade paddy committed to this agreement with any 
person or organisation other than the Producer Group unless the transaction is approved and 
recorded by the group’s Directors. Similarly, participating producers may not acquire paddy from 
any other person or organisation to meet their obligations to this agreement unless the transaction 
is approved and recorded by the group’s Directors.  
5. The Producer Group will provide the Miller with access to paddy fields listed in Schedule 4 on a 
needs basis for field inspection. 
6. Prior to the planting season, the Miller and the Producer Group will meet to negotiate minimum 
floor prices per basket of paddy in accordance with the variety and quality specifications listed in 
Schedule 2. At this meeting, the Miller and the Producer Group will also agree on the difference in 
prices paid by another commercial miller immediately after the previous harvest for a low quality 
paddy variety (the Reference Variety) and the high quality varieties specified in Schedule 2 of this 
contract.  
7. Subject to Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 6 the Miller will purchase the stated quantity and quality of paddy 
from the Producer Group upon harvesting at the higher of: (a) the relevant floor price specified in 
Schedule 2, OR (b) the price that another commercial miller pays for the Reference Variety 
immediately after this season’s harvest plus a premium at least equal to the agreed and relevant 
price differences specified in Schedule 2.  
8. All payments payable to the Producer Group under this agreement will be deposited to the 
Producer Groups’ bank account at “Insert Bank” account number “insert account number”. 
Payments will be made upon each delivery of paddy to the Miller OR no later than one (1) week 
from the date of delivery. 
9. The Producer Group is responsible for transporting the harvested paddy from one or more 
collection points to the Miller. Participating producers are responsible for transporting harvested 




10. If agreed, the Miller will provide paddy seed, fertiliser, and machinery and transport services to 
the Producer Group in the quantities and at the prices negotiated and recorded in Schedule 3.  
11. Where such inputs and services are provided by the Miller, the associated costs will be recovered 
from each payment made to the Producer Group at a rate pro-rated over the total quantity of 
paddy anticipated by the contract. Any under- or over-recovery will be corrected when payment 
is made for the final delivery. The Producer Group will subsequently apportion these costs to 
participating producers according to their individual use of the inputs and services.  
12. The Producer Group will ensure that its members comply with the husbandry practices prescribed 
by technical experts recommended by the Miller. 
13. These terms can be renegotiated between the parties to account for unforeseen natural events 
such as floods and droughts that prevent either party from honouring this agreement. 
 
Schedule 1: Paddy variety, area, quantity, timing and inputs 
Paddy to be planted 




Quantity expected at 
harvest (baskets) 
Variety 1:     
Variety 2:     
 
Class of seed (certified/ 
registered/stock) 
Variety 1:  
Variety 2:  
Expected planting date 
Variety 1: __ __ / __ __ / __ __ __ __ 
Variety 2: __ __ / __ __ / __ __ __ __ 
Expected harvest date 
Variety 1: __ __ / __ __ / __ __ __ __ 
Variety 2: __ __ / __ __ / __ __ __ __ 
Approved fertilisers  
Approved pesticides  
 









Last season’s price 
at harvest 
(Kyat/basket)  
Agreed price difference at 
last season’s harvest 
(Kyat/basket) 
Variety 1: STK 
13-16 50  (a)  (a)-(e) =  
Variety 2:  
13-16 50  (c)  (c)-(e) =  
Reference variety:  
13-16 50  (e)   
The parties agree that the price paid for paddy delivered under this contract will be reduced by ___% 
if its moisture content exceeds 16%. 
Schedule 3: Inputs and services to be provided by the Miller 








Variety 1:  baskets   
Variety 2: baskets   
 
Fertiliser received Quantity   
Type 1: 50kg bags   
Type 2: 50kg bags   
Land preparation acres   
Harvesting acres   
Transport baskets   
Total cost  
 
Schedule 4: List of producers’ names and designated acreages 
Farmer’s name Membership number Number of acres 
    
    


























































AGM training manual 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) training guide for in-field team and Directors 
 
What is the AGM? Clause 9 
The AGM is the supreme authority of the PG. It is a formal meeting which is held once a year where 
every member has the right to attend and where, other than associate members, are entitled to vote 
on matters that require member approval. The AGM is a legal requirement for PGs that intend to 
formalise their structure as a cooperative or company. The purpose of the AGM is to share the 
following: 
• Summary of the PGs activities over the past year by the BoD 
• Financial report 
• Appointment of committees, nomination, and election of board members 
• Business proposals and motions for consideration 
• Changes to the constitution 
Timing (Section 9.8) 
The first AGM of the PG should be held within one calendar year from the date of constituting the 
PG, and every year thereafter within three months of the PG’s financial year-end. 
 
Board and Committee nominations (Clause 10 and 11) 
 
BOARD 
• The board should comprise no less than five (5) directors and no more than ten (10) 
directors 
• Directors are eligible to serve a three-year term of office commencing from the day of 
election or appointment. They may hold office for no more than three (3) consecutive terms 
before retiring from the Board for at least one (1) year. For the inaugural AGM existing 
directors who wish to continue on the BoD will be reconfirmed by the members. ONLY 
vacant positions on the board will be open for nominations and elections 
• A director will be deemed to have vacated his or her position on the Board if they fail to 
attend three (3) consecutive Board meetings without giving satisfactory explanation to the 
Board within seven (7) days of their absence from the third meeting 
• Members (not including associate members) attending the AGM will nominate and elect 
directors  
• Associate members are not eligible for nomination 
• At least five (5) of the elected directors must be members nominated for election by 
members who are farmers 
• If the membership includes one or more organisations, these strategic partners are entitled 
to nominate no more than four (4) directors for election 
• Elected directors will choose, among themselves, a Chairperson and Vice-chairperson of the 
Board. The procedure to select the Chairperson and Vice-chairperson will be by show of 




• Elected directors may appoint additional directors who are not members of the PG but who 
bring business experience and expertise to the Board. The number of elected and appointed 
directors may not exceed a total of ten (10) 
 
COMMITTEE (section 11) 
• The Board may appoint a coordination committee for key products that it transacts with 
members 
• Coordination committees will comprise of no less than three (3) members and no more than 
five (5) individuals. These committees may include individual experts who are not members of 
the PG 
• Before the election of directors at an AGM, the general meeting (membership, not directors) 
will appoint an election committee. It will be the duty of the election committee to take charge 
of all matters pertaining to elections, nominations, casting and counting votes.  
• Current directors and members nominated for Board membership are not permitted to serve 
on the election committee 
Invitations and notice 
• The Secretary must give the members 14 days advance notice of the AGM (Clause 9.3). Invitation 
must include: 
o Venue, date, and time 
o Agenda  
Conducting the AGM 
The AGM will be conducted by the Chairperson. The secretary will take minutes of the meeting.  
Agenda will include (Clause 9.9): 
o Welcome remarks (Chair/Vice chair) 
o Ascertainment of quorum (Clause 9.4) 
o Take apologies for absence 
o Presentation of activities over the past year (Chair/Secretary) 
o Presentation of financial report 
o Adoption of reports 
o Business proposal or motions for consideration 
o Changes to constitution and by-laws 
o Appointment of committee and nomination and election of directors 
o Any other business 








Agenda Item Who is responsible Description 
Welcome remarks Chair/Vice chair Brief welcome to participants and members. Review of group 
objectives 
Ascertainment of quorum Secretary Headcount of members present. Must be 50% of registered 
members  
Take apologies for absence Secretary Apologies from persons who have been unable to attend are 
read out and recorded by secretary 
Presentation of activities over the past year Chair/Secretary Update on PG activities over the past year (include member 
training, collective action, contracts etc)  
Presentation of financial report Treasurer Overview of financial position (membership fees, group savings, 
expenses, assets, debts, and bank balance) 
Adoption of reports Members Must be proposed by a member and seconded by another 
member 
Business proposal or motions for consideration Chair/Vice Chair PG’s collective plan for the next year  
Changes to constitution and by-laws Chairperson Any changes needed to be made to the constitution 
(introduction of membership fees, shares etc) 
Appointment of committee and nomination and 




• Each individual wishing to stand need to have a proposer 
and seconder 
• Voting for directors (by show of hands or secret ballot) 
Any other business Members/participants Opportunity for members and participants interested in the PG 
to have a say. Should be monitored to ensure it does no go too 
long 
Closing remarks and adjournment. (Must be 




Closing remarks by chairperson (thanking persons for coming) 





Activities for field team before AGM 
Activities Who is responsible Description 
Update membership register CDFs, Directors • Work with directors to review and update membership registers. If there are 
membership fees introduced, persons who are not up to date with payments will be 
considered associate members  
• Need to review the membership register as at a particular date  
Membership ID cards CDF’s (update from NO), 
Directors 
Identification cards for PG members. This is essential to facilitate voting at the AGM 
Training of Directors CDFs, research assistant Research assistant will implement pilot training with 4 PGs. CDFs will be responsible for 
training remaining PG directors in their cluster 
Prepare report of PG activities 
over past year 
CDFs to assist directors to 
prepare report 
Simple report on PG activities over the past year. Most of these activities should be 
recorded in their meeting minute book. Change of PG name 
Update on contracts (seed multiplication, HB demo farm and paddy multiplication), bulk 
purchasing, collective selling, training etc)  
Prepare financial report CDFs (accountant?) to assist 
treasurer to prepare report 
Simple report on finances 
• Amount of money deposited in the bank (ensure that there is no cash in hand) 
• Membership fees collected over the year 
• Total revenue, expenses 
• Assets and debts 
• Value of stock in hand (feed, seeds, pigs etc) 
Prepare invitation notice of 
AGM 
CDFs assist directors Prepare invitation (date, time venue, agenda), ensure that PGs give 14 days’ notice 
Prepare agenda for meeting CDFs assist directors See above. Activities will be more detailed after training of directors 
Prepare business proposal/ 
collective action plan 
CDFs, MF assist directors to 
make a proposal/plan to 
present to members 
Directors presenting the group’s plan to members 
 
 
